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PREFACE 
The purpose of this study is to investigate thoroughly the 
effect of Agesilaos' career on the Greek world from 404 to 377 B.C. 
The usefulness and originality of the study lie partly in its being 
the first comprehensive treatment of the king in more than a century. 
It is also the first to incorporate fully the writings of the 
Oxyrhynchos historian in its presentation of events. Moreover, it 
offers several new interpretations of particular developments and 
trends. 
Because modern historians have limited their works to one 
' aspect or another of Agesilaos' career or have simply written lengthy 
surveys of the epoch, such questions as the nature of politics in 
Sparta, the extent to which Agesilaos and his friends created the 
Spartan hegemony, and the degree to which his designs were opposed 
have not been adequately addressed. This study attempts to bring these 
and other matters into clear and coherent focus. 
A final note: the abbreviations for journal citations which 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION k~D EVALUATION OF THE ANCIENT SOURCES 
Agesilaos II became king at a critical juncture in Spartan 
history. During his long reign (ca. 399-360 B.C.), he witnessed 
both the zenith of Sparta's power and her irreversible decline after 
the battle of Leuktra. The background to his accession,· the unusual 
manner in which it occurred, his highly effective campaign in AsiE! 
~finer, the role he played in the conduct and settlement of the 
Kor:.i.nthian War and his control of Spartan policy in the decade follow-
ing th£: settlement are the subjects of later chapters. First, hm-:-· 
ever, a urief discussion is needed of the ancient evidence upon whit::~· 
~nderst~nding of Agesilaos' influence on Spartan politic~ must rest. 
Epigraphical remains will often clarify aspects of Greek 
militar-y, diplomatic and political life while Agesilaos ,,r:J.s king .1 
Yet with a single exception from the ArteEision at Ephesos there ar.e 
') 
no ancient inscriptions which directly attest to Agesilaos.~ 
Similarly there is no numismatic material bearing on him since th·~ 
1The most convenient collections of these remains are Heiggs 
and Lewis' Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End £f the Fifth 
Centu~~-f., Oxford, 1971, and Tad's Greek Historical Inscriptions, 
VoL 2, Oxford, 1968. Bengtson's Staatsvertrage des Altertums, Vol. 2, 
Munich, 1962, which combines epigraphic and literary material, is also 
a very valuable tool for research: see the bibliography. 
2Borker, "Konig Agesilaos von Sparta und der Artemis-
Tempe! in Ephesos," ZPE 37, 1980, 69-75 and Hesenberg, "Agesilaos 
in Artemision," ZPE 41, 1981, 175-180, discuss the nature and 
significance of this inscription: see also ch. 5. 
1 
Spartans steadfastly refused to mint their o~vn coinage for nearly a 
century after the king's death. 3 Thus knowledge of Agesilaos' life 
2 
and influence must be derived almost exclusively from literary sources. 
Xenophon 
The most extensive contemporary source for t~e king's life 
is the works of his personal friend Xenophon. Of Xenophon's many 
extant works, the Hellenika and his enkomion the Agesilaos are of 
primary importance. Although the enkor~ion preserves biographical 
details of Agesilaos' career, it is more an uncritical eulogy written 
after the king had died, perhaps as a gift to his son Archidamos·. That 
Xenophon used the Hellenika extensively to compose it is clear becaus'=: 
often the description of events in the enkcmion parallels almost 
verbatim corresponding passages of the Hell~nika. 4 The enkomion omits 
3Jenkins, Ancient Greek Coins, New York, 1972, 11, writes 
"In Sparta, in fact, there was a rigid and typically puritanical 
prohibition of the use of coined money which persisted until the 
third century B.C." Nonetheless. on certain occasions the survival 
of coins supplements our knowledge of Spartan policy. Thus, ~vorks 
such as Hill's Greek Historical Coins, Chicago, 1976, and Kraay and 
Eirmer's Greek Coins, New York, 1966, will aid the understanding of 
Sparta-Persian relations from 404-387 and provide evidence of the 
decline of Sparta's influence in the Aegean after the battle of 
Knidos in 394. 
4Lesky, Geschichte der Griechischen Literatur, Munich, 
1971 (3rd ed.), 694, 777, notes that Xenophon used his Hellenika as 
a source for composing the enkomion which, along ~dth Isokrates' 
~uagoras, served as a model for similar works in the future. See 
also Baloch, Griechische Geschichte, Vol. 3.1 (2nd ed.)~ Berlin, 
1927, 401; Ed. Meyer, Geschichte des Altertums, Vol. 4.1 (4th ed.), 
Stuttgart, 1958, 260; and Breitenbach, RE 9A.2, 1671. 
3 
events not reflecting favorably on Agesilaos, 5 yet details not 
preserved elsewhere occasionally occur. The problem of the Hellenika 
is more complex because the work purports to be a general history of 
the Greek world from 411 to 362 B.C. In such a work Agesilaos, 
though prominent, is merely one individual among many whose deeds are 
recorded. It is therefore necessary to consider briefly Xenophon's 
worth as an historian, not as an encomiastic biographer or essayist. 
Several distinct problems emerge almost at once. In the wake 
of Athens' defeat and the excesses of the restored democracy (one of 
which was the execution of his mentor Sokrates), Xenophon adopted 
what became a communis opinio in an age when the Spartans were re-
' I storing ~aTplOl ~OAlT€lal. Many came to look upv~ democracy with 
deep suspicion. It seemed to lead eventually to mob rule and 
tyrannical imperialism which deprived victims of autonomy and free-
dom.6 The victorious Spartans sought to remedy such excesses and 
secure their own hegemony by imposing "ancestral constitutions" •vhich 
were in effect pro-Spartan oligarchies. 
Another influence which affected Xenophon (and Plato for 
that matter) was a growing admiration for monarchy. Xenophon's 
Swestlake, "Individuals in Xenophon's Hellenica," Essays on 
Greek Historians and Greek History, New York, 1969, 222, n.41, observes 
for example that the enkomion makes no allusion to the conflict in Asia 
Minor between Agesilaos and Lysander. 
6Meyer, Vol. 5, 2i3-75; Lesky, 691-93. 
4 
service tdth Kyros the Younger's Greek mercenaries exposed him to a man 
whom he later regarded as a model for the ideal ruler. Kyros the 
Younger apparently embodied many of the virtues which Xenophon would de-
scribe in his imaginary biography of Kyros the Great, the founder of 
the Persian empire. Thus it is important to recall that because of his 
disenchantment with democracy, Xenophon developed this strong under-
7 current of sympathy for monarchic rule. 
A second tendency in the Hellenika is a distinct philolakonian 
bias. While Xenophon is not blind to certain defects of the Spartan 
character and at times takes exception to Spartan conduct, 8 he evinces 
~ generally favorable outlook on the _polis \vhich provided him with his 
Eleian estAte at Skillous. As Grote observed long ago, 9 Xenophon cot>ld 
obtain copious information on Greek politics from pro-Spartan sources, 
while composing his \vork from a Lakedaimonian point of view, because he 
lived only 3.7 km. south of Olympia. 
7
-:..,1eyer, Vol. 5 360• Le k 694 • , ' s y, . 
8For example Xenophon believed that the Spartans had incurred 
divine displeasure for their hybristic seizure of the Kadmeia in 382 B.C. 
~ell. 5.4.1). He also records the wide-spread resentment of Agesilaos' 
campaign against Phlious in 381 (He 11. 5. 3. 16) . 
9 Grote, A History of Greece, London, 1888, Vol. 7, 345. 
Others have also commented on this pro-Spartan perspective; see 
Meyer, Vol. 4.1, 260-61; Lesky, 694; and Bro\vn, The Greek Histor-
ians, Lexington, Mass., 1973, 95,- for example. 
5 
Now that the two most salient traits of the Hellenika have 
been identified, it remains only to estimate Xenophon's worth as an 
historian. In antiquity Xenophon was usually regarded as more the 
philosopher than a historian. He tends to oversimplify and after the 
second book of the Hellenika, his work lacks the coherence of 
perspective from ~.;ithin Sparta itself. 10 In the later books of the 
Hellenika he retA;ns only a certain sympathy for the Spartans. Here his 
deficiencies most clearly emerge. He was unable to discern a pattern 
in the great welter of data before him, presenting only certain somewhat 
disjointed episodes which lent themselves to compelling literary treat-
ment. He entirely neglected the career of Epameinondas until the end 
of the Hel~enika where he only grudgingly admitted that the great Theban 
was a brilliant general. He passed over in silence the Boiotian 
constitution and the changes it underwent after 386. He makes no refer-
ence to the revival of Athens' maritime league in 377 and failed to 
explain the causes and significance of Kinadon's conspiracy at Sparta 
in 398. These omissions lay bare his difficulty in rendering data into 
a coherent and meaningful whole despite his considerable literary 
ability . 11 
Some scholars have judged Xenophon rather harshly. 12 Heyer 
has taken a more balanced approach. He admits that the Hellenika betray 
lOBrown, 96. 
llLesky, 693; Brown, 96. 
12Beloch, 3.1, 401, remarks that "Xenophon's Griechische 
Geschichte ••• ist kaum mehr als eine recht unvollstandige 
much evidence of bias and partiality, but cautions that it \Wuld be a 
mistake in most cases to doubt the reliability of the evidence which 
13 Xenophvn presents. 
On balance then, Xenophon's testimony about Agesilaos must 
he approached with certain things in mind. It i.s necessary to be 
atlare of Xenophon' s monarchic sympathies and qualified pro-Spartan 
perspective. As a friend of Agesilaos he almost always strove to 
6 
present his benefactor in a favorable light. This tendency caused him 
to gloss over or suppress what another author would set forth routinely. 
Finally there is a clearly episodic tone to the Helleni.ka in which 
Xenophon sketches certain details with great literary flair. The work 
nonetheless is marred by serious omissior,.:;, occasional negligence, 
antipathy to Thebes and a lack of thematic and interpretative unity. 
Also because Xenophon abandoned Thucydides' scheme of dividing years 
.into sununer and '-:inter phases after book two, his chronology often is 
14 
vague and confused. 
Although as an historian Xenophon falls short of the stature 
of Herodotus or Thucydides, he is still valuable and the information 
Materialensammlung, die in diese Form 'vahrscheinlich gar nicht zur 
Herausgabe bestimmt war." Hatzfeld, Les Hellefniques de Xenophon, 
Vol. 1, Paris, 1939, 15, wrote that Xenophon lacked the qualities of 
a true historian, grasping as he did only details, not substance. 
See also Jacoby, RE Suppl. 2, 513. 
13M eyer, Vol. 4.1, 263. 
14Breitenbach, RE 9A.2, 1671-72. 
"t.;hi.ch he presents, tvhile incomplete, is usually reliable. 15 
The Oxyrhynchos Historian 
A contemporary of Xenophon who also wrote a continuation of 
Thucydides' work is the as yet unidentified Oxyrhynchos historian, 
usually referred to as P. Some tantalizing problems emerged with the 
ptililication of fragments from this author's work. The consensus is 
that P continued Thucydides' history. 16 It was originally supposed 
that P concluded his history with the battle of Knidos in 394, but 
with the publication of additional fragments in 1949, some scholars 
7 
decided that he carried his account of Greek affairs do~~ to the imposi-
tio.1 of the King's Peace in 386. 17 There is even less agreement about 
the author's identity. Grenfell and Hunt, who discovered the longest 
15Meyer, Vol. 4.1, 263; Beloch 3.1, 401; Lesky, 693; and 
.dro•m, 87. Ivo Bruns, Das Literarische Portr~i'J:. der Griechen in funft~ 
und vierte Jahrhunderts vor Christi Geburt, Hildesheim, 1961 (rep~int 
O'f""1898 edition), 41-42,Writes that Xenophon does not attempt to 
analyze Agesilaos' motives. His descriptions of the king are to draw 
attention to the subject, not the context of events. Bruns also 
remarks, 136-37, that in the enkomion Xenophon presents Agesilaos in 
such a way that the reader can draw his own moral conclusions, a 
tendency which derives from Isokrates. Even less than in the 
Hellenika, however, does Xenophon attempt to analyze Agesilaos' goals 
or mentality. Instead, he presents a mere narrative of events. 
Unlike Thucydides, Xenophon does not ask about a man's absolute worth 
which depends not on moral activity, but rather the forces of nature. 
16 See Jacoby, Fr.Gr.H., ~ol. 2A.2, 6; Ed. Meyer, Theopomps 
Hellenika, Hildesheim, 1965, 88; Laqueur, RE 5A.2, 2193; Ac~ame, 
Ricerche intorno alla guerra corinzia, Naples~ 1951~ 5-6; Bruce, An 
Historical Commentary on the Hellenika Oxyrhynchia, Cambridge, 1967, 
3; Lesky, 700. 
17 See Accame, 5-6; Bruce, 4 and Lesky, 700. 
8 
fragment in 1906, argued for Ephoros. 18 Heyer believed that Theopompos 
of Chios was the most likely candidate. 19 Jacoby believed that Dai.-
machos of Plataia was the best choice because P shows a remarkable know-
20 ledge of Boiotian matters. Kratippos, Diyllos or Androtion have also 
been mentioned as possibilities, 21 but Bruce's suggestion is perhaps 
the best. He belizves that we indeed have the Oxyrhynchos historian's 
name before us, but cannot decide vhich name is the right one for lack 
cf evidence. 22 In any case it is unlikely without further papyrological 
finds that the Verfasserfrage will ever be satisfactorily resolved. 23 
18Grenfell and Hunt, Oxyrhynchus Papyri, Vol. 5, London, 1908, 
142-44. Jacoby convincingly eliminated Ephoros from contention by show-
ing that Ephoros' arrangement KaT~ y(vos (P followed Thucydides' annal-
istic framework) and the fact that he himself used P obviously precluded 
the possibility of Ephoros and P being the sao.e person. See Bloch, 
Abhandlt~ .~ur Griechischen Geschichtschreibung, Leiden, 1956, 319-20. 
19Meyer, Theopomps Hellenika, 17-20. Jacoby in Bloch's 
Abhaudlung, 316, also shatvs that although Theopompos did continue 
Thu,~ydi.des, his pro-Spartan bias, Isokratean style and the fact that he 
•..ras not a source for Ephoros eliminate him from contention. 
20 Jacoby, Fr.Gr._!!., 2A.2, 4-7. 
21Laqueur, RE 5A.2, 2196. Jacoby believes that Kratippos,. 
though he also continued Thucydides, was a poseur 1:vho lived in the first 
century B.C., not a genuine 4th century writer. See Bloch's 
Abhandlung, 329-30. 
22Bruce, 26-27. Bloch, "Studies in Historical Literature of 
the 4th Century B.C.," Athenian Studies, Presented to }i_.~. Ferguson, 
Harvard, 1940, 340-4l,who prefers to leave P anonymous, writes that it 
is best ''not to force the leading historians of the 4th century into the 
Procrustean bed of the Hellenica of Oxyrhynchos." Bloch believes that 
P's work did not survive because the work of his plagiarizer Ephoros 
superseded it, his style was rather dull and, unlike Ptolemy Soter whose 
work lay unused in the Library of Alexandria for centuries, P found no 
Arrian to resurrect him (Bloch, 339-40). 
23That such finds are possible has been shown with the recent 
9 
P has an important bearing on the early phases of Agesilaos' 
reign because he provides a remarkable counterpoint to Xenophon's 
description of the Asian campaign in 395. 24 Adhering to the chronolog-
ical framework of Thucydides, he provides parallel accounts of Konen's 
naval activity, the outbreak of the Korinthian War, and the best 
description of the Boiotian constitution before 386 to survive from 
. . 25 ant~qu~ty. 
Almost at once P came to be regarded rather highly for his 
conception of history. He exhibits an excellent knowledge of 
Anatolian geography, and gives detailed accounts of naval and military 
operations. Also his political analysis evinces superior judgment 
d . . h 26 an ~ns~g t. P is clearly inferior tc Xenophon in literary ability 
as his style is rather plain, but his interpretation of history sur-
passed that of his more renowned Athenian contemporary. 27 He ha~ a 
publication of a fragment of P which deals with events of 409/08 in 
Ephesos. Ludwig Koenen, working in the Cairo Museum, has brought this 
new piece of evidence to light. See Koenen, "Papyrology in the 
Federal Republic of Germany and Fieldwork of the International Photo-
graphic Archive in Cairo," StudPap 15, 1976, 55-67. 
24see ch. 4. 
25Bruce, 157-64. 
26Jacoby, Fr.Gr._!!., 2A.2, 6-7; Laqueur, RE 5A.2, 2197; Neyer, 
TheopomEs Hellenika, 17-20; Walker, The Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, Its 
Authorship~ Authority, Oxford, 1913, 119-20, 132, believed that P 
is superior to Xenophon in matters of operational detail, but falls 
short of the latter's political insight. This opinion is not shared, 
however, by Griffith, "The Greek Historians," 198-99, in Platnauer's 
Fifty Years (and Twelve) of Classical Scholarship, Oxford, 1968 or 
Bruce, 17-20. 
27 See Bruce, 8, 11. 
10 
better grasp of detail and analytical ability than Xenophon. Because 
of the foregoing and his work's central focus, he was one of the most 
reliable writers of history in the ancient world. It therefore is much 
to be regretted that P wrote in an age when rhetorical ornament was more 
important than sober historical analysis. 28 It is likely that his 
bare, rather lapidary style probably doomed his work to eventual 
neglect. 29 
In addition to his limited literary ability, P exhibits an 
occasional weakness despite the generally favorable regard he enjoys. 
For example his preoccupation with military detail often leads him to 
omit or gloss over diplomatic matters. He apparently disapproved of 
the radical Athenian democrats and the Ismenian faction in Thebes. 
In general he manifests a distinct sympathy for oligarchic government 
and a favorable attitude to Sparta. 30 A significant oversight in his 
account of the campaign of 395 is his failure to mention that Agesilaos 
was appointed supreme commander both by land and by sea, the first time 
in Spartan history such a thing had happened. 31 P does, however, offer 
28Griffith, 198-99 and Lesky, 655-56, 689, 699-700. 
29Bruce, 9-10. 
30see Bruce, 10-11. 
3lsee ch. 4. 
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a much more realistic analysis of Agesilaos' Asian campaign than 
Xenophon despite his occasional lapses or omissions. 
Had P's Hellenika come down to us intact, it is almost certain 
that our knowledge of the end of the fifth and beginning of the fourth 
century would be considerably greater than it is. This is especially 
so if Accarr.e's assertion is true that P concluded his work with the 
PeRc~ cf Antalkidas in 386, not as originally supposed, with the battle 
f L" .• d 32 0 ~11 OS. Finally is is important to note that P, ~.;ho was Ephoros' 
source for the years from 411-386 B.C., had an indirect influence on 
Diodorus. 
The Ephoran Tradition of Diodorus 
Anoth2r important source of information about Agesilaos is 
Diodorus Siculus whose work from Book 11 to Book 16 is an epitome of 
E h 33 p oros. Born in Kyme during the first quarter of the fourth century, 
Ephoros began his work sometime after 350 B.C. His was the first 
universal history,34 arranged in part episodically and in part 
geographically. His work in thirty books, beginning with the Dorian 
migrations and ending ~.;ith the life of Philip of Nakedon, 35 strongly 
32 Accame, 5, 17-20. 
33The major study which established the relationship 
between Ephoros and Diodorus' Books 11-16 is Untersuchungen uber die 
Quellen. der Griechische und sizilische Geschichte bei Diodor XI-XVI, 
Kiel, 1868. See also Jacoby, Fr.Gr.ft., lA.l, no. 70 and 2A.2, 22-27. 
34Lesky, 701. 
35Book 30 detailing the life of Philip was completed by his 
12 
reflects the "rhetorical" tradition of his teacher Isokrates. The 
Isokratean vie•..r of history, \vhich ultimately came to prevail, was that 
it should be the handrnaiden of politics. 36 Despite his penchant for 
moral pronouncements, his work lacked political passion and human 
warmth 'tvhich made him quite distinct from his contemporaries 
Theopompos of Chios and Kallisthenes of Olynthos. 37 Unlike the 
Ionians, Ephoros had little interest in geography, nAtural science 
and the human condition. His work is a universal history of the Greek 
p~ople at home and in the colonies which induced him to discuss barbarian 
events. Yet barbarian matters did not concern him ~ se_, but only as 
they affected the Greek world. Because of his lack of int"rest in other 
lands he was the fil·st historian to separate .:ompletely geography from 
its historical context, describing it in Bks. 4 and 5, but largely 
neglecting it later. 38 Since his work spanned 700 years. dealing with 
matters all over the Greek world, he \?as compelled to choose a thematic 
son Demophilos; see Lesky, 701. 
36 . Finley, The Use and Abuse of H~story, New York, 1975, 30-
31, 33 observes that, for the ancient Greeks and Romans, historiography 
was contemporary; the distant past was nearly irrelevant except for a 
general sketch. Information about remote periods, the Dorian migra-
tions for example, was even scantier for Ephoros than for the modern 
author who has at least the archaeological remains with which to work. 
Thus the chief purpose of non-contemporary historiography had become 
to serve up moral paradigms by the mid-fourth century B.C. Jacoby, 
Fr.Gr.H., lA.l, no. 70 and 2A.2, 22-27. 
37Jacoby, Fr.Gr.~. 2A.2, 23. 
38Jacoby, 25. 
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arrangement in contrast to Thucydides' annalistic approach, which is 
suitable only for war mongraphs. 39 His work which lacked Thucydides' 
intellectual incisiveness, resembled that of Hellanikos or Herodotus, 
though inferior to the latter in literary merit. 40 On balance, then, 
Ephoros succeeded rather well in giving his work a unifying focus amass-
ing a great deal of information, and clearly distinguishing the vague 
unreliable tales of the mythical period from the much more ascertainable 
data of the recent past. His weaknesses were that he was somewhat defi-
cient in critical faculties and his work is ·marred by a dull, heavy-hand-
ed moralism. His work is not as strongly biased as Xenophon's or 
Plutarch's Agesilaos despite a mildly pro-Athenian cast and a tinge 
of chauvinism for his native Kyme. What he reports of the early fourth 
century through his epitomizer Diodorus, therefore, will often supplement 
or correct information missing or distorted in Xenophon and Plutarch.41 
Diodorus' history is a universalist compilation written in the 
first century B.C. which presents Greek and Roman history in the form of 
42 
synchronistic annals. Diodorus gathered material for his work frvm a 
39Jacoby, 27. 
40Brown, 109 and Lesky, 701. 
4lsee Schwarz, RE 6.1, 15-16; Brown, 114-15; Jacoby, 28; and 
Barber, The Historian Ephoros, Cambridge, 1935, 105, who notes that 
some of Ephoros' weaknesses stem from the fact that "he lived in an 
age when the pragmatic historian was also a rhetorician." In antiquity 
Polybios (12.28.10) generally assessed him favorably as a historian. 
42Lesky, 871. 
variety of different authors, but as noted earlier, for Agesilaos' 
lifetime, his ~vcrk is an epitome of Ephoros. 43 In general Diodorus 1 
value depends upon the reliability of his source, since he merely 
summarized the author he happened to be reading at the time. His work 
j.;; flm.;ed by carelessness, poor critical judgment, confused chronology 
and lack of central intellectual focus. The chief value of his 
/ R~BAto8nKn is that it preserves fragments of better historians and an 
oc~asional bit of information not available elsewhere. 44 
For the career of Agesilaos, Diodorus is important beca~se 
the Ephoran tradition which he preserves is often at variance with that 
of Xenophon and Plutarch. There are for example many discrepancies 
ia ~.;h~t thE thre~ authors \·r:rite of Agesilaos 1 campaign in Asia Hiner, 
the liberation of Thebes and Agesilaos' reaction to it. 45 Therefore 
despite the many flaws and \.reaknesses in his rambling compendium, 
Diodorus at times provides insight into aspects of Agesilaos' life 
46 
w·hich other authors have neglected or suppressed. 
43see note 33. 
44Beloch 2. 2, 26, believed that Diodorus \vas important be-
cause he has preserved a more or less continuous history of the Greek 
west. Meyer, 4.1, 237, 265, writes that his careless and imprecise 
annalistic arrangement has often produced great chronological confusion 
and outright error. 
45For details see chs. 4, 8 and 9. 
46Judgments of Diodorus' general worth are not especially 
favorable. ~Vhile not dismissing him out of hand, Schwarz, RE 5.1, 
663, states "ein Werk kann man das Buch nicht nennen." Rose; A Handbook 
of Greek Literature, Ne~v York, 1960, 412, preserves Macauley's-even 
harsher assessment that he was "a stupid, credulous, posing old ass." 
Rose goes on to say, "and it goes without saying that the best which 
Plutarch 
After Xenophon the most extensive source for the career of 
Agesilaos is Plutarch, especially his biography the Agesilaos. 
Although Plutarch's fame derives chiefly from his biographies, 47 one 
should resist the impulse to include him in the ranks of ancient 
historians for the following reasons. First one of his major traits 
is an interest in antiquarian material. This leads to the various 
15 
collections of anecdotes which have little or no central purpose other 
than their amusing quaintness. These collections were common in 
Hellenistic times and the early principate, 48 but as such they are not 
connected history. Also Plutarch's secondary aim in writing the• 
biographies in pairs was to preserve Greek tradition in a world where 
Roman might had long since subsumed Greece politically. 49 Nonetheless 
Plutarch strove to show underlying similarities in the two cultures, 
especially as Rome had adopted much of the Greek intellectual and 
can be expected of him is that he will copy his authorities correctly 
and arrange events under the right dates so far as he knows them. His 
book is a mine in which to dig for fragments of better works. If we 
had the older historians, no one would read him." Lesky, 842, 




49Plutarch composed his biographies in the second half of 
the first century a.d. See Lesky, 922-23. 
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artistic tradition. His purpose was to reconcile Greece and Rome 
by highlighting similarities in their greatest historical figures. 50 
Finally his major purpose was to exemplify private virtue (or vice) in 
the careers of great men. This leads to an emphasis on the subject's 
education, personal manners and lifestyle tvitll a heavy reliance on 
anecdotal material. 51 He tells us himself that his object is not to 
write history, but rather to reveal 52 Ta Tns ~xns crn~c::1a. He 
is, therefore, not primarily interested in analytic history which seeks 
th2 causes and explanation for events and trends as part of nature, but 
rather he seeks to portray great figures as their many small deeds 
reveal them. 53 This moralistic influence on his purpose and nianner 
of cvmposition is traceable to Isokrates' Euagoras and Xenophon's 
The ?)eos of the subject is revealed by his npai;C::lS 
That certain traits and similar situations can recur makes possible the 
vari.ous which Plutarch appends to each parallel pair. 
Nonetheless many of these comparisons are some~vhat forced and today they 
are regarded as largely ineffectual. 55 
Oxford, 
50Lesky, 923; Ziegler, RE 21.1, 
51 Lesky, 922; Ziegler, RE 21.1, 
1970, 849. 
52 Plut. Alex. 1. 2-3. 
53 Lesky, 922. 
54
ziegler, RE 21.1, 905-08. 
55 Lesky, 923. 
899-901. 
909; Russell, OCD, 2nd Ed., 
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In composing the Agesilaos, Plutarch drew upon several 
sources for information, but relied most heavily on Xenophon. There 
is, nonetheless, information in Plutarch's biography which cannot have 
come from the writings of Xenophon. Plutarch refers directly to 
Theopcmpos of Chios and obliquely to Ephoros of Kyme in the Agesilaos. 56 
From this testimony and comparison of other passages in the biography 
with fragments of these two fourth-century writers, it is clear that 
Plutarch had their works before him while writing the Agesilaos. 57 
By the same technique the influence of Kallisthenes of Olynthos is 
also discernible in Plutarch's narrative fabric. 58 By consulting these 
authors Plutarch occasionally expanded on Xenophon's version of events, 
but only rarely contradicted his chief source. 59 
In addition to these authors Plutarch also drew upon his own 
collection of anecdotes in a section of the Moralia known as the 
Apothegmata to compose the biography. It is likely that Plutarch 
compiled these anecdotes to serve as notes for the composition of all 
56Plut. Ages. 10, 30 respectively. 
57
nippel, Quae ratio intercedat inter Xenophontis historiam 
Graecam et Plutarchi vitas quaeritur, Diss. Gissae, 1898, 76-77, 90-91. 
58nippel, 116. 
59D1'ppel, 115-16,· ~1 V 1 ~ 195 96 J b F G H .eyer, o • . - ; aco y, _£._£._. 
2B.l, 357-58; and Ziegler, RE 21.1, 905-08 also discuss the influence 
of Theopompos on the composition of Plutarch's Agesilaos. Jacoby, RE 
11.2, 2069, observes that Ktesias of Knidos, court physician to 
Artaxerxes, influenced Plutarch's biography of Artaxerxes and was also a 
source for his writings about Greeks who had extensive contact with the 
Persian empire, including Agesilaos. 
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b . h" 60 his 1ograp 1es. By themselves the Apothegmata most closely resemble 
the genre of Sammlungen represented by Aelian's Varia Historia. t~bile 
the Apothegmata cannot be regarded in any sense as connected history, 
they often furnish useful information not elset.;here available. 61 
The Strategemata of Frontinus and Polyainos 
Another type of Samml,mg which has a bearing on the life of 
Agesilaos is the Strategemata. Frontinus, who lived in the first cen-
tury a.d., wrote series of military reminiscences arranged by type of 
operation. Although his work includes famous Greek commanders, most 
of the stories concern Romans. It is unfortunate that he did not pre-
serve more episodes from Agesilaos' career, because not only his arrange-
ment of material, but his judgment in selecting it greatly exceeds that 
of Polyainos who wrote a century later. 62 
Polyainos, a :Hakedonian by birth, compiled a similar -:.;ark which 
he dedicated to the Roman emperors Lucius Verus and Harcus Aurelius. 
Unlike Frontinus~who was a man of considerable military experience, it 
is quite evident that Polyainos was primarily a rhetorician.63 Although 
60see Ziegler, RE 21.1, 905-08 and Lesky, 921-22. 
6lziegler, RE 21.1, 863-65. 
Plutarch's collectio;-preserves more 
Alexander or Caesar. 
It is interesting to note that 
stories about Agesilaos than even 
62 . . See Bayet, Litterature Lat~ne, Paris, 1965, 359; Rose, 
A Handbook of Latin Literature, New York, 1960, 435; Kappelmacher, 
iE 10.1, 591-605. 
63Lesky, 952, so describes him and deems his collection quasi-
historische. 
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he had access to Thucydides, Ephoros, Theopompos and others, he 
exercised little or no judgment in the selection of examples. He 
arranged his material in chronological order by individual commander, 
though his information is only as good as his sources. At times 
Polyainos' anecdotes offer important insight into events and person-
alities, but his carelessness and credulity too often make them mis-
leading or even worthless. 64 
The Attic Orators 
Of the rhetoricians in Athens, the three who shed the most 
light on aspects of Spartan policy from Athens' defeat in 404 to the 
revival of her naval alliance in 378/77 are Isokrates, Lysias and 
Andokides. ' " ' The latter is important because his speech TIEpl 1ns TIPOS 
/ > I AaKsoat~ovtous stpnvns is the only source attesting directly to a 
second peace conference in 392. The first occurred in Sardis and in-
valved both Greeks and Persians, but the second some months later in 
Sparta had only Greek participants. Andokides was one of the legates 
who pled the cause of ending the Korinthian War, but his plea was un-
successful and the irate Athenians forced him into exile for the 
second time. His speech highlights the differing aims of groups in 
both Sparta and Athens, including that of Agesilaos. 65 
64 Lammert, RE 21.2, 1432-36; Rose, A Handbook of Greek 
Literature, 394; Lesky, 952. 
65see Lesky, 403 and ch. 5 for detailed analysis of the 
events in 392. 
' ),., t' Lysias' speech KaTa cpaToaesvous starkly and dramatically 
reveals the excesses of Lysander's small cliques of extremist 
oligarchs. In many areas of the Greek world after 404 B.C. the 
Spartans tacitly supported these cliques in the name of restoring 
I I 
naTPlOl TIOAlTElal . \ ) I This speech and the KaTa AyopaTOU help make 
plain the serious decline in Sparta's prestige as liberator of Hellas 
and the anti-Spartan resentment which eventually led to the outbreak 
20 
of the Korinthian war in 395.66 Also important for grasping the partial 
revival of Spartan prestige after the Korinthian War is Lysias' frag-
mentary oration, the Olympiakos which was probably delivered in 384. 67 
Most interesting is the strong contrast in tone between the 
attitude expressed about the Spartans in Lysias' Olympiakos and 
Isokrates1 Panegyrikos which was written for the Olympiad of 380. 
Although Agesilaos is nowhere mentioned by name, the Spartan policy 
of which he was architect after 386 is bitterly denounced. Besides the 
tone of the work, the oration also provides many scattered, but useful 
bits of information about Spartan policy over a 25-year span. 68 
In a sense the Panegyrikos is a more developed expression of 
66see Lesky, 666 and ch. 2 for details. 
67Lesky, 666. 
date (388 is possible), 
See also ch. 7. 
Although there is some question about its 
the Olympiad of 384 seems the better choice. 
68see Lesky, 656-57. 
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sentiments originating in the immediate aftermath of the King's Peace 
of 387/86. In his rrsp~ s?pnvns Isokrates laments the overweening 
influence of foreign po\vers (i.e. the Persians) in Greek affairs, an 
influence to which the Spartans and Agesilaos had acquiesced. In 
his letter to Archidamos, Agesilaos' son, lsokrates expresses admira-
tion for Agesilaos, but points out a certain inconsistency in his 
policy toward other Greeks in the king's long reign.69 Isokrates' 
Harks are thus a minor, but important source for kno,,rledge of 
Agesilaos' career, not only for the information contained in them, but 
also because they shmv the shifting attitudes of other Greeks to the 
Spartans avet'a long period of time. Also his encomiastic tribute to 
Euagoras, Kypriote king and long-standing ally of Athens, influenced, as 
did Xenophon's eulogy of Agesilaos, all subsequent Greek biographical 
writing. 70 
Cornelius Nepos and Justin's EPitome of Pompeius Tragus 
·Apart from Frontinus, there are t~vo Latin authors whose works 
occasionally touch on the life of Agesilaos. The first is 
Cornelius Nepos, a contemporary of Cicero, whose compendium 
69see ch. 7 and Lesky, 656-61. 
70
see Lesky, 658 and note 4. The notion that Isokrates' 
letter to Philip of Makedon was a redac·tion of an earlier epistle to 
Agesilaos has now been discredited. See Blass, Die Attische Beredsam-
keit, Vol. 2, Berlin, 1874, 89, 293 and Norlin, ISOkrates, Loeb Ed., 
Vol. 1, XL The reason for rejecting such a view is the strong anti-
Spartan tone of the Partegyrikos which was composed at the height of 
Agesilaos' power and influence. There is, in the writings of Isokrates, 
an admiration for Agesilaos as a man, but marked ambiguity about his 
purpose and policies. 
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of sketches of famous foreign leaders (de excellentibus ducibus 
exterarum gentium) contains a synopsis of Agesilaos' career. These 
rhetorical exercises,which rely on matters of education, personal 
manners, and major events in the subject's life,are much more 
anecdotal than analytical. Nepos' synopses represented an early 
culmination in Latin letter3 of the Hellenistic tradition which found 
its fullest and most charming expressi0~ i~ the Parallel Lives of 
Plutarch. 71 Although Nepos is little more than a popularizer of 
doubtful skill whose style is dull or pretentious, his sketches of 
Agesilaos and other Greek leaders of the fourth century are not 
entirely without merit. 72 Although his work traces only the barest 
outlines of his subjects' lives, Nepos' biographies sometimes afford 
glimpses of Spartan policy or an aspect of Agesilaos' career not 
preserved elsewhere. 
The final ancient author whose work occasionally sheds light 
on Agesilaos is M. Iunianus Iustinus who epitomized the histories of 
Pompeius Tragus. Tragus wrote in the latter half of the first 
century B.C. His universal history in forty-four books had for its 
central focus the Makedonian conquest and the spread of Greek 
civilization especially to Rome and the west. He evidently exercised 
considerable care and good judgment in the selection of his material , 
71see Lesky, 920-23. 
72Bayet, 177-78 and Rose, A Handbook of Latin Literature, 
208-09. 
eschewing rhetorical devices to present an analytical rendition of 
fact. 73 
23 
Much like Diodorus who synopsised large portions of Ephoros' 
work, Justin has preserved the histories of Trogus in epitome. Un-
fortunately while Justin's work is at times valuable for the information 
it contains, it does not exhibit anything approaching the apparent good 
historical sense of Trogus' original. In addition to providing only a 
"sampling" of his model, Justin, by eliminating everything which had no 
dramatic or moral interest, robbed his own work of a unifying focus. 
Despite his occasional flair for detail and mastery of basic rhetorical 
technique, Justin's compilation is stylistically and historically little 
better than mediocre. 74 
With the discussion of Justin's Epitome of Trogus, the brief 
survey of the ancient sources dealing either directly or obliquely with 
Agesilaos is complete. How these sources illuminate the aftermath of 
the Peloponnesian War and the events immediately preceding Agesilaos' 
accession is the next matter for investigation. 
73Bayet, 292; Rose, A Handbook of Latin Literature, 312. 
74Bayet, 420; Rose, A Handbook of Latin Literature, 312-13. 
CHAPTER II 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO AGESILAOS' ASIAN CANPAIGN 
Before considering the Spartan campaign in Asia (396-394), it 
will be necessary to review briefly the course of events from the 
close of the Peloponnesian Har in 404 to the decision to mount the 
expedition in 397. Although a detailed analysis is not needed, some 
discussion of the relations among the Gre.ek states and the major thrusts 
of Spartan policy in these years will be helpful. The first sections of 
this chapter ~.;ill deal with the Spartans' treatment of the Greeks of 
Asia a!'ld the Aegean. In the next, the focus Hill be on her relations 
·tdth the members of her Peloponnesian alliance and other poleis on the 
mainland. The final section ~vill be a review of her dealings with the 
Persians. 
What the role of the Spartans in Greek affairs after the \var •vith 
Athens might have been and how it actually developed is given e sad, 
and perhaps intentional, irony in Thucydides. The occasion was 
Alkibiades' address to the Spartan assembly Capella) in 414. In the 
speech, 1 he urged his listeners to come to the aid of the beleaguered 
\ .. 
Syracusans and concluded his plea with the following words: KU1 ~ETa 
1 (6.92.5), see Gomme and Dover, An Historical Commentary on 
Thucydides, Vol. 4, Oxford, 1956-81, 366, who observe that the rule of 
an dpxnby force is the norm. To rule by good will alone would be a 
rarely achieved ideal. Alkibiades' plea here is compared with that of 
the Theban embassy to Athens in 395 (Xen. Hell. 3.5.14). 
24 
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\ J / )/ ( "' Kal ou S1a KaT'EuvolaV nyna8E. 
I. 
After the surrender of the Athenians in 404, Alkibiades' predic-
tion proved to be only partially correct. Sparta indeed ruled all Hellas 
in relative security, but only by relying on force and with little good 
will on the part of her subjects by the time Agesilaos departed for Asia. 
With the collapse of Athenian resi.:;L.ci.uce in the spring of 404, Agis with-
drew the allied army from Dekeleia and dismissed the several contingents 
to their native cities. At the same time, Lysander set sail to Samos to 
suppress the last pocket of resistance to the Peloponnesian victory. 
After the Athenians' defeat at Aigospotamoi, the Samians al9ne refused 
to desert them and actually rose up to massacre their oligarchic 
leaders. The response of the grateful Athenians is preserved in an 
inscription which praises the loyalty of the Samian demos and grants them 
citizenship. 2 Upon arriving in Samos, Lysander laid siege to the demo-
cratic defenders who had refused his terms. Faced with the overwhelming 
superiority of the allied forces, the Samians eventually capitulated 
without a struggle on the following terms: each person was to leave the 
island with only one cloak; all else was to remain behind; the oligarchic 
faction would be restored and Lysander would choose ten from their 
number to form the government. This was the first of the notorious 
dekarchies to be installed after the conclusion of the general peace. 
The activity of Lysander was not confined, however, to the suppression of 
2
xen. Hell. 2.2.6; Tod, Greek Historical Inscriptions, Vol. 1, 
no. 96, 231-34, Oxford, 1946, and Meiggs and Lewis, Greek Historical In-
scriptions to the End £i the Fifth Century B.C., no. 94, 283-87, Oxford, 
1969. 
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the democrats on Samos. At this time the Spartans were busily engaged 
in the dispersal or forced expatriation of Athenian klerouchs from 
Euboia, Lesbos, Naxos, Helos, Histiaia, Skione, Torone, Poteidaia and 
3 elsewhere. The purpose of this, of course, was to complete the 
:> / 
extinction of all vestiges of Athens' maritime apxn. 
The nature of Spartan policy and the manner in which she sought 
to implement it throughout the Greek world have been examined in ~~tail 
in two major studies. 4 These studies and evidence from antiquity show 
that Sparta's relations with the Greeks rested on three bases. The 
first was a system of harmosts and garrisons, the second, that of 
Lysander's forced oligarchies which the ephors later modified to rraTp101 
TIOA1TE1al, and, finally, an abrasive and intimidating diplomacy against 
both allies and adversaries not under her military supervision. 5 
Sparta undertook these harsh measures for a number of reasons. 
6 First, the male Spartiates numbered only about 4,000. These homoioi 
ruled over perhaps 250,000 to 300,000 people in Lakedaimon and Messenia 
"7 
and held sway over as many as two or three million.' Second, the 
3A wealth of literary and inscriptional evidence attests to the 
extent of the Spartans' efforts in this regard: Xen. Hell. 2.2.9; Plut. 
Lys. 14, Diod. 14.10.1. See also Tod, GHI, nos. 94 and 95, and Meyer, 
Geschichte des Altertums, Vol. 5, 6, Stuttgart, 1958. 
4cavaignac, "Les Dekarchies de Lysandre," Rev. Et. Hist. 90, 1924, 
285-316 and Parke, "The Development of the Second Spartan Empire, JHS 50, 
1930, 37-79. 
5For a very clear formulation of this in antiquity, see Herodes 
764A. 
6see Meyer, Vol. 4.1, 440, n. 1. 
7Beloch, Griechische Geschichte, Vol. 3.1, 307-13. 
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Spartans lacked economic contacts and did not mint their o~vn money. 
Individual Spartans were actually forbidden to own precious metals, and 
those who were caught with such in their possession could face the death 
8 penalty. For ordinary commerce between themselves, they relied on 
"leather coins," and, for exchange with the rest of the -vwrld, they used 
9 the monies of Persia, Aigina and Athens. A third reason was that Sparta 
had little experience in dealing with political systems different from 
her own. Finally, the Spartans relied heavily on the good will of at 
least two foreign powers, the Persians and Syracusans. If one bears 
these things in mind, the direction of her foreign policy becomes readily 
explicable. 
After Lysander had reduced Samos, installed a dekarchy, uprooted 
the Athenian klerouchies and resettled the natives whom the Athenians 
had displaced, he dispersed the various allied contingents to their 
native cities. He then took all but twelve triremes captured in the 
Peiraeus back to Lakedaimon. With these, he brought the crowns awarded to 
him by the various cities, 470 talents left from the money assigned by 
Kyros for prosecuting the war and all other booty. ~foreover, he had in-
stituted a system of tribute which would bring the Lakedaimonians an 
annual revenue of 1,000 talents. He delivered all of the foregoing at 
10 
the end of the summer of 404. 
8Aristotle, Pol. 1269-70; Xen. Lak. Pol. 7, 14-15: Aelian V.H. 
14.29; Plut. Lyk. 30. 
9 Xen. Lak. Pol. 7.6 and Meyer, Vol. 5, 24-25 with notes. 
10niod. 14.10.2; Xen. Hell. 2.3.8-9. 
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In 405/04, Lysander established a series of dekarchies throughout 
that part of the Greek world formerly subject to Athens. 11 The members 
of these governments in each case were drawn from the oligarch clubs. 
C I Cavaignac supposes that the members of these £Talplal were of the same 
approximate age, shared a common interest in art, music and politics, and 
had banded together to protect themselves from the excesses of the extreme 
12 democrats. ~~~i~ numbers were usually small, ranging from perhaps 
twenty to thirty. They were drawn from the aristocracy and wealthy 
mercantile class whose interests were best served by social stability and 
peace. Many of them had participated in the Ionian defections from 
Athens in 412/11. They had attempted to force oligarchic governments on 
their cities in the hope of suing for peace with Sparta. After the battle 
of Kyzikos in 410, however, many of these club members were forced into 
exile. Eventually they found refuge with the satraps or the Spartans. 
They later became ardent supporters of Lysander at his headquarters in 
Ephesos from 407 to the end of the war. 13 
We can be certain that it was from their ranks that Lysander 
created the dekarchies. Although ancient authors referred to them only 
in general terms, 14 Cavaignac believes that we can recover at least some 
of their names by considering the victory monument dedicated to Pythian 




e.g. Diodorus 13.70 and Plut. Lys. 5.3. 
mentions Charmides, son of Glaukon, as one of the 
the Peiraeus while the thirty ruled in Athens. 
Xenophon (Hell. 2.4.19) 
ten who held sway in 
29 
Apollo by Lysander in honor of his triumph over the Athenian navy at 
Aigospotamoi. This monument lists the allied navarchs who aided in the 
Athenians' defeat. From it we might deduce a partial inventory of the 
dekarchs who ruled in Asia Minor and the islands after the Pelopon-
nesians' triumph. The names appearing on the monument are those of the 
commanders from the Dorian islands, such as Melos and Rhodes, and the 
Ionian poleis, like Miletos, Ephesos and Chios. An examination of the 
epigraphic evidence and Pausanias will reveal the names of a few of 
these characters who later became dekarchs. 15 Cavaignac's supposition, 
of course, is that Lysander would likely have assigned those who 
supported him in war to positions of authority in their native cities 
in peacetime. 16 
Not all of Lysander's undertakings in 405/04 were narrowly 
partisan or destined to incur the outrage of the Greek world. There 
apparently was widespread approval of his measures to restore the 
Aiginetans, Melians, Skionians and others to their native lands. The 
Athenians had uprooted and expelled all of these peoples during the 
Peloponnesian War.l7 
Still on the whole the reaction of most Greeks was one of 
bitter disappointment. They quickly perceived that public affairs were 
15see Tod, GHI, Vol. 1, nos. 94/95, and Meiggs and Lewis, GHI, 
no. 95 for a complete-listing from the 13 marble fragments recovered at 
Delphi. Pausanias (10.9.7-10) lists some names which are now lost from 
the inscriptions. 
16cavaignac, 300. 
17Plut. Lys. 14.3. 
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to be in the hands of the most ambitious and violent of Lysander's 
partisans to the exclusion of all others. 18 The story was told of the 
Spartans who, like mischievous barmaids, gave the Greeks a sip of the 
sweet wine of freedom, only to dash it with the bitter vinegar of 
. d 19 serv:J.tu e. On the eve of Leuktra, Autokles, a delegate from Athens 
to the peace conference at Sparta, recited a catalogue of Spartan 
abuses after their victory in 404. 20 The Spartans, he said, were the 
greatest obstacle to autonomy despite their vaunted advocacy of it. 
They compelled submission from their allies, even forcing them to make 
war on cities with which they enjoyed friendly relations. They set up 
odious governments of ten or thirty to support Spartan policy without 
question. Finally, he accused the Spartans of securing their aims by 
force (the ubiquitous harmosts and garrisons), not by law, thereby 
making a mockery of their slogan "freedom for the Greeks," and showing 
themselves in truth to be the champions of despotism. 
In 403/402, there were two developments which illustrate the drift 
of Spartan foreign policy and the impact of changed conditions on her 
society. The first occurred during the civil strife in Attika when the 
thirty tyrants had appealed from Eleusis to Lakedaimon for aid against 
both Thrasyboulos' democrats in the Peiraeus and the moderate oligarchs 
who held the city. Lysander was initially given command of the army and 
his brother Libys was made navarch to cut off the Peiraeus by land and 
18.b'd l. l. • 13.4-5. 
19ibid. 13. 6. 
20
xen. Hell. 6.3.7-8. 
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sea. King Pausanias, however, persuaded three of the five ephors to 
raise another army. He did so to counter the self-serving interests 
of Lysander (whose creatures the thirty were) and to achieve a more 
equitable settlement. Pausanias relieved Lysander and eventually 
brought off a compromise whereby the democrats and moderate oligarchs 
were reconciled. The remnants of the thirty and their supporters 
~eceded from Attika and created a separate state in Eleusis. They were 
eventually attacked and killed at a peace conference in 401, and Attika 
once again became a single political entity. The important thing, how-
ever, is that Lysander's power and influence at Sparta suffered a major 
setback because of internal political opposition. As subsequent events 
would show, Pausanias may have been the leader of a conservative and 
traditionalist faction. The aims of this group were two-fold: they 
wished to curtail drastically adventurism beyond the Peloponnesos and to 
uphold uns~ervingly the Lykourgan politeia. 21 
Pausanias (3.5.2) preserves further evidence of internal political 
wrangling at Sparta. He records that the enemies of King Pausanias 
brought him to trial upon his return from Attika. Cavaignac points out 
that these were the supporters of Lysander who did so in order that their 
1 d • h II • • 1 I d • 1 • , h • !1 22 ea er m1g t ressa1s1r ascen ant qu1 u1 ec appa1t. Although Agis, 
the other king and once a friend of Lysander, may have sympathized with 




Pausanias' efforts to curb the famous navarch, he voted with fourteen 
of the twenty-eight / YEPOVTES 23 to condemn his colleague. That 
Lysander's influence was on the wane, however, is indicated by the fact 
/ 
that Pausanias was absolved. Although fourteen of the YEPOVTES and 
Agis had voted against him, the other fourteen and all five of the ephors 
had voted to acquit. 
In the fall of 403, after his chastisement in Attika and the 
acquittal of Pausanias, Lysander set out for Asia at the ephors' behest. 
He clearly intended to strengthen the hand of his supporters in the Greek 
24 
cities, the various dekarchs. Many cities, perhaps heartened by the 
acquittal of the conciliatory Pausanias, sent delegations to Sparta to 
complain of the highhandtdness of Lysander's creatures. Finally, 
Pharnabazos, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, perceived an opportunity 
to take advantage of turmoil in the Greek cities of Asia and wrote a 
letter to the ephors in which he protested the policies and conduct of 
Lysander. Fearing for his position, Lysander attempted to win over the 
satrap with blandishments. He pleaded with the hostile Pharnabazos to 
send another letter withdrawing the accusations of the first. 
Pharnabazos agreed and even showed Lysander the conciliatory epistle. 
The wily satrap, though, had secretly ?enned yet a third letter in which 
23Rahe, Lysander and the Spartan Settlement, 407-403 B.C., Diss. 
Yale, 1977, 19-22, suggests that Agis, who greatly advanced Lysander's 
career, may have withdrawn his support by the time of Pausanias' incur-
sion into Attika. The reason would be that both kings may have feared 
the navarch's vaunting ambition and his appetite for power. 
24
xenophon passes over this episode in silence and Plutarch (Lys. 
19-21) erroneously places it before his command in Attika. See Grote, A 
History of Greece, Vol. 7, 372, n.2; Meyer, Vol. 5, 41, n.l; Beloch, 3.l, 
16, n.l. 
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he repeated the accusations of the first. The ephors had summoned 
Lysander to answer the many charges and, with what he believed was 
Pharnabazos' letter of retraction, he departed for Lakedaimon. When he 
arrived, however, he was removed from command and became a laughing-
stock upon the ephors' receipt of the satrap's letter. Pharnabazos had 
deviously substituted the inflammatory third letter for the second when 
. . 25 he aff1xed h1s seal. 
At the same time, Lysander's friend Thorax, harmost of Samos, was 
tried on a charge of possessing private money. He was recalled, convicted 
and executed by the strict Lykourgan rhetra which forbade private owner-
h . f . 1 26 s 1p o any prec1ous meta s. In addition, other Lysandrians such as 
Derkylidas, harmost of Abydos, and Klearchos, who had repla~ed Sthenelaos 
as harmost of Byzantion, were recalled. 27 
The affair of Klearchos is interesting in that it shows the effect 
upon Spartans that access to great wealth and the wielding of nearly 
absolute power in other Greek cities might have. Klearchos apparently 
had proved ruthless, arbitrary, and brutal in imposing his will in 
Byzantion. As a result, the citizens secretly sent to Lakedaimon to 
/ protest. The ephors, in keeping with their campaign of restoring TiaTplOl 
25Plut. Lys. 19ff.; Nepos Lys. 4, and Polyainos 7.19.1. Beloch, 
Vol. 3.1, 16, n.l, observes that the dating of this incident is highly 
problematical. Nepos and Polyainos give no chronology and Plutarch's 
is confused. Andrewes, "Two Notes on Lysander," Phoenix 25 (1971), 
212-13, believes that the story of the satrap's deception does not 
"sound like the stuff of serious history," and believes it to be a "low-
grade fiction." 
26 Xenophon (Lak. Pol. 7.6), Plutarch (Lyk. 30), and Aelian 
c:y_. _g. 14. 29 ). 
27xen. Hell. 3.1.9; Diod. 14.12. 
34 
/ 
TIOA1TS1a1 wherever possible, sent an army under Panthoidas in the spring 
of 402 to relieve Klearchos of his command. After withdrawing his 
troops and booty from the city. however, Klearchos decided to resist. 
He was subsequently defeated and fled to Kyros, who received him 
hospitably. The ultimate consequences of Klearchos' excesses and de-
fection to Kyros are the subject of Xenophon's Anabasis. 28 
Thus it was probably in the spring and summer of 402 B.C. that 
the ephors disseminated their directive throughout the Aegean and Greek 
Asia that the naTp10l TIOA1TSlalwere to be restored.29 The man who had a 
statue of himself being crowned by Poseidon set up at Delphi and who had 
been accorded divine honors by the Samians30 found himself out of favor 
less than two years later. Parke believes that a fragmentary inscription 
from Delos31 was at least in part a manifesto reasserting the power of the 
ephorate and kings. Cavaignac thinks that the five ephors listed on the 
inscription, if it can be dated to 402, were the same five who voted to 
28xenophon (Anab. 1.1.9, 2.6.2) depicts Klearchos as the ideal 
military leader. The Ephoran tradition of Diodorus, of course, is not 
so clearly pro-Spartan as that of Xenophon and presents Klearchos' 
flaws as well as his virtues. Plutarch (Artax. 6) preserves a tradition 
in ~vhich the ephors ordered Klearchos to aid Kyros. 
29 Xen. Hell. 3.4.2. 
3°Paus. 10.9.7ff.; Plut. Lvs. 18.4; Bengtson, Die StaatsvertrHge 
des Altertums, Vol. 2, 152-158, has conveniently collected all evidence 
relating to this period. For a more sympathetic view of Lysander's role 
during these years, see Prentice, "The Character of Lysander," AJA 38 
(1934), 37-42. 
31Parke, 54; cf. also Tod, GHI Vol. 2, n.99. 
35 
. P . 32 F. 11 P k h h . ' ' 33 acqult ausanlas. lna y, ar e suggests t at t e lnscrlptlon 
in ~.;rhich the Athenians praise the Notians and Ephesians for having 
sheltered the democratic exiles from Sames indicates the demise of the 
dekarchies. This inscription, which dates to 403/402, could scarcely 
have been promulgated if the dekarchies were everywhere still in power. 34 
Lysander, on pretext of a vow made to Zeus Ammon, then departed 
to Libya to cloak his oisg~Jce. According to Ephoros, the actual purpose 
of the visit was more complex. 35 Briefly, Lysander, after having failed 
in similar attempts at Dodone and Delphi, tried to bribe the oracle of 
Ammon as part of a plot to abolish the hereditary kingship. Since 
Agesilaos played a role in the discovery of this plot after Lysander's 
death, discussion of th~ matter will be postponed to a later chapter. 
It seems likely that the infamous dekarchies of the "uncrowned 
king of Hellas"36 endured from the summer of 405 to the spring of 402 B.C., 
37 
a period of about three years. Isokrates (Panegyr. 113) suggests that, 
in one three month period in 404/403, the Spartans might have executed 
more men summarily than the Athenians had brought to trial during their 
32
cavaignac, 300. 
33M. Tod no.97.8-9; Meiggs and Lewis, 286-87; see also Andrewes, 
"Two Notes on Lysander," Phoenix 25 (1971), 219. 
34 Parke, 52. 
35Plut. Lys. 20.6. Thus Plutarch and Xenophon, in writing of 
this matter, may derive their information from the same source. 
36Meyer's felicitous phrase, Vol. 5, 32, "Er war in der Tat der 
ungekronte Konig von Hellas." 
37 see Meyer, Vol. 5, 41, n.l; Beloch, 2.1, 16; Cavaignac, 300-01; 
Parke, 52-53. 
' / entire apxn The disavowal of these extremist oligarchies by the 
36 
authorities in Sparta did not signal the end of Spartan domination in 
the Greek world. The dekarchies may no longer have enjoyed the support 
of harmosts and garrisons, but, as Parke has shmro, this system 
was still intact in Hellas. 38 In fact, Sparta's next undertaking in 
the effort to sustain her hegemony was a military struggle against a 
neighboring state in the Peloponnesos. Shortly after conducting this 
campaign, king Agis would die, and the stage would be set for the unusual 
and momentous accession of Agesilaos. 
The ~ar Against Elis and the Death of Agis 
A major Spartan undertaking in mainland Greece between 401 and 
397 was the war against Elis. Although the conduct of the war, at least 
in outline, is clear enough, there is a certain degree of confusion as 
to the chronology of its outbreak and duration. 39 
38 Parke, 41. 
39Two of our three sources (Xen. Hell. 3.2.21-31; Died. 14.17.4, 
34.1) assign a duration of about one year for the war, but one 
(Pausanias 3.8.5) writes that it lasted for more than two. According to 
Diodorus, the war began in 402, but Xenophon synchronizes it with the 
activities of Thibron and Derkylidas in Asia (400-399). Meyer, Vol. 5, 
184, n.l; Beloch, 3.1, 34-35; Grote, Vol. 7, 375, who dates the beginning 
of Derkylidas' tenure to 398, all comment on this difficulty. It seems 
most likely that the Eleians excluded the Spartans from the Ol)~pics in 
420 B.C., when they contracted an alliance with Athens, Argos, and 
Mantineia. Meyer, Vol. 5, 48, n.3; Beloch, 3.1, 17-18 discuss the 
chronology of this conflict. Beloch believes the war started in 402/401 
and was over in 401/400. Meyer thinks 401-400 are the likely dates. 
Grote, (in following Pausanias' notion of its duration) Vol. 7, 391-396, 
believes that the war lasted from 402-400. See Ferguson, CAH 5.9, 255-
258, 270-271, and Cary, CAR 6.2, 33-35. 
37 
Xenophon's account of the struggle is as follows: while 
Derkylidas was engaged in Asia, the Lakedaimonians had undertaken a 
. . . El' 40 pun1t1ve war aga1nst 1s. Their grievances against the Eleians were 
several. First, the Spartans accused the Eleians of having joined an 
alliance with the Argives, Mantineians, and Athenians in 420 B.c. 41 The 
Eleians had also excluded the Spartans from the Olympic games of that 
year. In spite of the Eleians' interdiction, a Spartan named Lichas 
entered a chariot with a Theban driver. When his chariot won, Lichas 
stepped forward to crown the victor, as was customary. The Eleians, how-
ever, recognizing him as a Spartan, beat him about the head and body and 
drove him from the sacred precinct. Lichas was an old man at this time 
42 
and a Spartan of some note. His mistreatment at the hands of the 
Eleian officials undoubtedly was not well received in Sparta. The final 
insult which evidently tipped the scales in favor of war was that, during 
the occupation of Dekeleia from 413-404, Agis had been denied access to 
the temple of Zeus at Olympia where Pythian Apollo had instructed him to 
offer sacrifice. The Spartans now decided to "bring the Eleians to their 
II , ) / 43 
senses (ao¢pov10a1 auTous ). 
The embassy sent to Elis also accused the Eleians of not having 
40Hell. 3.2.21-31. 
41 Thuc. 5.39-48. See also Tod, GHI, no. 72; Bengtson, 
Staatsvertr~ge 2, no. 193; Gomme et al., Vol. 4, 54-57. 
42He was sixty years old in 420; see Lenschau, RE 13.1, 211-12, un-
der Lichas. See Xen. Hell. 3.2.21 and Thuc. 5.49-50; Gomme ~ al., Vol. 4, 
66-67. 
43 Xen. Hell. 3.2.23. 
38 
contributed their share of expenses for conducting the war against 
44 Athens. Since the other grievances may have been almost t~..renty years 
old at the time of the embassy, perhaps this is the proximate cause of 
the war, rather than the items enumerated by Xenophon. The Spartans de-
manded that the Eleians restore autonomy to several outlying villages 
>.Jhich they had annexed. They kne\v, of course, that this demand \vould be 
refused and, when it was, the ephors called out the ban. Lepreion was 
L.5 
one town specified by the Spartans in their demand. · The allied army 
was 4,000 strong, with contingents from all allied states except Korinth 
. . h. f ' . 1+6 and Bo1ot1a, w 1ch explicitly disapproved o Sparta s motlves. 
Agis led the army into Ells by way of the Larisos river, but turned 
back because of an earthquake. At this unexpected turn of events, the 
Eleians took heart and sent out legates to other Greek pcleis, especially 
Korinth and Thebes to seek aid. The Eleians \vere disapp0inted, hc~;ever ~ 
by everyone except the Aitolians, ~vho sent 1,000 picked hoplites. The 
others were simply too cautious to flout Sparta openly. 47 
The ephors called out the ban again in the following spring 
(either 401 or 400 B.C.), and Agis proceeded first to Olympia and then to 
the outskirts of Elis city. Here he was aided by the defections of the 
Lepreians and the inhabitants of five other small towns in the south 
(Triphylia). \.Jhile Agis '\vas laying '\vaste to the surroundir.g country, an 
44
oiod. 14.17.5. See also Larsen, Greek Federal States, 
Oxford, 1968, 151-55. 
45Paus. 3. 8. 3; see Larsen, RE 19.825-28. Elis \vas divided 
into three areas: Elis proper (KOlAn RAts ), the northernmost section, 
including Elis city; the central area containing Olympia; and the south-
ern segment containing Lepreon and the other rebellious to\vns. 
46Diod. 14. 17. 6 
47D. d 1.0 • 14.17.9 
39 
oligarchic plot led by a pro-Spartan Eleian named Xenias within the city 
failed. The reason for the failure was the discovery that the leader of 
the democrats, one Thrasydaios, had survived an initial clash between 
the two factions. A man resembling Thrasydaios had been killed in the 
fray, but the real Thrasydaios had been in a drunken sleep when the melle 
broke out. 48 Upon awakening, Thrasydaios rallied his supporters, who 
then defeated the oligarchs and forced them to flee to the S~~~tduS. 
with the approach of winter, Agis withdrew to Lakedairnon and left 
Lysippos as harrnost to plunder Eleian lands until the corning of spring. 
Diodorus, however, reports that Agis wintered in Dyrne on the Patraic 
gulf (14.17). 
By the following summer (400 or 399), Thrasydaios sued ror peace 
with the Spartans on their original terms. The Eleians claimed a right 
to only one of the outlying towns, saying that they had purchased it for 
thirty talents. The Spartans, though, deemed that a forcible purchase was 
no more just than a forcible seizure and denied the Eleians' request. 49 
They did not, however, deprive the Eleians of their presidency of the 
Olympic games. They agreed to this because the Eleians promised not to 
debar the Spartans from future games and because the Pisatans who had 
originally held the presidency were now too few to perform the function. 50 
When all these matters were settled, peace was concluded and Elis joined 
48xen. Hell. 3.2.28-29. 
49xen. Hell. 3.2.30-31. 
50 Paus. 3.8.5. 
40 
the Peloponnesian alliance. 51 
Three other instances of Sparta's conduct toward the European 
Greeks remain to be discussed. Another demonstration of Spartan intent 
to quell dissent '"ithin the Peloponnesos '"as the campaign against their 
centuries-old subjects, the Messenians. 52 Their purpose was to expel 
Messenian agitators from outposts in Kephallenia and Naupaktos. 53 
Since the former is an island, the decision presumably involved a naval 
operation, but our only source is content to note that the Spartans 
succeeded without giving any details. The Spartans then returned the 
outpost to the Kephallenians. In the case of Naupaktos, located in 
Ozolian Lokris, the Spartan investiture probably also had a naval 
phase. Diodorus again supplies no hint as to th~ nurr.bers involved, the 
name of the commander, or the nature of the operation. As with 
Kephallenia, he records only that the Lakedaimonians were successful. 
51
swoboda,·RE 5.2, 2400-01 under Elis points out that the 
chronology of the Eleian war is a classic locus vexatus. Hatzfeld, 
, -----
"Notes sur la chronologie des Helleniques," REA 35(1933), 397, proposes 
that the lvar began in 400 and ended in--398. Agis was reluctant to 
attack and used the earthquake as an excuse to withdraw rather than 
desecrate the Olympic festival in 400. No such compunction stayed the 
Spartans, however, in 399. Finally in 398 (a Pythian year), a victor-
ious Agis could dedicate his spoils at Delphi. Xenophon's rough 
synchronism of this campaign with Derkylidas' activities in Asia, how-
ever, could easily refer not to the second, but rather the third and 
final year. This would eliminate the need to begin a sacrilegious 
campaign in an Olympic year. Thus the seismic shock would occur in 
401, the major effort in 400, and the end of the war and Agis' death 
in 399. Pausanias (3.8.3-5) observes that the war stretched into a 




see. Thuc. 5.35.7 (w. 421/0 B.C.) and 4.41.1 (s. 425 B.C.) 
and Gomme et al., Vol. 4, 37-38 and Vol. 3, 481 and 495. During the 
Archidamian-war, the Athenians had settled dissident Messenians in 
Naupaktos and Kephallenia to harass the Lakedaimonians. 
41 
The Athenian navarch Tolmides had handed Naupaktos over to the 
Messenians in 456 B.C., and the Spartans now restored it to the 
L k . 54 western o r1ans. 
Diodorus concludes his discussion of these operations by observing 
that many of the Messenians driven into exile eventually found employ-
ment as mercenaries. Some served in the armies of Dionysios I of 
Syracuse. Others who departed for Kyrene in Libya were apparently all 
but annihilated in a bloody Kyrenaian civil war. 
The second item of note for the period between 404 and 399 is 
the occupation of Herakleia in Trachis by the Spartan Herippidas. 
Sparta had intervened militarily in the region of the Malian gulf as 
recently as the winter of 413/412 B.C. Agis at that time had set out 
from Dekeleia to collect tribute for a Spartan ship-building effort. He 
had compelled the Oitaians, Phthiotic Achaians, Malians and others to 
contribute money and hostages much against their wi11. 55 The civil 
strife that had broken out in Herakleia furnished the Spartans with an 
ideal pretext to set up an outpost in north-central Greece near 
Thermopylai. 56 Accordingly, Herippidas was sent out to quell the un-
rest. He convened an assembly in the town and, on determining the 500 
54Diod. 11.84.7; Oldfather, RE 16.2, 1986, 1989, discusses these 
events in some detail and takes note of the chronological uncertainty. 
See also Diod. 14.78, 15.66 and Pausanias 4.26.2, 10.38.10. 
55Thuc. 8.3.1; see Gomme et al., Vol. 4, 395. Thuc. 5.51-52 
notes that, in 419, the Boiotians had occupied Herakleia. By 412, 
therefore, it must have been back in Spartan hands. Possibly the 
Boiotians were inciting unrest in this area ca. 399; see Gomme et al., 
Vol. 4, 68-69. 
56D. d 10 • 14.38.4-5. 
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men most responsible for the strife, executed them all. Moreover, he 
expelled the rebellious inhabitants around .Ht. Oite (who included 
Oitaians, Malians, Ainianians and Phthiotic Achaians). These people 
fled to Thessaly with their families, where they remained in exile 
until the Boiotians restored them five years later. 57 
A final indication of Spartan activity in northern Greece stems 
from unsettled conditions obtaining in Thessaly. Lykophron of 
Pherai was able to defeat a coalition under Larisaian leadership for 
1 b h . f i 1 1 1' 58 loca supremacy a out t e t~me o a part a so ar ec ~pse. 
By 400 B.C., Sparta's interest in north central Greece appears 
to have extended to Thessaly and Makedonia. A group of Larisaian exiles 
were debating whether they shGuld join the Spartans in a war of 
aggression against the Makedonian barbarians who had occupied their city. 
The contemplated hostilities, however, did not materialize and so the 
point was moot. 59 
57Diod. 14.82.6-7; Xen. »ell. 3.5.6; Meyer, Vol. 5, 50, n.2, dates 
Herippidas' occupation of Herakleia to 398. See also Beloch 3.1, 21, who 
ascribes the unrest in the region to a conflict between natives and the 
~TIOlKOl of Agis' incursion in 413/2. Aristophanes (Lysistrate 1168-70) 
alludes to the Spartan presence, and Xenophon (~. 1.2.18-19) records 
an uprising in which 700 people, including the harmost Labotas, were 
killed. See also Meyer, Vol. 4.2, 323-24 and Parke, 39,41. 
58xen. Hell. 2.3.4. The eclipse in question occurred on 3 Sept. 
404 B.C.; see Oppolzer, Canon of Eclipses, Harvard, 1962, 78, no. 1936. 
59our only evidence for this affair is a document entitled 
, ' , Hpwoou nspl TIOAlTElaS. Modern scholars, though, have concluded that the 
speech is an authentic product of the late fifth or early fourth century 
B.C. They have advanced sundry hypotheses for its date (see Wade-Gery, 
"Kritias and Heredes," CQ 39, 1945, 22, n.l and Sordi, "A proposito di 
uno scritto politico dey-401-400 A.C.: Il nsp~ TIOAtTEtas della pseudo-
Erode," Riv. di Fil. 33 (1955), 175ff). Others who have troubled over 
date and authorship are Beloch, Vol. 3.2, 132, n.2; Meyer, Vol. 5, 50, 
43 
Summary of Spartan Policy in Greece, 404-399 B.C. 
The reaction of various groups within the city to her newly 
won hegemony determined the major outlines of Sparta's policy from 
404 to 397. At first, this policy was essentially the creation of 
one man, Lysander. Building upon the existing system of harmosts and 
60 garrisons which had arisen during the Peloponnesian War, Lysander was 
able to install small groups of people loyal to him in the poleis of 
Asia Minor and the Aegean. These narrowly constituted governments of 
extremist oligarchs, the dekarchies, also included the thirty tyrants 
at Athens. 
After Lysander's two setbacks (Pausanias superseded his command 
in Attika in 403, and Pharnabazos denounced him to the ephors in 402), 
his political ascendancy was ended. It is to this period that most 
/ 
scholars date the decree calling for the restoration of the TiaTP101 
, 
TIOA1TE1a1 i h . 1 d d 1 . f A . 61 n t e ~s an s an po els o s~a. From 402 to Agesilaos' 
- I - \ I 
n.3; Drerup, /Hpwoou I TIEP1 TIOAlTElaS, Studien z. Gesch. und Kult. d. 
- - .. - --Alt. 2.1 (Paderborn, 1908); and Munschen, RE 8, 951-53. The best 
hypotheses for its date seem to be either 404, if Kritias is the author, 
or 401/0, if Thrasymachos or one of his students wrote it. In any case, 
its subject is resistance to the designs of Archelaos, king of Makedonia. 
60Parke, 44-49. 
61rn a recent study, Hamilton has argued on the basis of his recon-
struction of internal politics at Sparta that the decree may have been 
promulgated as late as 397, that the ephors perhaps ordered the disbanding 
of the dekarchies to conciliate the Persians in the wake of Derkylidas' 
truce with Tissaphernes, and that the grave domestic turmoil revealed by 
Kinadon's conspiracy could have dampened the Spartans' fervor for overseas 
adventurism. See Sparta's Bitter Victories, Cornell, 1979, 117, 128-29. 
I am inclined, nevertheless, to accept the earlier date for two reasons. 
First, there is the inscriptional evidence of the joint decree of ephors 
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succession (ca. 399), there seems to have been little factional strife 
in Sparta. The Lysandrians could no longer dominate policy as they had 
from 405 to 402. Similarly, the trial of Pausanias despite his 
acquittal shows that the most conservative Spartans (whose leader was 
Pausanias) were unable to assume the ascendancy. That Agis was able 
to undertake a punitive war against Elis by 401 hints at a consensus 
for limiting activity to European Greece. With the waning of Lysander's 
influence, Sparta's attention no longer focused primarily on Asia 
Minor or the Aegean. Rather she busied herself with the chastisement 
and kings at Delos (Tod, no. 99) and that of the second Athenian 
decree (Tod, no. 97.9-10) which date to 403/02. See Beloch 3.1, 19, 
n.l; Meyer, Vol. 5, 43. Grote, Vol. 7, 365-66, believes that some 
withered for lack of Spartan support, but that other endured until 
as late as 396. As Andrewes, "Two Notes on Lysander," Phoenix, 25 
(1971)213-14, observes, Tissaphernes actively worked to undermine 
Lysander and Kyros by giving refuge in Lydia to a thousand democratic 
exiles, (Diod. 13.104.5-6). Andrewes also refers to the notion of the 
dekarchies' survival until 397 as "reviving an old heresey" (ibid., 
206). The Delian decree appears to be a reassertion of traditional 
Spartan authority after Lysander's d~bacle in Attika (Cavaignac, 
300). In the second Samian decree, the Athenians praise the Notians 
and Ephesians for offering shelter to ~xiled Samian democrats, while 
the dekarchs held sway on the latters' native island. It thus 
seems unlikely that the dekarchs in Samos, ~otos, or Ephesos (which 
had been Lysander's headquarters) could have held unchallenged 
authority in those cities at the time of the decree (Parke, 52). 
Second, the decree was probably as much a formality as that of late 
404 which forbade any polis from aiding Athens' democratic exiles 
(Diod. 14.6.1-2). The only practical effect of the decree would have 
been to deprive the dekarchs of the unconditional support of harmost 
and garrison. With that prop removed, the extremist oligarchs could 
not prevent more moderate elements from resurfacing or returning 
from exile to participate once again in public life. This is not to 
imply that all dekarchs were at once deposed, arrested or exiled, 
however, since harmosts and garrisons would remain to aid in 
dampening violence and recriminations. 
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1 . . . hb 62 of luke-warm or reca c~t~ant ne~g ors. 
Concerning Sparta's relations with the Greek states in Europe, 
the following points should be made. Some of Sparta's staunchest 
allies during the struggle with Athens quickly began to have second 
thoughts after the demise of their common foe. Following Lysander's 
settlement in Attika (404 B.C.), Thebes, Korinth, Argos and Megara 
joined in contr~ve~ing the Spartans' decree against aiding Athens' 
democratic exiles. Thebes even went so far as to issue a counter-
decree imposing a fine on anyone who turned an exile back to the 
thirty. The Thebans also aided Thrasyboulos in mounting his attack on 
h P . 63 t e e~raeus. Korinth and Thebes again spurned the Spartans when 
62
some scholars have postulated the existence of three political 
factions at Sparta during this epoch. The most recent of these is 
Hamilton, Sparta's Bitter Victories, Cornell, 1979, 80-96 with notes. 
Hamilton speculates that the partisans of Lysander sought a naval as well 
as military hegemony and a sharp break with the archaic Lykourgan 
politeia. This would require the upkeep of a fleet, the imposition of 
tribute, and the introduction of currency at Sparta. Such p~ople also 
contemplated the evolution cf a more egalitarian society and the 
abolition of the hereditary kingship. See Aristole Pol. 5.1.5. and 
5.6.2; Isok. 12.67-69; Diod. 14.10.2, 13.2-8; Polybios-6.49.8 and 
Plut. Lys.24-26, Ages. 8; Nepos Lys. 3, for evidence of Lysander's 
covert plans. The second group under King Agis favored a more modest 
hegemony confined to European Greece. These Spartans would reduce the 
original Peloponnesian allies to near vassalage and extend Spartan 
influence beyond the Isthmos (see Diad. 14.38.4-5 for Herippidas' 
occupation of Trachinian Herakleia in 399.). The Third faction, led 
by King Pausanias, represented the most traditional elements in the 
state. Unlike either of the two hegemonist factions, this group would 
tolerate no deviation from the Lykourgan system and preferred to re-
main on terms of rough equality with the allies. They also would have 
carefully delimited Sparta's role in central Greece, the Aegean and 
Asia Minor. Hamilton ably discusses the balance of power among these 
factions, but Cawkwell, CR,30 (1980), 242-44, believes that Hamilton's 
c?njectures far exceed the evidence, and Tritle, CP 1 76 (1981), 234-37, 
f1nds the notion of this factional wrangling too reliant on ideology 
to the neglect of personalities. 
63For Theban aid to Thrasyboulos, see Lysias fr. 120; Hell. Ox. 
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Lysander undertook his Attic campaign of 403. Both poleis refused 
to send soldiers. One reason for this antagonism is not difficult to 
discern. Once Lysander had embarked the Spartans on a program of 
Panhellenic hegemony, they arrogantly appropriated all spoils of 
victory to themselves. The sole exception to this pattern occurred 
when the Boiotians, ~vho were the largest contingent at Dekeleia, simply 
took their share by force. The other allies re~Pived no share at all. 
Horeover, Lysander imposed an annual tribute of 1,000 talents on the 
Aegean and Asian poleis to underwrite the nascent hegemony. 
In 401 Thebes and Korinth, by refusing to participate in Agis' 
campaign against Elis, had faried yet a third time to support Spartan 
designs. The polis mentality (a deeply ingrai~ed desire for local 
autonomy) and earlier alliances could explain this reluctance in part, 
but the Lakedaimonians' short-sighted hybris was progressively 
alienating some of their most important supporters. The eventual re-
sult was that a powerful coalition of former friends and foes would 
take the field against Sparta less than a decade after the fall of 
Athens. 64 
17; Xen. Hell. 2.4.2; Diod. 14.6.1-3; Plut. Lys. 2.7.2 and Justin 5.9.8. 
That the allies had no share in the spoils of victory is attested by Hell. 
Ox. 17.4-5; Xen. Hell. 2.3.8, 3.5.5; Diod. 13.106.7; and Justin 5.10.~ 
~superb and moving account of the excesses inflicted by one of the 
thirty at Athens is preserved in Lysias' KaT~ EpaTooetvous Here 
the orator pleads for justice against his brother's murderer. 
64 see also Hamilton, 326-27, for the eventual consequences of 
Sparta's high-handedness after 404 B.C. 
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Sparta and Persia, 404-397 B.C. 
The most significant development in the Persian empire between 
404 and 397 'tvas the revolt of Kyros the younger. In spite of the 
failure to topple his brother from the throne, Kyros' attempt would 
have repercussions for more than a decade. Until the outbreak of the 
revolt (which was due at least in part to Spartan instigation),the 
internal areas of the Persian realm on the surface appeared quiescent. 
Hith the revolt of Kyros, Artaxerxes could no longer ignore Spartan 
perfidy and meddling in Persian internal affairs. 65 
Because he had fought at Kunaxa and proved loyal to the Great 
King, Tissappernes recouped the Lydian and Karian satrapies which he 
had lost to Kyros. By 400 he had arrived in Sardis and demanded that 
the Ionian coastal cities be subject to him as was his right according 
to the treaty he negotiated for Dareios in 412/11 B.c. 66 This prompted 
65xenophon's Anabasis, Diodorus (14.19-31) and the "lost history" 
of Themistogenes of Syracuse set forth the details of Kyros' revolt. 
Xenophon (Hell. 2.4.6) gives the name "Themistogenes" who is unknown ex-
cept for this passage. Laqueur's conjecture (RE 5A.2, 1684-86) that he 
may have written a history of Syracuse is pure-speculation. Prentice, 
"Themistogenes of Syracuse: An Error of a Copyist," AJP 1947, 76-77, 
ingeniously su~gests that 0€~lcrToylvt TQ ~upaKocrt~ may be a corrup-
tion of 0€~lcrTwS fvl TWV Kups(wv in which case Xenophon would be 
referring to himself. Meyer, Vol. 5, 176, n.2, asserts that 
Themistogenes is Xenophon's pseudonym for himself. The accounts of 
Ktesias, court physician to Artaxerxes, and Dinon of Kolophon survive 
in fragments (See Jacoby, Fr.Gr.H., 3C, 522, 688; also Meyer, Vol. 5 
174, n.l. and Beloch 3.1, 31,~.1). Dinan's account seems to have 
been the source for Plutarch (Artax. 6). Xenophon (Hell. 3.1.1) and 
Isokrates (4.103-7, 146) record Sparta's activity against the Persians. 
Plutarch (Artax. 6) claims that the Spartans ordered Klearchos to 
cooperate with Kyros! Diodorus writes that the Spartans cooperated with 
Kyros in secret at first and by 401 quite openly (14.11-12, 19.4-5). See 
Grote, Vol. 7, 181-82, Beloch 3.1, 34 and Meyer, Vol. 5, 184. 
66Thucydides 8.18, 37, 58 (see Gomme et al., Vol. 5, 40-42, 79-82, 
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the Ionians to appeal for aid to Sparta as TIPOOTaTns of Bellas. Be-
cause of Ionian resistance, Tissaphernes laid siege to Kyme in the 
summer and captured many of her inhabitants. The coming of '"inter 
forced him to lift his siege, but he ransomed his captives for a huge 
sum of money. 67 
Sparta's response to the Ionian plea '"as to send Thibron with a 
force of 5,000 men from the Peloponnesos that same summer. He aug-
mented this force by requesting some 300 horsemen from the Athenians 
who were only too happy to comply with the request, because the 300 had 
been supporters of the thirty tyrants. He further increased the army's 
size with the addition of some 5,000 veterans of Kyros '"ho had been 
operating against the Hellespontine Thracians under Xenophon. Final-
ly, he was able to recruit some 2,000 soldiers from the cities of 
Greek Asia, bringing his army to a strength of over 12,000 men. 68 
Since Agis was engaged in the Eleian struggle, Sparta's response to the 
Ionians' plea indicates the true thrust of her policy. Agis' cam-
paign would seem to be· more a police action than a major effort. The 
and 138-46). Justin 5.1.7. notes the alliance, but omits any reference 
to its terms. See also Bengtson, Staatsvertrage l• 138-43. Tissaphernes 
and Pharnabazos also issued coins in the Great King's name with Greek 
letters to pay the rowers. See Gardner, ~History of Ancient Coinage, 
Oxford, 1918, 334; Hill, Historical Greek Coins, London, 1906, 57-60; and 
Kraay and Hirmer, Greek Coins, N.Y., 1966,~368, 378 with notes and 
bibliography. 
67 Xen. Hell. 3.1.3-4, Diod. 14.35. The exact amount is unknown. 
68xen. Hell. 3.1.4; Anab. 7 .6-8; Diod. 14.37 .1-4. The chronology 
for this campaign cannot be fixed with certainty. }fust scholars suggest 
that Thibron did not arrive in Ephesos until the winter of 400 or spring 
of 399, e.g. Grote, Vol. 7, 375; Meyer, Vol. 5, 184-85 with notes; 
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influence of Lysander and his supporters is likely, because these 
people routinely favored a Spartan presence in Asia, an area rich in 
potential for exploitation. With the arrival of the Ionian contingent, 
Thibron marched to Ephesos and set up his headquarters. He advanced 
to Magnesia,which fell to his assault,and moved on to Tralles. Here his 
initiative failed because of the city's superior fortifications and 
natural defenses. He returned to Magnesia and transferred the 
' I inhabitants and their property to a nearby hill called o 9wpn~ 
He did so in the belief that Magnesia, unwalled and situated on level 
ground, would be easy prey for Tissaphernes' cavalry. When in fact the 
Persians appeared in large numbers, Thibron withdrew to Ephesos. 69 
At first Thibron's successes were largely diploma~ic. Almost 
all Greek cities in Asia Minor were willing to cooperate with a Spartan 
officer at the head of a sizeable force. With the arrival of Kyros' 
veterans from Thrace, he was able to move against Tissaphernes'cavalry 
even in open places. In Pharnabazos' realm, such cities as Pergamon, 
Teuthrania, Halisarna, Gambrion, Palaigambrion, Myrina and Gryneion came 
over voluntarily. At Phrygian Larisa, however, the inhabitants 
frustrated his attempt to invest the city, so the ephors ordered him to 
lift his siege and abandon Aiolis altogether. He was to march instead 
against Karia and Tissaphernes. 70 
Cary, CAH, Vol. 6, 37-39; Parke, 65. Beloch believes that he conducted 
summer and autumn operations while Tissaphernes was besieging Kyme 
(Vol. 3.2, 212-13). In any case, Derkylidas superseded him in command 
by the late summer of 399 (see below). 
69Diod. 14.36. 
70xen. Hell. 3.1.5-7 and Died. 14.37. 
While he was in Ephesos preparing to march against Karia, the 
ephors cashiered Thibron and replaced him with Derkylidas. The 
allies had complained that Thibron had allowed his troops to plunder 
Greeks. \~en he returned home, the Spartans assessed a ruinous fine 
against him and he went into exile. 71 
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Thibron' s replacement ~vas a man of long experience in Asia ~linor. 
He was renowned for his resourcefulness and bore the nickname 
"Sisyphos," as well as a grudge against the Hellespontine satrap 
Pharnabazos. Cognizant of the mutual suspicions between Tissaphernes 
and Pharnabazos, Derkylidas made a truce with the former. 72 Thus he 
abandoned plans for the Karian campaign and marched against Aiolis ~ 
which was only loosely attached to Pharnabazos' satrapy. By refusing 
to allow his men to plunder Greeks, he quickly won over such cities as 
Larisa, Hamaxitos and Kolonai on the coast. Cities further inland, 
such as Neandria, Ilion and Kokylion also came over to him voluntarily. 
A subordinate of Pharnabazos named Meidia~ who was in charge of the 
Troa~ refused to admit him to Kebren, but the city's Greek inhabitants 
finally forced Meidias to do so. By having Meidias accompany him on 
subsequent forays, he was able to bring over the towns of Gergis and 
71xen. Hell. 3.1.8-9. 
72Derkylidas had served in Greek Asia in 411 B.C. (Thuc. 8.60-
62). He was also harmost of Abydos during the navarchy of Lysander 
in 407/06. (Xen. Hell. 3.1.9). See Niese, RE 5.1, 240-41 and 
Parke, 41, 66-67. -xs-to his nickname and reputed resourcefulness, see 
Xen. Hell. 3.1.8-9 and Athenaios 11.101 (Jacoby Fr.Gr.H., Vol. 2A.l, 
63, NO":"?"l under Ephoros). ---
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Skepsis to the Greek site. Derkylidas had won the allegiance of nine 
cities in eight days. With the summer (399) campaigning season dra\ving 
to a close, he decided to seek a truce with Pharnabazos. His purpose 
was at once to protect his Aiolic allies from Persian cavalry and not 
to make himself a burden to them, as had his predecessor. 73 
Pharnabazos, reflecting on the strength of Derkylidas' force 
which had occupjpd n~arly all of Aiolis, decided to accept the truce. 74 
Until he could reorganize and augment his own forces, his Phrygian 
estates were in imminent peril. Derkylidas then moved into Bithynia, 
where he passed the winter in plundering the region. He was joined by 
, a force of Odryssian cavalry and Thracian peltasts from across the 
strait. Apart fr8m a single reverse which occurred when a large mass 
of Bithynians attacked his camp while his troops were absent on a raid, 
the winter season was a success. 75 
With the coming of spring (398), a deputation arrived from 
Sparta to extend Derkylidas' command into the next year. The three 
Spartan legates also mentioned that the Greek inhabitants of the 
Chersonesos had complained to the ephors about Thracian raids into their 
73
xen. Hell. 3.1.16-2.1; Diod. 14.38. 
74 In the spring of 398, Ktesias, court physician to Artaxerxes, 
visited Konon and Euagoras in Kypros after Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos' 
rapprochement. He also travelled to Lakedaimon on behalf of the Great 
King to attempt a reconciliation between Persia and Sparta. See Jacoby 
Fr.Gr.H., Vol. 3C.l, 483, no. 30 (Phot. Bibl. 72), under Ktesias; also 
Beloch~ Vol. 3.1, 36 and Meyer, Vol. 5, 193. The Spartans at the same 
time sent a legation to Sousa. The Persians, however, kept them under 
house-arrest to conceal the naval build-up in Phoinikia and Kypros. 
75 Xen. Hell. 3.2.2-5. 
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territory. Their land was very fertile, they said, but they were unable 
to till it properly because of these raids. They proposed that a force 
of Peloponnesian allies be dispatched to build a wall from sea to sea 
to keep the Thracians out. Derkylidas, taking the hint, crossed over 
to the Chersonesos. En route, Seuthes received him amicably in 
Hellespontine Thrace. Upon realizing how rich the soil was and having 
conferred with representatives of the twelve Ch~rsvnesian cities, he 
built their wall. According to the version of Diodorus the construction 
of the wall coincided with Derkylidas' arrival the year before to assume 
Thibron's command. Diodorus places the Chersonesian embassy to Sparta 
in the previous year and he states that they specifically requested 
Derkylidas. Xenophon, who was present in Asia at the time of these 
events, is perhaps to be preferred since he was an eye-witness to many 
of the things he describes and would have had reliable information 
available for events he did not himself see. Furthermore, it seems 
likely that the Chersonesians may have waited until early 398 to 
make sure that Derkylidas did not prove another Thibron who would fatten 
his own men at the expense of the Greeks he was supposed to protect. 76 
After completing the wall, Derkylidas led his army back to Asia. 
He had determined that all was well and prospering in the Greek coastal 
regions. The sole exception was that a group of Chian democrats were 
plundering Ionia from their exile stronghold at Atarneus. He thereupon 
undertook an eight months' siege and finally occupied the city. The 
76Diod. 14.38.6-7; Xen. Hell. 3.2.6-11. 
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defenders had held out for so long because they had laid in a 
sizeable supply of grain. Derkylidas then restocked the city's 
granaries for his own troops and departed for Ephesos after appointing 
77 Drakon of Pellene his governor (F398). 
In the spring of 398, the principal satraps of Greek Asia, 
Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos) had decided to work in concert to exp~l 
the Spartans. Putting aside their differences (although Pharnabazos 
remained secretly jealous of Tissaphernes' appointment as supreme Persian 
commander), they conferred in Karia. Tissaphernes was receptive to his 
rival, because an Ionian embassy to Sparta had insisted that the Lake-
daimonians press the satrap to grant full autonomy to all Greek cities. 
The Spartans accordingly decided to mount a two-pronged attack on Karia, 
where Tissaphernes' residence was located. Derkylidas was to lead the 
army and the navarch Pharax would co-ordinate naval operations. 78 
Thus after completing his siege of Atarneus, Derkylidas was pre-
paring in the spring of 397 to march on Karia. The Persians outflanked 
him, however, and in anticipation of his attack, they recrossed the 
Maiandros river. Derkylidas alerted Pharax that the Persian forces were 
in a position to plunder Ionia at will. He thereupon withdrew to the 
N h h I . 79 ort to protect t e on~ans. 
In the midst of this hasty volte-face, Derkylidas suddenly 
77xen. Hell. 3.2.11 and Isok. 4.144. 
78 Xen. Hell. 3.2.12-13. 
79Hell. 3.1.12-15. 
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realized that the Persian army was bearing do\vn upon him in the immediate 
vicinity of the Maiandros. Since he had assumed that the Persian objec-
tive was the area around Ephesos, his troops were not in formation. 
Rather than offer battle, both sides agreed to a one-day truce. 
Derkylidas was unsure of the reliability of his troops from Ionia (some 
had fled at the mere sight of the Persians), and he was uneasy about 
risking a pitched battle. As for Tissaphernes, he was fearful of the 
formidable reputation of the Greek hoplites. In spite of Pharnabazos' 
objections, he was therefore receptive to a peaceful resolution. Each 
side presented its terms. The Persians demanded the departure of the 
Lakedaimonians and all harmosts. The Spartans insisted on full autonomy 
for all Greek cities in Asia. It was agreed that the truce should obtain 
until Tissaphernes could confer with the Great King and until Derkylidas 
80 
could inform the authorities in Sparta. Moreover, after Derkylidas had 
made his truce with Tissaphernes in late 399, Pharnabazos enlisted the 
services of the Athenian navarch Konon in 398. Since the battle of 
Aigospotamoi in 405, Konen had been living in exile at the court of 
Euagoras, king of Kypriote Salamis. After persuading the Great King, 
Pharnabazos offered Konen 500 silver talents to outfit a fleet. 
Euagoras and other leaders in Kypros were induced to furnish 100 triremes. 
Konon agreed to accept command of the entire Persian fleet because he 
hoped to avenge Athens' defeat and win glory for himself. Upon accepting 
his commission in the Great King's na~J. Konon took forty triremes 
80 Xen. Hell. 3.2.16-20; see Bengtson, Staatsvertrage ~' 164-65. 
55 
already available and sailed to Kilikia to complete his preparations. 81 
82 According to Plutarch, Konen wrote to the Great King, suggesting 
that he required a navy just as the king had need of a navarch. No 
mention is made of Pharnabazos' role in procuring the command for Konen 
in this version. Pharnabazos most likely did have such a role, as 
Xenophon reports, but it may also be true that Kanan brought l'!imself 
to the attention of the Great King. Since Pharnabazos \vas jealous of 
Tissaphernes' position as supreme commander of the land forces, it seems 
reasonable that he •vould attempt to augment his own influence by 
strengthening Artaxerxes' hand at sea. 
Konen spent most of 397 recruiting mercenary seamen and overseeing 
the construction of the Persian fleet in Kypros. Thus while 
Derkylidas and the satraps had negotiated a temporary cessation of 
hostilities on land, Pharnabazos and Konen continued their clandestine 
efforts to augment dramatically Persian naval strength in the Aegean 
Sea. This was the situation in the eastern ~fediterranean on the eve of 
Agesilaos' campaign. 
81Diod. 14.39.1-4; it is undoubtedly to this period that the 
beautiful Kyzikene issue of silver dates with Pharnabazos' idealized 
likeness and Greek lettering (not Aramaic). See Gardner, A Historv 
of Ancient Co~~. Chicago, 1974, 334; Kraay and Hirmer,-G~~~ 
Coins, Ne"t-l York, 1966, 370 with notes; and Hill, Greek Historical 
~. Chicago, 1976, 57-60. 
82 Plut. Artaxerxes 21.1-3. 
CHAPTER III 
AGESILAOS' YOUTH AND ACCESSION, .!_HE CONSPfRACY OF 
KLNADO~, AND PREPARATIONS FO~ THE ASIA?i _EXPEDITION 
\Jhile Derkylidas ·.vas campaigning in Asia ~tinor, two important 
events occurred in Lakedaimon. The second of these was the ephors' 
discovery of a plot to overthrmv the government. The year before, ~vi.th 
the death of Agis, a dispute had arisen over the royal succession. 1 
It was this dispute that first brought Agesilaos into the full light of 
history. Evidence for his life before he became king is, as might be 
expected, meagre. The future king ~vas born in 44 1+ B.C., the son of 
Archidamos II of the Eurypontid house and his second wife Eupolia. 2 
1
see ch. 2, 36, and notes 39 and 51 for the insoluble chrono-
logical muddle. Though certainty is unattainable, the best dates for the 
Eleian struggle are from spring 401 to summer 399. Thus Agesilaos' 
accession would occur in late summer or early autumn and the detection of 
Kinadon's plot in late spring or early summer 398. 
2There is evidence for Agesilaos' life as a family man, but it is 
rather sparse and scattered. Nonetheless at least the outlines are dis-
cernible from an occasional reference in our sources. This 1:1uch c<m be 
ascertained: He married a woman named Kleora and had three children by 
her, a son Archidamos who later became king, and two daughters Eupolia 
and Prolyta. The evidence for Archidamos' birth occurs in Xenophon's 
Hellenika 6.4.18. In his first command, he was summoned to aid in the 
aftermath of the battle of Leuktra. Since a Spartan, even a san of a 
king, would not normally assume a commanc before the age of thirty, per-
haps Archidamos "t-Tas barn approxiMately l:.Gl B.C. in order to be old 
enough to lead out his own army in 371; see nertzberg, Das Leben des 
Agesilaos II von EParta, ,Hall~, 185S, 23S. Agesilaos did not command, 
as Xenophon notes, 81.<\ acree:vtas. As to the dates of his daugl1ters' 
births, there is no evidence surviving from antiquity. Hertzberg has 
speculated that his marriage may have occurred some time after the 
defeat of Athens in 404, perhaps in the following year. His assumption 
that Archidamos was the eldest cannot be supported by the evidence. 
Plutarch's Agesilaos 10.6, Xenophon's Hellenika 3.4.29, and 
Justin 6.3 provide information about his wife's family, where her 
56 
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Since he was not his father's first born, he underwent the rigors of 
~ / 
the Spartan aywyn, because only those destined for the kingship were 
exempted. 3 It was during this period of youthful training that 
Agesilaos first made the acquaintance of Lysander, a man whose long 
;elationship with Agesilaos' older half-brother Agis made possible 
his final effort to win permanent influence in Sparta. The former 
Justin 6.3. provide information about his wife's family, where her 
brother Peisandros' name appears (see Ehrenberg RE 19.1., 144). 
Similarly Pausanias 3.9.3 gives her father's nam;-as Aristomelidas 
(Ki1:chner, RE 2.1, 950), 'l.vho was sent to Thebes in 396 to enlist 
Boiotian aid for the Asian campaign. Peisandros was left in co~~and 
of the Spartan navy when Agesilaos departed for the interior of Asia 
in 395. 
Agesilaos had a younger half-brother by his mother (he and 
AgiE, had sharerl the same father) naned Teleutias, (Ehrenb~rg, RE SA.l, 
398-400), and a sister Kyniska (Honigmann, RE Vol. 12.1., 2). 
Teleutias will figure prominently in subsequent chapters and Kyniska 
achieved renm.;rn by becoming the first 'l.voman in history to enter a 'l.vinning 
c~ariot in the Olympic games (Plut. Ages. 20.1). 
3Plutarch's biography is the only source for Agesilaos' life 
as a private citizen and the major emphasis is moral. He notes, for 
example, that Agesilaos was well suited to rule because he had learned 
to obey. Hhile learning to .obey, he became enamored of Lysander, an 
older member of his aye::\n or "herd" because he was smitten by the 
latter's physical beauty. Agesilaos was lame in one foot, but the 
bloom of youth was enough to make up for his deformity. In spite nf 
his handicap, the future king did not shrink from challenge, no matter 
how strenuous, and proved himself in every way a worthy competitor, 
(Ages. 1.1.-2.2.). Although a resilient and hardened competitor, he 
displayed a winning charm and affability. Hertzberg, 232, provides 
a genealogical chart which summarizes the information about Agesilaos' 
family. For his date of birth, see Hertzberg, 229, n.2a and 233, n.6; 
Niese, RE Vol. 1.1, 802; and Kle~ne Paulv, Vol. 1, 127-28. As to the 
date, there is no reason to doubt Plutarch's statement that the king 
was ei5hty-four at the time of his death in Libya in 360 B.C. (Ages. 40.2). 
Plutarch's reference to the exemption of eldest sons of the two royal 
houses is the only one about this prerogative to survive from antiquity. 
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navarch exerted his authority and popularity to win Agesilaos the 
kingship, and two years later, he manoeuvered the king into his first 
4 
overseas command. 
In addition to what can be gleaned from Plutarch, there is in-
direct evidence from the histories of Thucydides and, in one instance, 
from Xenophon's Hellenika about Agesilaos' military experience. 
In the summer of 419 B.C., Agis led the Lakedaimonians to their 
northern border at Mt. Lykaion, but turned back because of unfavorable 
5 
omens. One year later, at the request of the Epidaurians who were 
suffering an Argive incursion, Agis led the allies against the Argolid. 
Later that same summe~ having withdrawn from the Argolid, 6 he again 
, 
led the Lakedaimonians out Tiavon~E1 1 this time against Mantineia in 
relief of the Tegeates. This expedition resulted in a major Spartan 
victory. 7 In the winter of 417, Agis took the field against the 
Argives a third time in full force with all the allies except the 
Korinthians. Although he seized and dismantled some walls and occupied 
4Rahe, Lysander and the Spartan Settlement, ~07-403 B.C., diss. 
Yale, 1977, 7-9, 19, believes that Lysander was a ~oea~~ and the pro-
tege of Archidamos and later Agis. Thus he participated in the aywyn 
with Agesilaos, the son and half-brother respectively of his sponsors. 
5 Thuc. 5.54; see Gomme ~ al. Vol. 4, 73-75. 
6see Gomme ~ al., Vol. 4, 111-119 for a precise and detailed 
analysis of this campaign. 
7 Thuc. 5.64, 5.75; see Gornne ~ al., Vol. 4, 91 
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a small town, this action was indecisive. In the early spring of 413, 
the Spartans under Agis invaded Attika and fortified Dekeleia. 8 
Finally Lysander was completing his preparations for the blockade of 
Athens and requested King Agis to occupy Dekeleia a second time in full 
force to reduce the city to starvation and surrender in the fall of 
9 405 B.C. 
One can surmise in all the instances cited, that Agesilaos 
participated in these actions under the command of his older half-
brother. In the first case, the abortive mission near Mt. Lykaion in 
419, Agesilaos would have been about twenty-five years old. In the 
Spartans' final blockade and siege of Athens in 405/04, he would have 
been approaching forty. His military experience before his accession, 
even to judge from this limited evidence, is likely to have been 
considerable. 10 
The Disputed Succession and Triumph of Agesilaos 
After depositing one-tenth of the booty from the Eleian War at 
Delphi, King Agis II fell ill and was carried back to Sparta where he 
soon died.11 A conjunction of three peculiar circumstances made 
8 Thuc. 7.19; see Gomme et al., Vol. 4, 395. 
9xen. Hell. 2.2.7; see also ch. 2. 
10Hertzberg, 235. See also ch. 2, 25 and 36, n. 39 
llxen. Hell. 3.3.1, Paus. 3.8.7. Several ancient authors allotted 
at least some space to the disputed succession and turmoil in 
Lakedaimon after Agis' death. The year in question was in all likelihood 
399 (see ch. two for a discussion of the chronological muddle of this 
Period); the authors and their works are Xenophon in his Agesilaos 1.5 
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Agesilaos' succession possible. First, a cloud of suspicion had plagued 
the young heir Leotychidas for most of his life. From the time of his 
birth, he had been suspected of being Alkibiades' bastard. During the 
latter's exile in Lakedaimon, rumor abounded that Timaia, Agis' wife, 
had become pregnant by him. 12 As a result, when she gave birth in the 
tenth month after Agis had forsaken her bed, the king refused to 
k 1 ..:1 h. . 13 ac now ettge 1s patern1ty. Even the ephors were suspicious, and 
It " Timaia's habit of referring to the child as Alkibiades in the presence 
of her helot maids did little to advance the suspect heir's cause. 14 
Second, the advocacy of Lysander that summer was crucial, because 
an oracle-monger named Diopeithes had produced an old Delphic augury 
warning the Spartans "not to lame the kingship." Agesilaos' lameness 
thus gave a pretext to Leotychidas' supporters to rally to the young 
heir's side. 
Third, in a more speculative vein, there may have been an under-
current of factional wrangling. The Lysandrians would back a man whom 
and Hellenika 3.3.1-4, Plutarch in his Agesilaos 3.1-5 and Lysander 
22.3-6, Pausanias in the Description of Lakonia 3.8.7-9, and Nepos in 
his synopsis of Agesilaos' life 1.4-6. Xenophon is the contemporary 
source, but the best description of events is in Plutarch's 
biography. 
12 See Thuc. 6.88.9-93.1; Isok. 16.9; and Plut. Alk. 23.1. Gemme 
et al., Vol. 4, 360-61, 366, discuss the implications ~Alkibiades' 
sojourn in Sparta. He arrived in the winter 415/14; thus in 399 
Leotychidas could have been no more than 15 years old. 
13A nocturnal earthquake had created in Agis' mind a superstitious 
fear of Poseidon's wrath. Thus he chose not to sleep for a time in the 
same bed as his wife. 
14Plut. Ages. 3.1-2, Alk. 23.7-8, Lys. 22.3-4; Xen. Hell. 3.3.2. 
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their leader believed "tvould be pliable and willing to support Spartan 
expansion into the Aegean and Asia. On the other hand, more traditional 
Spartiate~ who believed in the great rhetra of Lykourgos and doubted 
the ,.,isdom of simply taking over the maritime &pxn of Athens> would 
likely support Leotychidas. Agis after all had finally recognized the 
boy as his son, and the \....-ords of a dying man counted for much .15 
In addition to these thre~ circ~mstances, it is clear that 
Agesilaos was eminently suited for the role of military leader. He was 
scrupulously deferential to the ephors and the y{poVTSS who wielded 
the most power in the state at that time. By skillful and subtle manip-
ulation he ~vas able to augment his own pm.rer and largely circumvent 
these two bodies whose function was to check the power and ambition of 
the kings. Similarly, he enjoyed cordial relations with ordinary 
citizens by favoring those amenable to his purposes and winning over his 
adversaries with encouragement when they served the state well. His only 
weaknesses were that he was overprotective of his friends and would 
demonstrate an imperfect grasp of the importance of naval strength. 16 
Clearly the issues which carried the day for Agesilaos were his 
proven ability and the question of Leotychidas' legitimacy. Since his 
15Rice, Why Sparta Failed, diss., Yale, 1971, 10-11 and 
Hamilton, Sparta's Bitter Victories, Cornell, 1979, 87-88, n.l, theorize 
that three factions were competing for power at this time. See ch. 2 
for a discussion of the varying aims of each group. 
16Plut. Ages. 4.3-5.2; Beloch, Vol. 3.1, 109; Meyer, Vol. 5, 
197-98, 288-89. In this last regard, he was quite unlike his former 
partisan and ~PCXO'T~S Lysander. 
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nephew was a mere child, no older than fifteen years, the vigorous 
and tested adult would appear to have been the better choice for the 
state. Because of Agis' deathbed acknm..rledgement of the youth, 
Diopeithes' advocacy undoubtedly carried weight with the superstitious 
Spartans. This was so despite Xenophon's description of Diopeithes as 
AswTU;<dn ouvo.yopc:uwv ':Jhich hints at political as well as religious moti-
vation. 17 The key phrase in Lysander's ~cbut~al of the seer was that 
the god (Apollo) did not care if a king walked ~;.;ith a limp, oX\' c:l. lln 
/ ?f \ ( I ('( \ \ >I \ / 18 Y'JnulOS ()..)\) J.1n6c: Hpo.d.n6ns' TOvTO Tnv xw.Anv €l \JO.l 'Tn\) So.ulA€lo.\). 
This interpretation of the oracle, Agesilaos' contention that Agis had 
forsaken Timaia's bed ten months before Leotychidas' birth, and probably 
Agesilaos' maturity convinced the ephors to pronounce the more experienced 
man king. We are told that upon assuming the kingship, Agesilaos divided 
the estate of his older brother among his mother's poor relatives and 
drove the hapless Leotychidas into exile. 19 
It should be noted that Lysander's successful r~se was not univer-
sally acclaimed as a triumph of justice. From the remarks made by 
Plutarch in his comparison of Agesilaos and Pompey, it is clear that 
there was much doubt about the propriety of the accession in the ancient 
world. Although Agesilaos may have been a favorite of historians 
17 Xen. Hell. 3.3.3. 
18Plut. Ages. 3.3. 
19Ibid. 3.6. 
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20 beginning with Xenophon, Plutarch condemns him for injustice and 
self-serving expediency for the manner in which he became king. 21 He 
and Lysander stand censured for condemning and exiling Leotychidas and 
having done the state a disservice by "darkening the oracle of Apollo." 22 
The Conspiracy of Kinadon 
After describing Agesilaos' accession, Xenophon gives a flawed 
(by modern standards), but remarkably revealing glimpse into Spartan 
society in the years following Athens' defeat in 404 B.c. 23 The effects 
of the war on the holdings of some of the Spartiates resulted in their 
/ 
inability to keep up their share of the crucrcr1 1:lC:t1 • Because of this 
failure, these men lost their voting privileges in the assembly (aoella). 
One of their number, Kinadon, headed a conspiracy involving other 
' " UTf01JSl0\JS5 1 as they were called, ~ioikoi, and Messenian helots 
whose purpose was to overthrow the government. Xenophon's purpose in 
recording the details of this plot was to highlight the role of his 
friend, the new king. Agesilaos' part was limited to parti~ipating in 
unpropitious sacrifices at the time that the details of the plot sur-
faced, although he may have had a deliberative role in formulating the 
countermeasures. 
20Nepos Ages. 1.1. 
2lsynkrisis 1.2,2.1. 
22Parke and Wormell, The Delphic Oracle, Vol. 2: The Oracular 
ResPonses, Oxford, 1961, 50. The oracle originally appears in Diod. 
11.50.4. This reference dates to 477 B.C. when it was already considered 
"ancient." 
23Hell. 3. 3. 4. 
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The details of the plot are the following. Less than a year 
after becoming king, Agesilaos failed three times to obtain favorable 
omens at a sacrifice. The seer performing the ritual interpreted the 
contrary outcome as an augury of internal peril to the state. A few days 
later an informer came forward to alert the ephors that a man called 
Kinadon ~vith other "inferiors", perioikoi and Hessenian helots, was plot-
ting to murder the Spartiates and assume control of the state. 24 The ha-
tred among the few who were privy to the conspiracy was so intense that 
they wanted "to eat the Spartiates raw." The ephors at once consulted 
with certain elders and devised a ruse to entrap Kinadon. They would send 
him on a spurious mission to the ~fessenian town of Aulon. They would 
instruct him to arrest certain helots there and a beautiful woman who 
reportedly was corrupting Lakedaimonians stationed there, young and old 
alike. In reality, however, those assigned to accompany him had secret 
instructions to arrest him as soon as they were outside Sparta proper. 
In case any of his accomplices should hear of the counter-plot, a squad 
f 1 . . h. d . 25 o cava ry was to ass1st 1n 1s etent1on. It may be that Kinadon had 
performed such services for the authorities in the past after losing his 
c; 
status as an "equal" (Of.lOlOS ). In any event, he did not find the 
assignment unusual and thus played into the ephors' hands. Vpon his 
24chambers, "On Messenian and Laconian Helots in the Fifth 
Century B.C.," The Historian)40 (1977), 271-85, observes that much of 
the difficulty and confusion about the helot problem would disappear 




arrest, he was forced to reveal the names of his principal comrades, 
and the list which his captors compiled contained even so respected a 
man as the seer Tisamenes. \Vhen the ephors had received Kinadon and 
his fellows into custody back in Sparta, they asked him why had had un-
dertaken such a thing. His response was that he wished to be less than 
no one in Lakedaimon. He and the others were subsequently ~.;hipped and 
prodded in public, and 1='Ce::;umably executed. 26 
As Hamilton has observed, 27 Xenophon surely "c orr.mi t s one of his 
most serious sins as an historian by failing to analyze the causes and 
results of Kinadon's conspiracy." The root causes of the plot may have 
q 
been the growing inequality of wealth among the 0~0101 , which forced 
some of them to default in their contribution to the OU001T{a1 , or 
common messes. The penalty for such insolvency was loss of citizen 
privileges. Hamilton suggests that there may have been in Sparta at 
this time a crypto-democratic movement which hoped to achieve a more 
equitable participation of all Lakedaimonians in the affairs of state. 
It was certainly during this period that Lysander had plotted to open 
the kingship to anyone descended from Herakles, not just the members of 
26 ( I Hell. 3.3.9-11. Reduction to U~0~€1WV entailed loss of 
voting privileges in the apella. Many Spartiates suffered this 
embarrassment because they had been unable to contribute their share 
to the common mess. During the long struggle with Athens, such men had 
been unable to oversee their estates. See Meyer, Vol. 5, 26-27, 46; 
Beloch, Vol. 3.1, 28. A brief notice of the conspiracy appears in 
Aristotle's Politics 1306b, where a discussion of the weaknesses of 
aristocratic governments is under way. Polyainos also briefly 
summarizes the failure of the plot and the fate of the plotters (2.14.1). 
Aristotle discusses the growing poverty in Sparta by 404 in Pol. 1269-70. 
Xenophon (Lak. Pol. 14.1-7) hints at it. 
27Hamilton, 126. 
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1 . h 28 the two ru lng ouses. 
The internal situation at Sparta in 398 shm,'n by Kinadon' s plot 
was remarkably volatile. The obvious fear it aroused in the ephors, 
elders, and likely the two kings hints strongly at the changes and 
turmoil within the fabric of Spartan society. Yet as we have seen, the 
state easily suppressed the helot unrest, the "inferiors" dissidence 
and any nascent egalitarian tendencies. 
Preparation for the Expedition !£ Asia 
In foreign affairs, specifically touching Greek Asia, the in-
effectual Thibron had given way to the popular and successful Derkylidas. 
After the Spartans' wide-ranging incursions into Lydia and Phrygia, 
Tissaphernes, the Lydian satrap, had effected a temporary truce with 
Derkylidas in the spring of 397 (see ch. 2). Pharnabazos, the satrap 
of Daskyleion in concert with Tissaphernes and Konon, had undertaken a 
?9 huge Persian naval build-up in Kypros the previous summer (398 B.C.).-
The purpose, of course, was to challenge Spartan naval strength in the 
28For the discovery of Lysander's plot after his death at 
Haliartos in 394: Plut. Lys. 24-26, Horalia 229f, 212Cd, Ages. 20.2-3; 
and Nepos ~· 3. Both Hamilton, 126-28 and Cartledge, Sparta and 
Lakonia, A Regional History, 11QQ-ill ]·.£·• Ne~v York, 1979, 273-75, per-
ceive an intimate link between the conspiracy of Kinadon and deteri-
orating social stability in Lakonia at this time. 
29Although Spartan legates arrived in Kypros to discuss peace 
terms, Euagoras and Konon detained them (F398). Pharnabazos and Konon 
were thus able to conceal the naval build-up in Tyre for a full year. 
When Artaxerxes' court physician Ktesias came to Euagoras' court with 
a letter from the Great King, the Spartan legates were released, and 
Ktesias accompanied them to Lakedaimon. See Fr.Gr.H., nos. 688.30.32 
and Heyer, Vol. 5, 193-94 with notes. ---
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Aegean. Tissaphernes' temporary truce with Derkylidas would permit a 
similar massing of Persian land forces with an eye to ridding Greek Asia 
30 
of the troublesome Spartans permanently. 
In the fall of 397, word finally reached Sparta of the impending 
Persian designs on the Greek world of Asia Minor. Tissaphernes' truce 
vith Derkylidas ~;,;as shmvn to be a sham, and the true nature of 
Artaxerxes' and the satraps' intentions became clear from the testimony 
of a Syracusan mariner named Herodas sailing with his cargo ship to 
Tyre where he had seen 300 Persian ships either being fitted out or 
constructed. By discreet inquiry, he learned the purpose of this build-
up and set sail immediately for Sparta. After hearing Herodas' story, 
the ephors promptly summoned the allies to a congress in order to debate 
the best course in the face of the Persian threat. 31 
Lysander also was alerted about the activities in Asia Minor, 
and he lost little time during the allied congress in Sparta to urge 
his supporters from Greek Asia to request Agesilaos as commander of the 
expeditionary force. He intended to manipulate the new king in order to 
reassert his own influence in the Greek East. 32 He hoped to restore his 
friends, the former dekarchs, who had fallen out of favo~ and thereby 
strengthen his own faction in Sparta. His role in the deliberations was 
to downplay the Persian naval threat. He also hoped to restore the 
30
xen. Hell. 3.2.16-20; Diod. 14.39; Plut. Artax. 21.1-3. 
31 Xen. Hell. 3.4.1-2. 
32 Plut. Ages. 6.1-3, ~· 23.1-2. 
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dekarchies by procuring the command for his friend Agesilaos and then 
using the king to advance his o~~ designs. 33 Some 34 have seen in the 
former navarch's machinations a final, desperate attempt to regain the 
stature he lost in 402 with his friends' demise in Asia Minor. As a 
private citizen, he could never hope to rival the power or prestige of a 
king or even that of an influential ephor. Another successful navarch 
and :l.::co<,lplished diplomat, Antalkidas, would come to a similar realiza-
tion some ten or twelve years later. Thus Lysander's only chance was 
to manipulate a king who in some respects was obligated to him for his 
kingship and command. 
35 Agesilaos stepped forward to request the command, when the 
ephors had called the allied assembly. His purpose was to offer the 
Persians an honorable peace, or if they preferred war, to forestal~ 
their design on the Asian Greeks and even to wrest Asia Minor from 
Artaxerxes' control altogether. Agesilaos clearly showed that he had 
his own ideas about the expedition and was his own man, something which 
did not augur well for Lysander's purposes. In any event, the congress 
voted to name Agesilaos commander and to furnish him with a levy of 
2,000 neodamodeis, 6,000 soldiers from the allies, and a council of 
33 Xen. Hell. 3.4.2. 
34Meyer, Vol. 5, 194-95; Grote Vol. 8, 422; and Cary, CAH 
Vol. 6, 41. 
35xen. Ages. 1.6-8. It is curious that Xenophon eschews any 
mention of Lysander's role in this version. 
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thirty Spartiate advisors, chief of whom was Lysander. 36 At this 
point, a closing observation about the neodamodeis in Agesilaos' army 
is needed. Because Diodorus does not even mention these troops while 
Xenophon and Plutarch do so only cursorily, they have let slip an 
opportunity to furnish us with an insight into the social conditions 
obtaining at Sparta in the early fourth century B.C. ~oreover they 
perhaps have overlooked yet another reason for ~vul!Ling the Asian 
expedition. It is certainly possible that the authorities at Sparta 
undertook the campaign not only to meet the threat posed by 
Artaxerxes and the satraps, but to dissipate the revolutionary fervor 
of Kinadon's conspiracy~ By drawing off an additional 2,000 of the 
ablest and most vigorous of the non-Spartiate Lakonians, leading 
Spartans may have hoped to eliminate the basis for other such plots 
in the future. The battle-tested neodamodeis could expend any residual 
resentment by plundering the rich provinces of western Asia, rather 
th b f . b . d . L k d · 37 an y orm~ng su vers~ve ca res ~n a e a~mon. 
After decreeing the levy of allied troops, neodamodeis and 
advisors, the Spartans contracted an alliance with the Pharoah Nepherites. 
36xen. Hell. 3.4.2, Ages. 1.7; Plut. Ages. 6.3. Diodorus 
(14.79.1) alludes to the 6,000 allied troops and the thirty advisors, 
but is silent about the neodamodeis. 
37Grote, Vol. 7, 420-2~ succinctly notes that wide-spread 
civil discord would serve as a motive for dispatching resentful 
Lakedaimonians on "distant and lucrative military service." He cites 
the pre~edent of Brasidas' Thracian expedition of 424-22. See Thuc. 
bks. 4-5; 1,000 neodamodeis were already serving in Asia with 
Derkylidas at this time (Xen. Hell. 3.1.4). 
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The Egyptians, chafing bitterly under the Persian yoke and often in open 
rebellion against the Great King, agreed to supply the Spartan navarch 
Pharax with equipment for 100 triremes and 500,000 measures of grain. 
From his base in Rhodes, the latter with 120 ships then blockaded 
Konen's squadron of forty Phoinikian vessels at Sasanda in Karia. From 
this port, he laid siege to Kaunos, some 28 km. inland, but was coropelled 
to lift both siege and blockade upon the arrival of a relief force 
under Tissaphernes. The Lakedaimonians withdrew to Rhodes, and Konon 
sailed away to the Knidian Chersonese to recruit an additional forty 
ships for the Persian fleet. 38 
38
niod. 14.79; Justin 6.1-2; Meyer, Vol. 5, 172, 196; Beloch 
3.1, 42, 3.2, 123; Bengtson, Staatsvertrage ~. 167: Egypt had been 
in open rebellion against Sousa since 401 under two pharaohs, 
Amyrtaios (404-399) and Nepherites (399-393). The most recent 
opportunity for revolt had surfaced with the abortive attempt of 
Kyros to dethrone Artaxerxes (Xen. Anab. 2.1.14, 2.5.13; Isok. 5.101). 
CHAPTER IV 
AGESILAOS IN ASIA, 396-394_ B.C. 
The Fleet Assembles at Geraistos in Euboia 
In deciding to campaign against the Great King, the Spartans had 
several motives. In 400 B.C., they had promised to maintain the 
autonomy of the Greek cities in Asia. The expeditions of Thibron and 
Derkylidas were undertaken in fulfillment of that pledge (see ch. 2). 
Moreover, they could best dispel the threat of internal disruption 
(which Kinadon's failed conspiracy had laid bare) by sending abroad 
' to rich and distant lands those most likely to spearhead such activities 
in the future. Also Lysander and his partisans undoubtedly thought to 
recover their lost fortunes abroad and fallen status at home. As to 
Agesilaos' purposes, one might surmise that much the foregoing was at 
work, but he also seems to have entertained personal designs on an 
Homeric scale. 1 Hhile Pharax and the Spartan legates were preoccupied in 
Egypt, Rhodes and Karia, it was not by accident that Agesilaos had the 
allied fleet assemble at Geraistos in the southernmost tip of Euboia. 
wnile most of the army was preparing to take passage to Ephesos (the 
Spartan headquarters in Asia), Agesilaos intended to perform sacrifices 
at Aulis in imitation of Agamemnon. 
With most of the ships lying at anchor in Geraistos, the king 
lcartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, 277. 
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sailed up the strait and crossed over to the mainland at Aulis. 2 The 
night before performing the sacrifice, a dream came to him, advising 
that he make the same offering to the goddess that Agememnon made before 
'1 3 he set sal . Agesilaos reported the dream to his friends and decided 
to offer a deer instead of his daughter, because he did not wish to 
I imitate his Nycenean predecessor's cruelty. 4 
On the following day, one of the most crucial events in Agesilaos' 
life took place. It would have far-reaching consequences for his 
foreign policy throughout his reign. He decided that his own seer 
would sacrifice the stag at the altar of Artemis. This privilege had-
been traditionally reserved for the Boiotians. Upon hearing of this 
breach of convention, the ouictarchs sent cavalry to prevent Agesilaos 
from acting in a manner contrary to local custom. These riders tore 
the still smouldering thigh pieces from the altar and cast them aside. 
This officially sanctioned deed, which to Agesilaos' mind set his whole 
enterprise on an ill-omened footing, transformed his attitude to the 
Boiotians from distaste to hatred. 5 
2Geraistos on the south coast of Euboia was likely the site where 
a storm destroyed a squadron of Xerxes' fleet. See The Blue Guide to 
Greece, 379 and Herodotus 8.13. Xenophon (Hell. 3.4.3-4~ausanias 
(3.9.3-4) and Plutarch (Ages. 6.4-5) recount the detour to Aulis. 
3Plutarch's inclusion of the dream has a dramatic flavor reminis-
cent of Xerxes' dream (Herodotus 7.12-18) before the expedition to Greece. 
4Plut. Ages. 6.8. 
5 Xen. Hell. 3.3.4; Pausanias 3.9.3-4; Plut. Ages 6-10. See also 
Grote Vol. 7, 424; Heyer, Vol. 5, 196; Hertzberg, 41-42, Cartledge, 
267-77. Since at least 404, ill will marked the Boiotians' relation-
ship with Agesilaos' older brother Agis. The Boiotians simply 
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Arrival in Ephesos, Negotiations, and the Rebuff to Lvsander 
Tissaphernes, the satrap of Karia and Lydia tvho had negotiated 
a truce with Derkylidas several months prior to Agesilaos' arrival did 
not relish the prospect of an additional 8,000 hostile Greeks in his 
realm. Before Agesilaos could further augment his forces by local 
recruitment, the satrap tried to stall for time by demanding why 
Agesilaos had come to Asia. The king replied that he wished the Greeks 
in Asia to be as free as those in Europe. Tissaphernes averred that 
this could be so as soon as he had notified the Great King, if the 
Spartans would depart. He then proposed a three months' truce to allow 
time for Artaxerxes' response during which interval both sides would 
swear not to harm each other. Tissaphernes took the oaths in the pres-
ence of Derkylidas, Herippidas and Megillos tvho st..rore for Agesilaos. 6 
appropriated most of the booty from Attika after the disbanding of the 
allied occupation of Dekeleia. In 403, they ignored a Spartan decree 
and openly aided Thrasyboulos in his attack on the tyranny of the 
thirty. They had refused by 401 to participate in Agis' action against 
the Eleians and finally in 396, they spurned the embassy of Agesilaos' 
father-in-law Aristomelidas to join in the expedition to Asia. 
The Thebans, however, were not alone in refusing to join 
Agesilaos' crusade in Asia Minor. The Athenians had also demurred 
ostensibly on grounds of weakness, but Konon's overt advocacy of the 
Persian cause figured in their reluctance. Some Athenians dreamed of 
restoring their vanished ~Pxn and most would have welcomed revenge for 
Lysander's victory at Aigospotamoi (405) and the Peiraeus (404). The 
Korinthians actually responded at first with enthusiasm to the Spartan 
summons, but offered regrets when their temple of Olympian Zeus burned 
down. It is tvorth noting that these three states and Argos formed a 
coalition to make war on the Peloponnesians only two years later (see 
Hamilton, 183-85). Thus the Spartans' campaign involved only the 
Peloponnesian allies and the Ionian and Aiolic poleis of Asia. Never-
theless it was clearly Agesilaos' aim to continue restoring Sparta's 
tarnished image abroad by expelling the Persians from the Greek world 
altogether. 
6 Xen. Hell. 3.4.5-6. 
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Scarcely had the oaths been sworn before Tissaphernes perjured 
himself by gathering and training in the ~1aiandros plain a large army 
which he had earlier requested of Artaxerxes. Agesilaos knew of the 
continued Persian build-up, but he chose to abide by his pledge not to 
harm the satrap's realm, since the allies too \vere gathering additional 
support to counter Tissaphernes' treachery. Mistrust of the satrap 
produced a willingness to cooperate with Agesilaos even on the part of 
barbarians, which implies that efforts were under \·JaY to swell the 
number of troops in the allied army. These efforts netted another 4,000 
soldiers. The total number of allied troops must have exceeded 20,000, 
since Lysander's followers, other Asian Greeks and even barbarians were 
7 drawn to the king's entourage. 
\v'hile the truce was in force, Lysander began in earnest to 
attempt the restoration of his clients and the recovery of his own 
fallen status. He began to receive legations from his friends in such 
ostentatious fashion as to overshadm.r Agesilaos and make him seem no 
more than a figurehead. Because of this slight to his dignity (which 
he also believed could undermine his authority as strategos), the king 
began turning away Lysander's friends with their petitions unfulfilled. 
Similarly, he adjudicated unfavorably all matters pertaining to them. 
His purpose in openly thwarting these people, of course, was to assert 
his own authority. Moreover, the thirty Spartiate advisors had urged 
.., 
'Xen. Hell. 3.4.11, Ages. 1.10-11; Plut. Ages. 9.1; Polyainos 
2.1.8; Died. 14.79.2. See also Schaefer, RE Suppl. 7, 1593; Bengtson, 
Staatsvertrage l• 164-66; Lins, Kritische Betrachtung der Feldzuge 
des Agesilaos in Kleinasien, Halle, 1914, 16; Meyer, Vol. 5, 199. 
such steps because they resented serving as aids to Lysander rather 
than counsellors to the king.8 
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The former navarch eventually divined the reason for Agesilaos' 
behavior. He expressed his shame to the king at being treated in so 
unseemly a fashion by someone he had considered a friend. Agesilaos 
replied that only those who sought to appear more important than the 
king were so treated. To drive this point home, Agesilaos made 
Lysander his steward and told the clients to address their petitions 
to the king's meat carver. This action was characteristic for a man 
who had built his power base among the ephors and the common people. 
Because of the excessive adulation bestowed upon Lysander, it was neces-
sary for the king to demonstrate clearly to all that any power held by 
one man must derive from legitimate and duly constituted authorities. 
Agesilaos would permit no man, not even Lysander, to stand above the 
h d h k . 9 ep ors an t e 1ngs. 
Lysander then reali~ed the extent of the error he made in under-
estimating his old friend. He could no longer deceive himself that 
Agesilaos would be his tool or that he would control the allied efforts 
10 
as he had when he served as secretary to the navarch Arakos in 405. 
8xen. Hell. 3.4.7-10; Plut. Ages. 7-8, 1J.s. 24. Beloch 3.1, p. 41; 
Meyer, Vol. 5, 197-98; and Grote, Vol. 7, 4~5-2~ note that Lysander's 
arrogance may have been bolstered by the fact that the Ephesians had 
erected a statue to him in the temple of Artemis (Paus. 6.3.6). 
9Plut. Ages. 8.1. For the importance of Agesilaos' insight into 
the nature of power and leadership ability, see ch. two, and Meyer, 
Vol. 5, 197, who observes that no Spartan king in a century had been 
held.in such high esteem. 
10 Xen. Hell. 2.1.7. 
' 
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He subsequently apologized for his conduct and volunteered to serve the 
king and the Greek cause in Daskyleion, the satrapy of Pharnabazos. He 
set off for the Propontis where he brought about the defection of 
Spithridates, his family, and 200 horsemen. He obtained quarters for 
the Persian officer's family and the horsemen in Kyzikos, but brought 
the man himself and his son to visit Agesilaos in Ephesos. The king 
was pleased with Lysander's accomplishment, but put him to no further 
use. Thus at the end of the expedition's first year, Lysander went 
back to Sparta in relative dishonor. He deeply resented the sway of 
the two kings and was frustrated at his failure to reinstate the 
dekarchs in Asia Minor. 11 
Rupture of the Truce and the Campaign of 396 
In midsummer, when Tissaphernes was convinced that his army was 
sufficiently ready and had received the promised reinforcements from 
the Great King, he delivered an ultimatum to Agesilaos, threatening 
to declare war unless the allied arnij immediately withdrew fran Asia. 
Although Agesilaos' advisors were disturbed by what they perceived as 
a sizeable Persian advantage, the king not only rejected the satrap's 
~ A A ~ 
ultimatum, but did so joyously (paAa ¢atop~ T~ rrpocrwrr~) because 
he believed that Tissaphernes' perfidy had alienated the gods from the 
Persian cause and made them allies of the Greeks. A less pious 
explanation would include Tissaphernes' timidity in the face of Greek 
11 Plut. Lys. 24.2; Lins, 17, observes that dispatching Lysander 
to the Propontis produced Agesilaos' first real success. 
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hoplites (see ch. 2), the presence of the allied fleet off the coast, a 
recent treaty with Egypt which guaranteed a supply of grain, the difficul-
tY of controlling a large army in a city, and finally Agesilaos' own 
eagerness and ambition. The allies' only disadvantage was that they were 
lacking horsemen, while Tissaphernes' great strength, of course, lay in 
the renowned Persian cavalry. 12 
After sending the Persian legates back with his response, Agesi-
laos ordered the Greek cities south of Ephesos to set up market places for 
his troops. Greek cities to the north in Ionia and Aiolis were to send 
horsemen to Ephesos. Tissaphernes knew that the allies lacked horsemen 
and that Karia, his principal residence, was unsuitable for cavalry op-
erations. He therefore ordered his infantry to withdraw south of the 
Maiandros to defend Karia, while he massed his cavalry in the Maiandros 
plain, where he expected them to trample the Greek footsoldiers. Agesi-
laos, of course, had no intention of attacking Karia, even though it was 
Tissaphernes' home province. Instead, he gave orders to march up the 
coast to Daskyleion (Pharnabazos' residence), intending to gather horse-
men and supplies along the way. Also with Spithridates' defection he had 
acquired a most reliable guide to the Hellespontine area. Thus the Spar-
tan king adeptly requited the satrap's strategem with one of his own. 
Because of their uneasy cooperation Tissaphernes did little or 
nothing to relieve his ally's plight. Moreover, Persians in the Pro-
pontis, not expecting the Greeks to venture so far north, were caught 
12xen. Hell. 3.4.11, Ages. 1.13; Lins, 17-1~ and Kromayer, 
Antike Schlachtfelder, Vol. 4, 263-64, discuss the strategic situation 
of both sides. 
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off guard by Agesilaos' advance. As a result, the allied army, 
plundering at will, accumulated a great deal of booty. Many cities 
defected to the allied side, while one perhaps succumbed to a ruse. 13 
A sudden sortie of Persian cavalry near Daskyleion routed the Greek 
riders and only the hoplites' appearance caused the Persians to retreat. 
After this skirmish, Agesilaos had the army march back to Ephesos for 
t~c winter. Because of the obvious superiority of the Persian cavalry, 
Agesilaos issued a proclamation to all Greek cities in the hope of 
offsetting the Persians' advantage by the following spring. He declared 
that every rich man was to supply a horse and rider. If he did not him-
self wish to serve, he could hire someone else. By the next spring 
Agesilaos had greatly augmented his cavalry because of this proclama-
tion.14 
Naval Matters: Konen, Pharax and the Rhodian Revolt 
After Pharax had lifted his siege of Kaunas and the blockade of 
l3According to Frontinus (3.11.2) and Polyainos (2.1.6), 
Agesilaos induced the Phokaians' surrender by ordering a withdrawal at 
which their half-hearted resistance collapsed. When the Greek army 
reappeared, the townsmen surrendered. The dating of this ruse is not 
secure, as Beloch, Vol. 2, 14~ and Meyer, Vol. 5, 198, point out. It may 
belong to the campaign of 364 B.C., when Agesilaos returned to Asia after 
a thirty year's absence. Diodorus mentions only that Agesilaos with Kyme 
as his base plundered extensively in the Kaystros plain after the truce 
expired. 
14 Xen. Hell. 3.4.11-15, Ages. 1.13-19; Plut. Ages. 9, C. Nepos 
(Ages. 3.1-2) refers briefly to Agesilaos' deception of Tissaphernes and 
the lucrative campaign of 396 in the Propontis. Plutarch (9.4) asserts 
that the king cited the precedent set by Agamemnon (Iliad 23.296-99), 
who had done well to accept a good mare and free a cowardly rich man 
from service. 
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Konen at Karian Sasanda, he set sail to Sicily with 30 ships. The 
Spartans sent him in response to Dionysios I's request that all Greek 
£oleis aid him in repelling a Carthaginian invasion. 15 
After the Lakedaimonians departed, Konon lost little time in 
doubling the size of his fleet to eighty ships. By vigorous solicita-
tion in the Knidian Chersonese, he put to good use the money procured 
for him by Pharnabazos in 398/7. The exiled Athenian navarch then 
achieved the first real success in his attempt to avenge Athens' 
disastrous defeat at Aigospotamoi in 405. By seizing a beachhead at 
Loryma, Konon induced the Rhodians to defect from Sparta's Aegean 
, , 
apxn , a move for which there was great public sympathy. The Rhodians 
then intercepted the huge shipm~nt of grain which Nepherites had 
promised to the Spartans. The Egyptian vessels, carrying the grain and 
unaware of what had happened on the island, put into the harbor and were 
16 promptly seized. The coup at Rhodes precipitated the expulsion of 
the Spartan garrison and caused the loss of five or six hundred thousand 
measures of grain. In addition, the Rhodians welcomed Konon and extended 
their harbor to him as a base from which he was able to enlist the 
15niod. 14.62.1; Polyainos 2.11.1; Frontinus 1.4.12. Ehrenberg 
RE Vol. 19.2, 1816-17, and Beloch 3.1, 58 and 3.2, 372, plausibly 
identify Pharax who blockaded Konon in 396 with the Pharakidas named 
by Diodous and Polyainos. Meyer, Vol. 5, 106, believes nonetheless 
that we may be dealing with two different men. 
16
niod. 14.79.6-8; Justin 6.2; Paus. 6.7.26, Grote. Vol. 7, 436, 
n.3, observes that Rhodes had long been a way-station for Egyptian grain 
bound for Greece (see Herodotus 2.182 and Demosthenes 56.9-10). See 
also Bruce, "The Democratic Revolution at Rhodes," ..£Q.,ll (1961), 166-70. 
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services of an additional ninety triremes. The size of the Persian fleet 
now stood at 170 triremes to the Peloponnesians' 90. The Rhodian defec-
tion from the Spartan alliance and the seizure of the grain caused a 
major shift in Spartan naval policy a few months later in the spring 
(395). The loss of the grain also profoundly affected the conduct of 
Agesilaos' campaign. 17 
Preparations for the Campaign of 395 
During the winter and early spring (396/95), Agesilaos again 
clearly demonstrated his flair for leadership. He ordered a series of 
athletic contests in the great Ephesian agora. The purpose of these 
competitions was to bolster morale and hone the martial skills of the 
Ionian and Aiolic recruits. There was an Homeric echo in the king's 
purpose--the new Agamemnon staging games for the troops--more plausibly, 
though, he sensed a need to develop camaraderie and skill, especially 
among the Asian Greeks in his army. As Derkylidas in 397, he 
experienced misgivings about the competence of his Ionian and Aiolic 
soldiers. 18 Even the more experienced and soldierly troops may have 
required some training and diversion in view of the rich plunder of the 
autumn campaign and the inevitable allurements of a large coastal city. 
Agesilaos also offered prizes to the artisans who made the best weapons 
17see Grote, Vol. 7, 436-39; Beloch 3.1, 42-44; and Meyer Vol. 
5, 201. A brief notice of the Rhodian revolt appears in Isokrates 
(Phil. 63). The orator ascribes Konon's victory at Knidos in 394 to 
the revolution at Rhodes. See also ch. 5. 
18 Xen. Hell. 3.2.17-18. 
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and tools. As a final device to promote morale, he displayed to his 
men the naked bodies of prisoners whom the camp vendors had been unable 
to sell. His purpose was to show to the Greeks what sort of adversaries 
they were likely to encounter. He selected prisoners whose flabbiness 
and whiteness of skin betrayed a lack of the soldierly toughness and 
stamina which stern from hard training and long exposure to the elements. 
Buyers, he noted, had been found for the clothes and equipment of these 
prisoners, but not for the men themselves, who were ridiculed for their 
19 
softness and effeminacy as worthless. 
Agesilaos' humiliation of the Asian captives was a brillant 
20 
method of inspiring confidence in his own men. He did take care, 
though, that no one, especially the women and children, went hungry or 
was abandoned by the vendors as unsaleable. 21 He also evinced a flair 
for diplomacy by eliciting the aid of barbarian deserters.· He promised 
them just treatment in exchange for information. He also spared 
districts which came over to the allies, whether forcibly or voluntarily. 
19 Xen. Hell. 3.4.19, Ages. 1.28; Plut. Ages. 9.5. 
20Grote, Vol. 7, 431-32, contends rather oddly that the display 
of the naked prisoners was not meant to insult them, but rather to 
encourage the Greek soldiers. Yet because he quotes Herodotus 
1 10 ~/ 'I ... \ :) 7 ,I ,, ,;.. , • • • : avopa o$9nvat yu~VOV ES atOXVVnV ~EyaAnV ~EPE1• ~t ~S 
difficult to imagine that the prisoners were not humiliated by this 
treatment. 
21Grote, Vol. 7, 430, n.l, notes that there was a larger market 
for women to serve in harems and as religious prostitutes in Asian cities. 
Moreover, there would naturally arise a lucrative trade in eunuchs to 
attend such women. See Herodotus 5.6, 8.105; Dio Chrysostom. 21.4-6; 
and Xen. Kyropaid.7.5.61-65. 
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He wanted to win these areas over by good will to assure adequate 
provisioning for his troops. Finally, the king clearly showed his 
respect for people's religious sensibilities by carefully honoring all 
sacred precints, Greek and barbarian. 22 
Before the events of 395 began to unfold, Lysander and the thirty 
Spartiate advisors set sail for home upon expiration of their one-year 
tenure. Herippidas and !:~.:i.rty new counsellors replaced them. There 
followed a reorganization of command in which Agesilaos assigned 
Xenokles and another officer to lead the cavalry recruited during the 
winter. He also appointed one Skythes to lead the neodamodeis, and 
Herippidas assumed command of the veterans of Kyros. Finally, Mygdon 
took charge of the Greek troops from Ionia and Aiolis. With these 
developments the stage was set for the second and final year of the 
A . d" . 23 s1an expe l.tl.on. 
The Campaign of 395 B.C. 
The Greeks' activity for this year falls into two parts. The first 
is the spring campaign in Lydia which ends shortly after the battle of 
Sardis. The second finds Agesilaos and the allies engaged in a series of 
wide-ranging incursions into the interior of Asia Minor and the satrapy 
24 
of Pharnabazos. This venture followed quickly upon Tissaphernes' 
demise and death in late summer. 
22xen. Ages. 5.7, 11.1; Plut. Ages. 14, Apo. Lak. 213c. 
23xen. Hell. 3.4.20. 
24Agesilaos had led his army as far north as Daskyleion in 396 
(Xen. Hell. 3.4.11-15). 
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For the Lydian operations the sources are as follows: the march 
from Ephesos to the Hermes valley: Xen. Hell. 3.4.21-22; Ages. 1-28-30; 
p. 11.1-4; Diod. 14.80.1-2; Plut. Ages. 10.1; Paus. 3.9.5; Polyainos 
2.1.9; Frontinus 1.8.12; Nepos Ages. 3.4-5; the battle of Sardis: Xen. 
~· 3.4.22-24, Ages. 1.30-32; P. 11.5-6; Diod. 14.80.2-4; Plut. Ages. 
10.3-4; Paus. 3.9.6; Nepos Ages. 3.6; the de~cent along the Kogamos to 
the Maiandros and the return to Ephesos:P. 12.1-4, Died. i4.~0.5. 25 
When Agesilaos was sure that his new officers and recruits were 
' sufficiently prepared, he announced that the Greeks would march Tnv 
He set out from Ephesos 
along the Kaystros river, veered north and led his troops through the 
Karabel Pass. This narrow defile lies near the western end of the 
27 
rugged Tmolos ridge whose westernmost peak is Lydian Olympos. With 
25The great differences between Xenophon's narrative (which is the 
source for Plutarch, Frontinus and Polyainos) and that of P Oxyrhynchios 
(the source for Ephoros/Diodorus) have been discussed in ch. one. 
Pausanias' description of this phase, though brief, clearly derives from 
Xenophon. Nepos' account which is longer than Pausanias' also follows 
the tradition of Xenophon. Isokrates 4.153 alludes briefly to Spartan 
greed and the Persians' perfidy even to one another at this time. 
26xenophon (Hell. 2.4.20) believes that this vaguely worded 
statement was sufficient to deceive Tissaphernes about the Greeks' intent. 
27see Oberhummer, RE 18.1, 315: Kromayer, Schlachtenatlas, 
Griech. Abt., chart 4, map 8, and Antike Schlachtfelder, Vol. 4, 276. 
Ramsay, The Historical Geography of Asia Minor, 30, 60-62, points out 
that Herodotus (2.106, 5.54) erroneously ascribed a Hittite stele in 
the Karabel t~ the Pharaoh Sesostris. This path is in fact the southern 
part of the Royal Road from the seacoast to Sardis. 
the peak on their left, the Greeks descended into the plain south of 
28 Mt. Sipylos to await Tissaphernes' cavalry. The Persian horsemen 
appeared on the fourth day and killed some of the Greeks who were 
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scattered over the plain. > I Agesilaos then formed his men up £V TIA1V81w 
\ 
better to resist Persian harassment. Before the Persians' arrival 
only local Lydian defense forces (the yu~vnTa1 of P.) had been present 
to monitor and impede the Greeks. As more of Tissaphernes' sizeable 
cavalry force crossed the Tmolos, somewhere near Thybarna, Agesilaos 
ordered his army to march east toward Sardis at sunrise on the next 
day. 29 During the night, however, he secretly detached a force of 900 
hoplites and 500 peltasts under his cavalry officer Xenokles with 
orders to march ahead and set up an ambush. With the dawn Agesilaos led 
28Diod. 14.80.1; see Burchner, RE 3A.l, 276-77. Diodorus records 
that Tissaphernes had amassed 10,000 horsemen and 50,000 footsoldiers. 
P. 11.5 places these totals at 15,000 and 10,000 respectively. Xenophon 
mentions no numbers, but says that the infantry were deployed south of 
the Maiandros and the cavalry (for quick pursuit) to the north of the 
river. Diodorus perhaps transposed the figures cited by P. and augmented 
that of the infantry. Since Ephoros was Diodorus' source, perhaps 
Pausanias 3.9.6 also reflects the Ephoran tradition when he writes that 
the Persian force was the largest assembled since Xerxes' invasion of 
Greece eighty-five years earlier. During these operations, some part of 
the Persian force remained behind to defend the satrapal residence in 
Daria. Dugas, "La Campagne d 'Age silas en Asie Mineure," BCH, 34 (1910 ), 
62-65, Bruce, An Historical Commentary~ the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, 
Cambridge 1967, 153, have conjectured that some of the differences in 
the versions of P/Diodorus and Xenophon can be explained by assuming 
that Xenophon remained in Ephesos during the Lydian phase of this year's 
campaign. Anderson, "The Battle of Sardis in 395 B.C." Cal. Stud. in 
Class. Ant., 7 (1974~ 32, concedes that this is possible.--cornelius-,-
"Die Schlacht bei Sardis," Klio,26 (1932)> 29-31 believes that Xenophon, 
after surrendering command of the Kyreians to Herippidas, accompanied 
the Greeks, but was not privy to Agesilaos and his thirty new advisors. 
29xen. Hell. 3.4.21 states that the Persians first appear four 
days after the Greeks had left Ephesos. See Meyer, Theopomps Hellenika ,. 
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the bulk of the army eastward, while the Persians and Lydians resumed 
their harassment of his flanks and rear. When both Greeks and barbarians 
had passed, Xenokles deemed that the time was right and signaled his men 
to attack. The concealed Greeks' sudden onslaught threw the enemy into 
confusion, whereupon Agesilaos wheeled the main column about to trap the 
barbarians between himself and Xenokles. The enemy fled in all directions 
over the Hermos plain~ h0'•7ever, and most, including Tissaphernes, escaped. 
The Greeks pursued to the west as far as the Persian camp and killed some 
600 of the fleeing army. They overran the small garrison guarding the 
camp and captured a great deal of booty including the personal posses-
sions of the satrap (see map on following page.)30 
Xenophon's version of the march and battle differs in some im-
portant particulars from those of P. and Diodorus. In his version, the 
Greeks encounter no resistance in the Hermos plain between Mt. Sipylos 
and Sardis, but march unimpeded to the outskirts of the city. The 
Persian cavalry rush. to the city's defense, crossing the low-lying Mes-
sogis ridge, the Kaystros plain, and the Tmolos by the Hypaipa (Odemis) 
13. Later authors also ~~ote that Tissaphernes was deceived by Agesilaos' 
vague statement (e.g. Plut. Ages. 10.1-2; 3.9.5; Nepos Ages. 3.4-5; 
Frontinus 1.8.12; and Polyainos 2.1.9) into thinking that the Greeks' 
objective was Karia, not Lydia. It is unlikely that Tissaphernes was 
deceived at all, however, as the strategic situation would dictate that 
he protect Karia while the naval build-up under Konon and Pharnabazos 
was in progress. 
30 P. 11.1-6, Diod. 14.80.1.3-4. Because the text of P. describ-
ing the Greeks' march is mutilated, particulars of the antagonists' 
crossing of the Tmolos derive from Diodorus whose account of the march 
and battle is very similar to that of P. Diodorus gives the number 
of Xenokles' men as 1,400, which led Dugas, 67, and Bruce, 79 tore-
store P. to bring him into accord with Diodorus. Diodorus has 
Agesilaos initiate the ambush, not Xenokles (see Bruce, 79) and puts '·., .. --._ 
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This map is adapted from Kromayer and Veith's Schlachten-
atlas zur antike Kriegsgeschichte, Munich, 1922, griech. Abt., Chart 4, 
map 8. 
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route through the Goldjuk pass at 1065 meters. They descended directly 
into Sardis where Tissaphernes remained after entrusting conduct of the 
battle to a subordinate (the ~YE~~v of Xen. Ages. 1.30). This 
officer told the commander of the baggage train to camp west of the 
Paktolos to await the arrival of Agesilaos and the Greeks. This second 
subordinate ordered horsemen to attack when he saw that the Greek 
vanguard was scattered for pillage. Many Greeks died in this attack, 
but Agesilaos signalled his cavalry to come to the foragers' rescue 
which induced the Persians to assume battle formation. In the absence 
of the Persian infantry, Agesilaos believed that the enemy was vulnerable 
and after favorable sacrifice~, he ordered a full assault. The 
Persians resisted the Greek cavalry, but gave way before the light and 
heavy infantry. They fled in disarray across the Paktolos, where many 
were killed, and withdrew into Sardis. The Greeks pursuing to the east 
captured the Persian camp, seventy talents worth of booty and even some 
camels which Agesilaos eventually took back to Greece. 31 
the barbarian dead at 6,000 instead of 600. Bruce, 83-84, observes, 
however, that rhetorical exaggeration in Ephoros (Diodorus' source) 
is not at all uncommon. Because P. is the source for Ephoros, his 
account should take precedence. 
31 1 4 2 •• " . Xen. Hel • 3 •• 2 -25, Ages. 1.30-32. Delbruck, Ant1ke_ 
Kavallerie," Klio, 10 (1910), 335-40;Kaupert in Kromayer's Antike 
Schlachtfelder, Vol. 4, 262; and Anderson, 27-30, all argue for a 
rejection of P. and Diodorus as misinformed. Dugas, 58-95; Meyer, 
Theopomps Hellenika, 13-15; Delib~que, Essai sur la vie de Xenophon, 
Paris, 1957, 141-42; and Bruce, l-22,all reject Xenophon and accept P. 's 
version. Breitenbach, RE Suppl. 12.1, 393-95, leaves the question open, 
but inclines slightly toXenophon. Busolt, "Der Neue Historiker und 
Xenophon," Hermes1 43 (1908), 262-65; Lins, Kritische Betrachtuf, 21; 
and Anderson, 36, note the unlikelihood of the Greeks marching v 
~Atve{~ through the Karabel. Delbruck, 337-38, thinks it not likely 
·- ... -
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Xenophon is likely correct in stating that the first Persian 
horsemen did not appear until the fourth day of the Greek march from 
Ephesos. P. and Diodorus are right in ascribing Persian resistance to 
Agesilaos in the Hermes plain well to the west of Sardis, however, and 
their chronology allows an extra two or three days before the decisive 
encounter. Tissaphernes did indeed lead his men, as P. and Diodorus 
write, but he led them over the Ovadjik pass at 841 meters to the Hermes 
plain, not over the Goldjuk into Sardis (see map on p. 85 a). His 
c / 
subordinate, the nYEllWV , took part of the cavalry and perhaps some 
infantry to reinforce Sardis and await the Greeks just west of the 
Paktolos. The purpose of Tissaphernes' strategem, of course, was to trap 
the Greeks iu a pincer, but Agesilaos, upon receiving reports of a 
second group of Persian cavalry near the city, turned the tables on the 
satrap and caught him in a pincer movement by dint of Xenokles' ambush. 
Tissaphernes' camp was the one captured by the Greeks and the remnants 
of his men, as did the Persians near the Paktolos, withdrew for safety 
into Sardis without offering further resistance. 32 
that they could have done so in the Hermes plain either, because of the 
numbers of the Persian cavalry. Yet if the Persian cavalry made a two-
pronged attack to trap the Greeks in a pincer, Delbruck's objection is 
answered, because they would have been greatly inferior numerically to 
the Greeks in the Hermes plain between Mt. Sipylos and Sardis. Xenophon 
mistook the ~YEll~, who in fact remained in Sardis during the battle, 
for Tissaphernes •. 
32P. 12.1, Diod. 14.80.5. The initial resistance that the Greeks 
encountered near Mt. ,Sipylos came from Lydian YUllVnTat who were 
later joined by Tissaphernes' cavalry. The satrap would not leave 
Sardis itself unprotected, since a Greek army had put the city to the 
torch once before in 498 B.C. (Herodotus 5.99-101; Plut. Mor. 86lb-c). 
Anderson, 43, refers to "local defense forces" monitoring the Greeks pro-
gress. Tissaphernes may have decided to split his cavalry into three 
88 
For some three days after the battle, the Greeks pillaged the 
area around the city after setting up a trophy and returning the Persian 
and Lydian dead under a truce. 33 Agesilaos then led the Greek army 
southeast along the Hermos and Kogamos rivers34 until he reached the 
headwaters of the Maiandros across from Kelainai. Because the Persians 
were chagrined at the Greeks' success and in awe of Agesilaos, they 
followed the Greek army, but only at a discreet distance.35 Agesilaos 
/ 
was thus able to dissolve the TIAlV8lOV and permit his troops to forage 
at will. 
roughly eq~al parts, one to ride with him over the Ovadjik, one to go 
with the nYE~WV into Sardis through the Goldjuk (the route taken by 
the Greeks in 498), and one to remain in the Maiandros valley in defense 
of Karia. If P. is correct in assigning 15,000 riders to the satrap, 
each of these parts could have amounted to about 5,000 men. Delbruck, 
338, believes that the numbers cited by P. and Diodorus are considerably 
exaggerated. In any case, with Lydian light infantry and Persian 
cavalry in pursuit, Agesilaos' 14,000 Greeks could easily have marched 
tv ITAlve{~ through the Hermos plain after the first appearance of 
Tissaphernes' cavalry. Some of the Greeks would naturally remain behind 
to defend Ephesos; see Anderson, 31. (If Xenokles' contingent of 1,400 
ambushers amounted to a tenth of those with the king, roughly 6,000 
Greeks would have stayed behind to defend Ephesos.) Delbruck's conten-
tion that the ITAtve(ov formation was unsafe unless the enemy's. pursuit 
was desultory or numerically weak would not apply, if the Greeks out-
numbered the barbarians in the Hermes plain by almost three to one. 
33p. 12.1; Died. 14.802. Dugas, 61; Bruce, 79 and Anderson, 39, 
have noted that Diodorus' description of this pillage should have 
occurred after his account of the battle, not before it. 
that of 
is now 
34The Hermos' modern name is Gediz (BITrchner, RE 8.1, 903-04), 
the Paktolos is Sartiay (Keil, RE 18.2, 2439-40) and the Kogamos 
called Alaschelir Tschai (Burchner, RE 11.1, 1034). 
35P. 12.1-2; Diodorus 14.80.5. Kelainai in later antiquity was 
renamed Apameia; its modern name is Dinar (Ruge, RE 11.1, 133-34). 
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After his sacrifices at the Maiandros proved unfavorable, 
Agesilaos decided not to cross the river to march on Kelainai; instead 
he ordered the army to follow the river's course along its north bank 
back to Ephesos. The bulk of Tissaphernes' infantry and a part of his 
cavalry, of course, had remained south of the river to defend Karia. 36 
The Fall of Tissaphernes and Truce with His Successor 
Shortly after the Greek army withdrew from the headwaters of the 
Maiandros, Tissaphernes succumbed to a fatal combination of court 
intrigue and inability to rid Asia Minor of the Greeks. The immediate 
cause of his fall was perhaps his defeat at Sardis, 37 but the Great 
King's ire and apprehension had been simmering for some time. After Kyros' 
failed rebellion, Artaxerxes and his mother Parysatis (who preferred her 
) '1 d 38 younger son were reconc~ e • Although the satrap ranked high in 
Artaxerxes' esteem and took over Kyros' districts of Karia and Lydia, 
Parysatis hated him for denouncing Kyros and helping to supress the 
36 P. 12.3-4. 
(Hell. 3. 4. 21 , Ages. 
Maiandros plain. 
P. (11.3), Diodorus (14.80.1), and Xenophon 
1.29) all refer to Tissaphernes' forces in the 
37xen. Hell. 3.4.25, Ages. 1.35; Plut. Ages. 10, Artax, 23; Paus. 
3.9. 7. In a recent article, Westlake, "Decline and Fall of Tissaphernes," 
Historia,30 (1981~ 267-68) writes that Tissaphernes sent a subordinate 
to harass the Greeks in the Hermos plain, while he proceeded to Sardis. 
Westlake, 272, thinks news of the d~acle near Sardis did not reach 
Sousa before Tithraustes set out. Thus Tissaphernes' fate in this view 
had already been sealed. 
38
·niod. 14.80.6; Xen. Anab. l.l.4. Tissaphernes, of course, 
had a hand in Kyros' defe-'.:lt. 
revolt. She quickly took advantage of his failures against Thibron 
and Derkylidas to turn the Great King against him. Pharnabazos also 
strove to undermine his rival's influence at court. 39 
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Thus when Agesilaos routed the redoubtable Persian cavalry west 
of Sardis and penetrated Phrygia almost to Kelainai, the King of Kings 
finally acted. Since only Pharnabazos in cooperation with Konen had 
been effective against the Spartans, and Ariaios, the Phrygian satrap, 
was now at risk, Artaxerxes moved to replace the inept Tissaphernes. 
He therefore dispatched Tithraustes, his chiliarch or "grand vizier," 
to Kolossai, the Phrygian capital. After Tithraustes and Ariaios had 
arrested Tissaphernes and executed him in his bath, the head of the 
l.J ill-starred satrap was sent to Sousa. 
Tithraustes quickly took charge of Karia and Lydia and sought 
to reach an agreement with Agesilaos to prevent the Greeks from wreaking 
further havoc in the late Tissaphernes' domain. He proposed to leave 
Greek Asia autonomous, though still tributary to Sousa, if the Spartans 
would disband their army and return home. Agesilaos refused, maintaining 
that he could not act on such a sweeping proposal without consulting the 
authorities in Sparta. Because many Greeks were fond of Tithraustes 
and overjoyed at the execution of Tissaphernes, Agesilaos agreed to a 
six-months' truce in which he would spare Lydia and Karia. He was now 
free to operate in the mountainous interior of Anatolia and the 
Propontis which were the bailiwick of Pharnabazos. Tithraustes also 
39Justin 6.1.3~6. 
40niod. 14.80.6; for Kolossai (modern Honaz), see Ruge, RE 11.1, 
1119-20. Schaefer, RE Suppl. 7, 1598-99, offers an excellent discussion 
of the end of Tissaphernes' career. 
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agreed to give Agesilaos thirty talents for provisions and pay, although 
at the same time he very cleverly disbursed money to Timokrates of 
Rhodes for the purpose of bribery on the Greek mainland. 41 
The Autumn Campaign in Phrygia and the Propontis 
With the conclusion of these terms and the advent of summer, 
Agesilaos assembled his army north of Kyme. He was preparing to march 
through Mysia to the Anatolian interior / when a dispatch ( crKUTaAn ) 
arrived from the ephors. Its contents were of momentous impact, for 
Agesilaos was placed in command of the fleet with discretion to choose 
his own navarch. This decision was unique in Spartan history, for no 
42 
one had ever held supreme command both by land and sea. The ephors 
and / YEPOVTES had perceived Tithraustes' purpose in sending Timokrates 
to Greece and were aware that only a concerted, two-part effort could 
thwart the Persians' design to wrest control of the Aegean away from 
the Lakedaimonians. Timokrates' promise of money from Sousa to under-
write an anti-Spartan coalition in Greece and Konon's activity in 
Rhodes and Kypros were the gravest threat to Sparta's hegemony since 
the surrender of Athens. ~Vhile Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos had failed 
utterly to dislodge the Spartans from Asia on land, Konon and 
Timokrates were preparing to do so by naval action and by fomenting war 
in Greece. 
41 X;n. Hell. 2.4.26; Plut. Ages. 10.5, Artax. 23; Bengtson, 
Staatsvertrage 2, 167-68. Isokrates 4.153 states that the truce was to 
last for eight months. The results of Timokrates' activities in Greece 
will be discussed in ch. 5. 
42xen. Hell. 2.4.27-29; Plut. Ages. 10.5-6. 
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In his new capacity as chief of naval operations, Agesilaos 
decided to postpone his march to Mysia in order to augment the fleet. 43 
Because the Rhodian revolt44 had deprived the Spartans of the grain and 
naval equipment promised by Nepherites, the time to counter Konen's 
strengthening of the Persian fleet had arrived. Agesilaos, therefore, 
ordered that 120 triremes be made ready for service. He suggested that 
cities rravide some and wealthy individuals seeking to curry favor out-
fit others. With the coming of autumn some weeks later he was at 
last ready to begin his campaign in the interior. Before setting out 
he appointed his brother-in-law Peisandros navarch.45 
The autumn expedition consisted of three phases. 46 The first 
43Lins, Kritische Betrachtung, 38-39, suggests that the battle 
of Sardis occurred in early May. By July, Agesilaos would have returned 
from the Maiandros headwaters to conclude the truce with Tithraustes. 
His march to the plain north of Kyme and receipt of the OKU~~An could 
date to August. By allowing a few weeks for overseeing the construction 
of the fleet, one surmises that Xenophon's phrase ~~a ~ETO~~p~ (Hell. 
4.1.1) for the opening of the Mysian campaign is likely to be correct. 
44Diod. 14.79.4-7 and Justin 6.2.1-3 (spring 395). 
45xen. Hell. 2.4.29; Plut. Ages. 10.6. Plutarch writes that 
this decision was an error, because more experienced men (such as 
Libys, Pharax and even Lysander) were available. This seems, however, 
to be little more than tendentious hindsight. He writes that Agesilaos, 
according to Theopompos (Fr.Gr.n. 115.321), was commonly agreed to be 
the greatest man alive at that time. Meyer, Vol. 5, 197, notes that 
Agesilaos was the most highly regarded Spartan king in nearly a century 
as shown by his supreme command on land and sea. Since 90 triremes 
were in service, another thirty were needed. See also ch. 5. 
46nugas, 77, believes that P. omitted Agesilaos' extraordinary 
command and Peisandros' appointment as navarch because he was more con-
cerned with troop movements. Nevertheless, the omission of this detail 
is significant especially in light of what P. (22.4-5) writes of 
Agesilaos' intentions for the next year. 
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was the march from the plain of Kyme to the Paphlagonian border near 
the Halys River. The second phase comprised the treaty with the 
Paphlagonians and the return to Kios on the Propontis. The final phase 
was the march from Kios to the region of the two Mysian lakes just 
before the onset of winter. This region on the southern shores of the 
Propontis was also known as Hellespontine Phrygia and was the satrapy 
of Pharnabazos. Agesilaos and the Greeks entered Pharnabazos' realm 
after marching north to the eastern end of the Ida ridge. Here the army 
veered east, crossed the Thebe and Apia plains47 and entered Mysia. 
Agesilaos attempted to wi~ the autonomous Mysian highlanders over to 
the Greek side; those who agreed were spared the customary pillage, 
those who refused were not. His purpose in all this was to create a 
series of barbarian buffer regions between the coastal Greeks and the 
court at Sousa. 
The first difficulty of the autumn march arose when the army 
had reached the southern slopes of Mysian Olympos. 48 The only passage 
east was a narrow defile and Agesilaos was compelled to negotiate a 
safe conduct with the local mountaineers. The natives, however, 
treacherously attacked the Greeks' rear and killed about fifty soldiers 
who were not in formation. Agesilaos thereupon ordered a one-day halt 
47
see Honigmann, RE 5A.2, 1595-99 for Thebe and Hirschfeld, RE 
1.2, 2801 for Apia. Both-areas lie near modern Balikesir. While the 
Greeks were in Lydia, they adhered to the terms of the truce with 
Tithraustes and avoided pillage. After leaving the Ka·!kos plain (modern 
Bahir Tschai, Burchner, RE 10.2, 1501-02), they resumed pillage. 
4~odern Ulu Dag at a height of 2493 meters, see Ruge, RE 18.1, 
314. 
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to bury the dead while during the night, he had Derkylidas set up an 
ambush. At dawn the rest of the army moved forward which deceived the 
barbarians into thinking that Agesilaos was departing in dismay at the 
previous day's defeat; but Derkylidas' ambushers suddenly fell upon the 
barbarian leaders who had thought once again to attack the Greek rear. 
Agesilaos ordered the main body of troops to wheel about in support cf 
the ambushers and this time 130 barbarians died in close fighting. 
That evening the Greeks returned to their earlier campsite to await a 
legation from the villagers which arrived on the following day to gather 
up the dead. Agesilaos then took hostages from each of several villages 
to assure the Mysians' adhere~ce to the terms of the original safe 
conduct. 49 
After leaving the slopes of Mysian Olympos, Agesilaos gave the 
army a few days' rest before setting out to the south and east along the 
Tembris river. This was a part of Greater Phrygia which he had not 
penetrated in 396, so he gave his men a free hand at pillage. His guide 
for this part of the march was Spithridates whom Lysander had detached 
from Pharnabazos along with his son and 200 riders the previous summer. 50 
After passing the winter in the Greek city of Kyzikos, these Persians 
had joined Agesilaos' march south of Mysian Olympos. 
49P. 21.1-3. Agesilaos demonstrated that the same ruse which had 
embarrassed Tissaphernes in the Hermes plain could also prove effective 
against mountaineers in rugged high country. 
50spithridates vindicated Lysander's judgment and proved quite 
useful to the Greek cause. He had served under Pharnabazos against the 
Kyreians after Kunaxa, but took grave offense at the satrap who deceived 
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Spithridates guided the Greeks along the Tembris51 to Leonton 
Kephalai, 52 because the city was on the Royal Road. From there they 
could follow the Royal Road to the Halys and Paphlagonia. Agesilaos 
was especially pleased that Spithridates joined him because of an amorous 
infatuation with the Persian's handsome young son Megabates. 53 When the 
Greeks arrived at Leonton Kephalai, they attempted without success to 
reuuce the city by siege. After laying waste the area around the heavily 
fortified town for a few days, the army proceeded northeast along the 
Royal Road (from Sardis to Sinope) to Gordian which lay on the Sangarios 
River. 54 The soldiers were able to collect a great deal of booty and 
supplies from the territory, but the city's natural and man-made defenses 
proved too strong despite many attempts to take it by storm. Rhathanes.55 
him into believing that he would marry his daughter. Pharnabazos' real 
purpose was to make the girl his concubine, since he had long wished to 
marry only a daughter of Artaxerxes (Xen. Ages. 3.3). Another reason 
for his defection naturally concerned his own ambitions to which 
Pharnabazos was insensitive (Xen. Hell. 3.4.10; Plut. Ages. 11.2, Lys. 
24). See Kahrstedt, RE 3A.2, 1815-16. 
51The Tembris (modern Pursah) is a tributary of the Sangarios. 
Its headwaters are near Leonton Kephalai. See Ruge, RE 5A.l, 433. 
52Modern Afyon Karahissar (Black Opium Castle), see Ruge, RE 12.2, 
2052; Dugas, 81, Lins, 42-43. Meyer, Theopomps Hellenika, 25, n.l, doubts 
that Afyon is the site and places it instead further north. Because 
A . \ " , , "' ,. pp~an (Mithr. 19). says To -rns ¢puytas O)(UPWTCLTOV xwptov and the 
Royal Roads from Sousa to Sardis and Sardis to Sinope converge here, Afyon 
is the preferred identification. 
53p. 21.4; Xen. Ages. 5.4-6 lauds his hero's restraint in not 
yielding to passion, as does Plut. Ages. 11.2, 5-6. 
54The Sangarios is one of the longest and most important rivers 
in Anatolia. It has even retained the essence of its ancient name, 
known today as the Sakarya (Ruge, RE 14.1, 535-40). Gordian has been 
identified with modern Germa (Ruge:-RE 7.2, 1590). 
55P. 21.5-6. Rhathanes (or Rhathines) is also mentioned in 
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coordinated the Persian resistance and after six days Spithridates 
persuaded Agesilaos to march east to the Halys. At the Halys, the army 
turned north and marched along the river to the Paphlagonian border. 
Here at the Phrygian-Paphlagonian boundary, Agesilaos sent Spithridates 
. . h p hl . h" f . 56 to negot~ate w~t a ap agon~an c 1e ta1n. Spithridates returned 
with the chieftain and in exchange for a promise of 1,000 horsemen and 
2,000 foot soJrliPrs, Agesilaos offered his new ally the hand of 
Spithridates' daughter in marriage. 57 He then led the army directly 
east to the Sangarios, where the forces promised by his new ally joined 
him. Following the river's north bank, the Greeks marched to the city of 
Kios58 on the Mysian-Bithynian border. Here the Greeks and their allies 
tarried for ten days to engage in looting and pillage, although, as 
Leonton Kephalai and Gordion, the city itself proved invulnerable to 
assault. Agesilaos next led the army on a punitive expedition to the 
northern slopes of Mysian Olympos in requital for the highlanders' 
}nab. 6.5.7, Kyropaid. 8.3.32, and Hell. 3.4.13 by Xenophon. Also 
Isokrates(4.144)notes that Agesilaos reached the Halys River (modern 
Kizil Irmak, longest river in Asia Minor), Ruge, RE 7.2, 2286-87. 
56P. (22.l)names the Paphlagonian Gyes. Xenophon (Hell. 4.1.3 and 
Ages. 3.4) calls him Otys and Kotys respectively and writes that he was a 
king. Plutarch (Ages. ll.l)also calls him Kotys. Lenschau, RE 18B.l, 
188~ notes that it is impossible to recover this man's real name. See 
also Dugas, 83-84. 
57P. 22.2; Xen. Hell. 4.1.3. This girl, whom Kallias transported 
by ship to her new home, was reputedly quite beautiful and likely the one 
whom Pharnabazos had insulted which precipitated Spithridates' defection. 
Agesilaos thus created a dynastic marriage between two rebellious subjects 
of the Great King. 
58Modern Gemlik on the southeast shore of the Propontis (Ruge, RE 
11.1, 486-88). According toP. 22.2, Agesilaos led the army back to the 
Propontis because he believed it would be less strenuous for the troops 
59 
treachery some months before. 
97 
The army finally arrived at its last objective for the campaign 
of 395, the region of the Mysian lakes and Daskylion where Pharnabazos 
reputedly kept his treasury. In 396, the Greeks had penetrated this 
60 far north from Ephesos, but retreated to their winter quarters with 
no lasting result. On this occasi.on marching from the east, Agesilaos 
intended to conduct extensive operations in the ~egion and, if 
possible, to seize the satrap's treasury. His first object was Miletou 
Teichos, 61 but once again Lakedaimonian siegecraft proved inadequate 
to the task and the army, having crossed the Rkyndakos River62 withdrew 
to the shores of the Daskylitis lake. 63 The region of the Mysian lakes 
and Daskylion contained many prosperous villages, a series of game 
preserves and the Makestos, an excellent river for fishing. It was here 
who faced a lack of food with approach of winter. See Dugas, 85-86; 
Lins, 43; and Meyer, Theopomps Hellenika, 26-27. 
59p, 22.3; for the earlier episode, see P. 21.2-3. 
60 Xen. Hell. 3.4.13, Ages. 1.23. 
61Modern Kirmasti (or Kemalpasa), south of the eastern lake known 
in antiquity as the Apolloniatis, now the Apolyont (Ruge, RE 15.2, 1659). 
62p, 22.3. Munro, "Dascylium," JHS,32 (1910), 57-67, identifies 
this lake with the modern Lake Manyos, as does Ruge, RE 4.2, 2220-21. At 
a depth of 60 meters, this lake was easily navigable by Pankalos' 
triremes (see next page). Munro, however, believes the satrapal residency 
and treasury were one and the same, whereas Ruge and Dugas much more 
plausibly locate the residence on the coast. The Daskylion treasury 
(whose bullion was minted at Kyzikos some 26 km to the northwest) probably 
lay at Top Hisar near the modern town of Conlu; the satrap, who was an 
accomplished naval man, had his residence on the coast near modern Tiulye. 
63The Rhyndakos in the region of the Mysian lakes is known today 
as the Kirmasti or Kemalpasa. At its source, however, it is called the 









that Agesilaos decided to pass the winter. 64 He sent for Pankalos, a 
subordinate of Cheirikrates who was navarch of the Hellespontine 
region. Pankalos arrived with five triremes, sailed up the river to 
the Daskylitis lake and laded all the booty which the Greeks had 
accumulated since setting out from Ephesos in the spring. Leaving the 
lake, Pankalos sailed down river to the Propontis and deposited the 
plunder near Kyzikos so that Agesilaos would be able to pay his men for 
the next year's campaign. 65 Agesilaos then dismissed his Mysian 
soldiers, but told them to return in the spring. The Greeks spent most 
of the winter conducting raids and pillage in the My~ian Lake region. 66 
On one occasion a Greek foraging party was scattered over a level area 
when Pharnabazos suddenly appeared with two scythe-bearing chariots and 
400 horsemen. He fell upon the 700 or so scattered Greeks and killed 
or captured about 100. Spithridates some four days later learned that 
the satrap was in the village of Kaue about 30 km. away. He informed 
Herippidas who in turn asked Agesilaos for 2,000 hoplites, a similar 
64 Xen. Hell. 4.1.15-16. The Makestos today is called the Simav 
Tschai, Ruge (RE 14.1, 773). As Munro, 63, observed,Agesilaos led the 
Greeks upstream-and to the west in search of Pharnabazos' bullion stores, 
not downstream along the Propontis to the satrapal residence as Dugas, 87 
believed. Ruge, RE 4.2, 2220-21, points out there were no less than five 
sites called Daskylion in western Asia Minor. 
65p. 22.4. Kyzikos was an autonomous Greek city which enjoyed 
amicable relations with Pharnabazos whose bullion the Kyzikenes regularly 
minted. The Daskylitis lake at a depth of 60 meters and the Makestos 
river were fully navigable by trireme. Munro, 58-5~ rightly dismisses 
the notion of a vanishing marshpond as the ancient Daskylitis for pre-
cisely this reason. See Ruge, RE 12.1, 231-33 and Kraay, 370, No. 718. 
66p. 22.4; Xen. Hell. 4.1.16. 
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number of peltasts and as many of the Greek, Paphlagonian and 
Spithridates' Persian horsemen as he could persuade to accompany him. 
His purpose was "to do something glorious." Unfortunately less than 
half the contingent he requested showed up, even though his sacrifices 
proved favorable. In order not to become a laughing stock for the thirty 
advisors and the king, Herippidas set out with his diminished force and 
overra~ rharnabazos' camp. He captured a great deal of booty and many 
of the satrap's pack animals after killing most of the Mysian guards. 
Pharnabazos and the other Persians, however, escaped. The Greeks' 
success was nonetheless marred by a dispute which arose over the distribu-
tion of this booty. Herippidas insisted on taking charge of all of it 
himsel~ refusing to allow the barbarians in his force to keep anything. 
When Spithridates and the Paphlagonians tried to take their share, 
Herippidas surrounded them with hoplites and forced them to turn over 
everything to him. His motive was to sell the booty to the merchants and 
thereby enrich himself. Because of the grave insult to his honor and 
the plain injustice of Herippidas' decision, Spithridates fled during the 
night with his own troops and the Paphlagonians to Sardis where he joined 
h b 11 . A . i 67 t e re e ~ous satrap r1a os. 
After the loss of Agesilaos' Persian and Paphlagonian contingent 
to Ariaios, Pharnabazos sought to come to terms with the Greeks. For most 
67 . Xen. Hell. 4.1.17-28, Plut. ~es. 11.3-6. Xenophon and 
Plutarch both write that nothing so bitterly angered Agesilaos during 
the entire Asian campaign as the loss of this Persian officer and his 
men. Moreover, the strategic mishap was enhanced by a personal loss, that 
of Spithridates' son Megabates, of whom Agesilaos was enamored. Xenophon 
(Ages. 5.4) and Pl~tarch (Mor. 209d) write of the king's self-restraint on 
one occasion (before Herippidas' gaff) in resisting the urge to embrace and 
kiss the handsome youth. 
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of the late autumn and winter of 395/94, the presence of the hostile 
Greek army had compelled the satrap to keep constantly on the move. He, 
therefore, believed that with this first reversal, Agesilaos might be 
willing to talk. Apollophanes of Kyzikos, a man trusted by both sides, 
arranged a conference. As the elder of the two principals, Pharnabazos 
spoke first. After recalling his services to the Greeks during the war 
68 
with Athens he complained about the uns~emly devastation being done 
by his former friends to his father's lands and possessions. The thirty 
advisors were ashamed and kept silent, but Agesilaos himself finally 
spoke. He pointed out that even Greek cities which were once allied 
had made war on one another and he offered to accept Pharnabazos as 
an ally, if he, like Ariaios, were to revolt from the Greek King. 
The satrap's response was that he would do so if Artaxerxes were to 
69 
replace him as supreme commander in his own satrapy. If, however, 
the Great King retained him in a position of honor, he would be obliged 
to resist Agesilaos in whatever way possible. At this Agesilaos shook 
the satrap's hand, expressing his regret that he could not have such 
68
see Thucydides 8.18, 8.37, 8.58 and Justin 5.1.7 (412-411 
B.C.); also Gomme et al.,' Vol. 5, 40-42, 79-82, 138-46; Bengtson, 
Staatsvertr~ge £, 139-143. Pharnabazos, some two years after the con-
clusion of the alliance, made a truce with the Athenians and offered an 
Athenian legation safe conduct to Sousa. See Xen. Hell. 1.2.8, 11; Plut. 
Alkibiades 31.1; and Diodorus 13.66.3; also Bengtson:-8taatsvertrage £, 
147-48. 
69Pharnabazos, of course, was fully aware of Timokrates' mission 
to Greece and its intent to create an anti-Spartan alliance. Thus the 
likelihood of any further warfare under Agesilaos' leadership in Asia 
Minor was greatly reduced; see ch. 5. 
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a man as an ally and a friend. Moreover, he agreed to withdraw from 
Pharnabazos' territory and, if continued warfare were necessary, he 
. d h ' 1 d f f h . . 70 prom~se to spare t e satrap s an rom urt er ~nvas~on. Agesilaos 
then withdrew his army after exchanging gifts with Pharnabazos' son. 71 
He encamped in the plain of the Thebe near the temple of Astyrene 
Artemis and continued to augment his forces for the spring campaign. 
Because of the formation of the anti-Spartan coalition in Greece, the 
ephors sent a herald named Epikydidas with a crKUT~An summoning him 
back to Greece "to defend the fatherland." 72 
What Agesilaos intentions were for the coming year, had he re-
mained in Asia are fairly clear. With his brother-in-law Peisandros 
in charge of the fleet at a strength of 120 ships, he planned to co-
ordinate naval and military strategy. Peisandros would sail down the 
GOast to harass Konon by retrieving Rhodes and forcing him to withdraw to 
Kypros. At the same time Agesilaos would lead the army through Kappadokia 
and the Kilikian Gates73 to the Tauric coast just .north of Kypros where 
70 Xen. Hell. 4.1.29-38, Ages. 3.5; Plut. Ages. 12.1-9. 
7lxen. Hell. 4.1.39-40; Plut. Ages. 12.1-5. Many years later 
Agesilaos aided this young Persian when he had been unjustly exiled by 
his brothers: Plut. Ages. 13.6-7, Mor. 19lb, 209e, 807£. 
72xen. Hell. 4.1.41-4.2.2, Ages. 
3.9.12; Nepos Ages. 4.1; Justin 6.2.17. 
Abydos), see Jessen RE 2.2, 1878. 
1.36; Died. 14.83.1; Paus. 
For Astyra (just s.e. of 
73The Kilikian Gates are a pass in the Tauros mountains at an 
elevation of 1100 meters. The modern name of this site is Gu1ek 
Boghaz; Ruge RE 11.1, 389-90. 
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the Great King's fleet was under construction. The Spartans by advancing 
over land and sea might have recovered Rhodes, thwarted Kanan in Kypros 
and seriously crippled Persian naval operations in the Mediterranean by 
burning the Kypriote base. Since Ariaios, the Phrygian satrap in Sardis, 
was already in revolt from Artaxerxes and the Spartans were allied to 
the Pharoah Nepherites, a two-pronged attack was certainly feasible. 74 
The chiliarch Tithraustes and Agesilaos' would-be ally Pharnabazos with 
the collusion of Kanan and Timokrates of Rhodes, however, had already 
undermined any such project by the spring of that year. Much to his 
chagrin and disappointment, Agesilaos was, therefore, compelled to 
abandon any design~for further achievement in Asia. 
74P. (22.4)and Nepos (Conan 2.3) are quite specific about Agesilaos' 
intentions. P. even gives an estimate of the distances involved, saying 
that a N-S march to the seacoast of Phoinikia from Gordian through 
Kappadokia and the Kilikian gates is similar in length to an east-west 
one from Sinope to Gordian. Although the name of the latter city is 
missing from P. because the papyrus breaks off, it is quite clear that 
the Royal Road from the Black Sea to the Aegean coast is what P. had 
in mind. Xenophon (Ages.l.36) and Plutarch (Ages.l5.l)rather wildly sug-
gest that Agesilaos' purpose was to march on Ekbatana and Sousa to over-
throw the Persian empire; see also Diod. 15.31.3. Dugas,89, and Bruce, 16, 
remark that P. has given a much more realistic assessment of the king's 
strategy for 394. Neither Agesilaos nor Peisandros could have anticipated 
the dramatic increase in Konon's fleet strength to 170 ships which made 
possible the Rhodian revolt, but Agesilaos' program to build 30 ships would 
have restored the Peloponnesian fleet to its earlier strength. Even at 
a disadvantage of fifty ships, a naval campaign against Konon was, there-
fore, quite feasible, if well co-ordinated with vigorous activity on land. 
CHAPTER V 
AGESILAOS' RETURN FROM ASIA AND THE FIRST PART 
---- ---- --- --- ----OF THE KORINTHIAN WAR, 395-392 ~·f· 
Although Agesilaos' campaign into the Anatolian interior had 
resulted in no permanent occupation, he had brilliantly succeeded in 
creating a basis for widening the already latent disaffection with 
Sousa. Moreover, his relentless pillage had greatly swelled Spartan 
coffers while Spartan prestige in Asia soared after slipping badly 
during the tenure of Lysander's dekarchs. He had shown that the 
Persians were venal, disloyal and militarily inept even with the 
advantage of their formidable cavalry. 1 
While the Persians' soldierly reputation and the loyalty of 
many of the Great King's subjects were deeply suspect in Asia Minor, 
Pharnabazos and Konen had greatly advanced the Great King's position 
at sea. Too, the chiliarch Tithraustes, by temporizing with 
Agesilaos and buying him off for thirty talents,was able to send 
Timokrates to Greece once again with another fifty talents to cement the 
anti-Spartan coalition. 2 Pharnabazos had sent Timokrates in the fall 
1Pharnabazos must be exempted from the charge of disloyalty as 
he remained the faithful servant of the Great King throughout his long 
career. See Lenschau, ~E 19.2, 1847; Olmstead, History of the Persian 
Empire, 387; Isokrates ~.142-40 explicitly cites the Persians' in-
competence to deal with the Greek invaders in this period. 
2 Xen. Hell. 3.5.1; Pausanias (3.3.9) erroneously attributes the 
outbreak of the-war to this second mission in 395. As Meyer, Vol. 5, 228; 
Beloch, Vol. 3.1, 67, n.l; Bruce, 59, Hamilton, ~arta's Bitter Victories, 
182-83; and Lenschau, Phil. Woch.,47 (1933), 1326-27, have observed, 
the war was already in progr~ Plutarch (Artax. 20.4, Lys. 27.1, 
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of 3963 to exploit the growing resentment against Sparta by dispersing SO 
talents with a promise of further support to the leaders of anti-Spartan 
factions in various mainland poleis. 4 After Tissaphernes' demise in the 
summer of 395 and the truce with Agesilaos, Tithraustes decided to en-
gage the services of the Rhodian agent P-rovocateur. He sent Timokrates 
to Greece with another fifty talents and a promise of continued Persian 
support in the fledgling confederacy's struggle against the Spartan 
alliance. This mission came at a crucial moment and showed that despite 
Persian military weakness, the empire was well served by the diplomatic 
brilliance of her northwestern satraps, the great skill of her 
Phoinikian and Greek sailors and the vast wealth of the imperial 
treasury. 5 
and Ages. 15.6)recounts Agesilaos' witticism that Persian archers were 
driving him from Asia, an allusion to Tithraustes' coins brought by 
Timokrates to the anti-Spartan Greeks in Europe. See p. 115, n. 34. 
3 P. 7.2. Polyainos (1.48.3) does not mention Timokrates 
by name. Bruce, 59, sees a conflation of P. and Xenophon in Polyainos 
and prefers to date the first mission to 397. Hamilton, 188, thinks 
that 396 is more likely since Tissaphernes' treachery and Agesilaos' 
surprise attack in Daskylion could well have moved Pharnabazos to rid 
himself of the Spartans obliquely. If so, this would be the satrap's 
first meeting with Konon since he went to Sousa in 398 to begin the 
naval project. Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos' relief of Konon, whom 
Pharax had blockaded at Kaunas in 397, however, remains a possible 
date for the first mission. 
4These leaders were Kylon and Sodamas in Argos, Timolaos and 
Polyanthes in Korinth, Ismenias and Androkleidas in Thebes and Kephalos 
and Epikrates in Athens. Since the latter two were not in power, Xeno-
phon avers that the Athenians officially rebuffed Timokrates. Kephalos 
and Epikrates, however, undoubtedly accepted Timokrates' Persian 
largess on an unofficial basis. P. 2.2; Xen. Hell. 3.5.2, Paus. 3.9.8. 
5olmstead, 287-88. For the likelihood of two separate missions 
to Greece, see Barbieri, Conone, Rome, 1955, 90; Bruce, 60; and 
Hamilton, 211. 
The Phokis-Lokris Dispute and the Outbreak of the 
Korinthian War, 395 B.C. 
After the second mission of Timokrates, the leaders of the 
pro-Athenian faction in Thebes decided that the time had come to 
galvanize all Greece into an armed struggle against the Spartan 
alliance. Thebes was torn by factional rivalry at this time6 and 
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Ismenias' group believed that resistance to Sparta was not only feasible 
but necessary for their own political survival. Ismenias and 
Androkleidas, who along with Argive, Athenian and Korinthian leaders 
had benefitted from Timokrates' visits, believed that Theban 
Lakonophiles were plotting to el~minate the city's pro-Athenian 
faction. They knew that not even the other Boiotarchs would be willing 
7 to attack Sparta openly, because the Lakedaimonians "ruled Greece" 
It would, therefore, be necessary to devise 
a suitable ruse. They persuaded a group of Phokians to attack Ozolian 
Lokris over a disputed area on the western ridges of the Parnassos 
massif. In the past, much wrangling had arisen over grazing rights 
and each side on occasion had plundered the other's sheep. In every 
case, however, the matter had been submitted to arbitration. 8 This time 
Ismenias and Androkleidas' men persuaded the Phokians to respond to such 
a raid by a full-scale invasion. The Lokrians, whose land was cut and 
burned, sent a legation to Thebes requesting military aid. Since the 
6p. 16.1, 17 .1. 
7P. 18.2; Xen. Hell. 3.5.3. 
8P. 18.3. 
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Lokrians and Boiotians had long been friends, Ismenias and Androkleidas 
were able to persuade the Boiotarchs to come to the Lokrians' aid. 9 
When the Phokians learned of this decision, they withdrew from West 
Lokris and sent to Sparta a request that the Lakedaimonians interdict 
the Boiotians from invading Phokis. Though mistrusting the Phokians' 
story, the Lakedaimonians nonetheless sent legates to Thebes who for-
bade any hostilitie~ and insisted that all disputes be submitted to arbi-
tration in Sparta. Ismenias' faction, however, incited the Boiotians to 
reject the Spartans' demand and mount the attack on Phokis. 10 
When the ephors called out the ban, they sent Lysander ahead 
to await the full allied levy under King Pausanias. Militarily, of 
course, the Spartans' intent was to entrap the Thebans and Lokrians in 
a classic pincer movement. Lysander also achieved diplomatic success 
9P. 18.3-4. 
10P. 18.4. The essence of Jsmenias' plan was the deceit to 
provoke the Lokrian request for Boiotian aid. Xenophon (Hell. 3.5.3-5) 
writes that Theban leaders induced the Lokrians to charge-rent to the 
Phokians for use of the disputed land. This was to cause a Phokian 
invasion which would move the Lokrians to request Boiotian help. At 
this request for_help, Androkleidas persuaded the Boiotians to invade 
Phokis, a long time ally of Sparta, which would convince the Spartans 
that the treaty had been violated. Xenophon erroneously makes the 
eastern, not western, Lokrians the object of Boiotian aid while making 
no reference to any Spartan attempt at a diplomatic resolution. 
Plutarch (Lys. 27.2-3) blames the Thebans for attacking Phokis and 
Lysander for desiring vengeance. Diodorus(l4.80.1-3)also attributes the 
war's outbreak to the Boiotian invasion of Phokis. The diplomatic 
mission from Lakedaimon mentioned in P. indicates that Pausanias was at 
first reluctant to open up a second Spartan war effort against the 
Greeks while Agesilaos was still in Asia. The rebuff of this embassy 
and the Boiotians' invasion of Phokis, as Plutarch makes quite clear, 
induced Lysander to create a major shift in Spartan policy. Xenophon's 
erroneous ascription of disputed land to the eastern ~okrians, his 
in that he detached Orchomenos from the Boiotian league11 after re-
cruiting a force of Phokians, Oit.ians, Herakliotes and Halians near 
d . 12 Leba e~a. Just as in 396, when he detached Spithridates from 
Pharnabazos, Lysander proved himself a gifted diplomat and had now 
recovered much of the influence he lost after being disgraced by 
'1 13 Ages~ aos. 
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The Boiotians' response to the Spartan initiative was to send 
a legation to Athens. In their speech to the Athenian assembly, the 
legates noted that the only way for the Athenians to regain some measure 
of their former influence 'tvould be to go to war against the Spartan 
alliance. They mentioned the great discontent with Sparta in Argos and 
omission of any reference to Spartan diplomacy or Ismenias' brilliant 
ruse make it likely that P's explanation should be preferred. See 
Oldfather, RE 13.1, 1200-01. Hamilton, 193-95, who repeats Xenophon's 
error about 't-lhich Lokrians were involved in the dispute, believes that 
Xenophon derived his information from a biased Spartan source whose 
purpose was to cloak the Thebans' emb~rrassing rejection of Pausanias' 
diplomacy. Thus it is likely that before this rejection and the actual 
invasion of Phokis, most Spartans were unwilling to go to war against 
the Boiotian league despite Xenophon's assertion (Hell. 3.5.5). These 
purported grievances were probably more irking to the Lysandrians than 
anyone else. 
11 Andokides (3. 2.0) cites this loss as the reason for the 
war. Surely it was an annoyance to the Boiotians, but it was not 
the casus belli. It did, however, prompt their embassy to Athens. 
12P . ' d . i (3 ) \ " , ~ ausan~as escr~pt on .9.9 TOV OtTOV aK~a~OVTa 
that May 395 was the precise date of the Spartan mobilization 
~fvEtV ). See also Xen. Hell. 3.5.6 and Plut. Lys. 28. 




Korinth and the willingness of these states with Persian support to join 
an anti-Spartan coalition. Finally, the Boiotians insisted that many 
Eoleis would welcome Athenian aid against the oppressive Spartan har-
mosts and garrisons. Thus sometime in July or August, the Athenians 
voted to enter into an alliance with the Boiotian league. 14 
At about this time, Pausanias assembled the full allied levy 
at the Lakedaimonian frontier (Skiritis), obtained favorable sacrifices, 
and marched to Plataia to await word from Lysander who was pillaging 
near the town of Lebadeia. Lysander sent a letter to Pausanias in 
which he requested a rendezvous near Haliartos whose citizens he was 
trying to win over with diplomacy. The man carrying this letter, how-
ever, fell in with Theban scouts who reported back to the city. There 
an Athenian levy was placed in charge, while a Theban force marched to 
the Haliartians' relief. Without waiting for Pausanias, Lysander moved 
his line forward from the hill he had occupied outside the town. As he 
approached the gates, a force of Thebans and Haliartians suddenly rushed 
out while the Theban relief force outside the walls rose up against 
Lysander's rear. In the ensuing struggle the Spartans lost their 
greatest naval commander, his personal priest and about 1,000 of their 
allies. The Theban losses amounted to 300 men who)in their anxiety to 
dispel any suspicion of "lakonizing;' pursued the fleeing allies into 
14
xen. Hell. 3.5.7-17; P.(l8.l)notes that it was widely expected 
that the Argives, Korinthians and Athenians would join the Boiotians 
in a war against Sparta. See also Tod, Qlll, nos. 101-02, Bengtson, 
Staatsvertr~ge 1, 168-70 with full notes and bibliography, Meyer, Vol. 
5, 230; Beloch 3.2, 69; and Hamilton, 201. 
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rugged terrain where the advantage reverted to the Peloponnesians. 15 
Word reached Pausanias of Lysander's demise while the main army 
was on the road between Plataia and Thespiai. When the king arrived 
at Haliartos, he conferred with his advisors and decided to recover 
the fallen Spartans under a truce. The Thebans would allow them to re-
cover the dead only on condition that they withdraw from Boiotia. 
P~usanias agreed and led the army back across the Isthmos. When he re-
turned to Sparta, however, he found himself on trial for his life. The 
Lysandrians,who were stunned and outraged at their hero's death,accused 
Pausanias of failing to arrive at Haliartos on the specified date, of 
recovering the dead by truce instead of offering battle, and of allowing 
the Athenian democrats in the Peiraeus to escape chastisement (a charge 
of which he had bee~ acquitted eight years before!). Realizing that 
his case was hopeless, he fled for sanctuary to the temple of Athena 
Alea in Tegea where he eventually died in exile. 16 
During that same summer (395), Tithraustes, after coming to 
terms with Agesilaos, sent Timokrates to Greece with another fifty 
15Plut. Lys. 28.1-12. Xenophon who relied on a Spartan source 
is clearly in error when he asserts that the rendezvous at Haliartos 
had been arranged in Lakedaimon (Hell. 2.5.6). Similarly, he writes 
that Lysander did not wait for Pausanias at Haliartos, but rather that 
he approached and was either surprised by the Thebans near the town 
walls or simply chose to resist their advances in expectation of de-
feating them (Hell. 3.5.17-21). Xenophon puts the Theban losses at over 
200 with no mention of the number of allied fallen who fled at Lysander's 
death. For a brief synopsis of Lysander's death, see also Diod. 14.81 
and Paus. 3.5.3-5, 9.32.5. 
16 Xen. Hell. 3.5.17-25; Plut. Lys. 29.1-30.1; Diod. 14.81.2-3, 
89.1-2; Paus. 3.5.6. See also Beloch, 3.1, 71 with notes. 
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talents. The Theban and Athenian success against Lysander and 
Pausanias at Haliartos, Timokrates' second disbursal of Persian silver 
and the long-smouldering resentment in Greece at Sparta's high-handed 
oppression resulted in the creation of the anti-Spartan coalition at 
17 Korinth in the autumn. The envoys of these states quickly under-
took a diplomatic offensive to detach as many states beyond the 
Isthmos from the Spartans as possible. That autumn the anti-Spartan 
coalition brought over to its side the Euboians, Chalkidikians, Medias 
of Larissa (whom they aided militarily in his struggle with Lykophron 
of Pherai~18 and the Ambrakiotes, Akarnanians, and Leukadians. 
Ismenias with 2,000 soldiers and aid from his new ally Medias 
captured Herakleia,expelled the Spartan garrison and repatriated the 
town with its original inhabitants. He then defeated a force of 
Phokians commanded by a Spartan officer near the town of Naryx in 
Lokris which in legend was the birth place of small Aias. One thousand 
allied soldiers fell, while the coalition lost 500. 19 
Athens d~ring the winter and spring of 395i94 was also actively 
17see Bengtson, Staatsvertrage l• 171-72, Tod, GHI, no. 102, 
and Hamilton, 207. 
18niod. 14.82.1-6. Hamilton, 215, points out that the coali-
tion needed an ally in Thessaly because the Spartans had a garrison at 
Oite and Herakleia, while the Orchomeni.ans held Thermopylai for them. 
Thus, if Agesilaos were to march home from Asia, he would encounter 
significant resistance south of Mt. Olympos. 
19niod. 14.82.6-10. Thus in late 395 the Spartans suffered 
embarrassing, but not crippling military and diplonatic losses in central 
Greece. 
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recruiting new members for the coalition. She brought Lokris and 
Eretria into the fold by treaty. 20 By the spring of 394, a consider-
able number of hostile troops had gathered at Korinth and Sparta could 
no longer ignore the growing military threat. The ephors therefore 
decided to move against the coalition and took two steps to this pur-
pose. They called out the ban and named Aristodemos commander, since 
Pausanias' son Agesipolis was too young to assume military responsibili-
ties. Because a regent was chosen to lead the Peloponnesians, it was 
clear that Sparta intended a full-scale effort. The second measure 
was to summon Agesilaos home from Asia. 21 
Ancient and modern authors have advanced various explanations 
for the outbreak of what was to be known as the Korinthian War. In 
antiquity some attributed the hostilities to Persian diplomacy. 22 
Others have explicitly rejected this notion and insist instead that 
deeply felt resentment against Sparta and factional politics created 
the necessary conditions. 23 One author ascribed the war to the defection 
of Orchomenos from the Boiotian league. 24 Modern scholars have seen 
20see Bengtson, Staatsvertr:ge 2, 170-71 and 176-77. 
21
xen. Hell. 4.2.1, 9; Diod. 14.83.1. 
22xen. Hell. 3.5.1-2; Plut. Ages. 15.8; Paus. 3.9.9. 
23p, 7.2-3, 16.1, 17.1. 
24 Andok. 3.20. 
mere ill luck and accident as the cause, 25 fear of Spartan interven-
tion in the internal affairs of the coalition states, 26 and serious 
economic strictures on Athens and Korinth, 27 all of which created 
violent opposition to Lakedaimon. The best and most inclusive 
explanation would discover the war's cause in the complex welter of 
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social, political and economic conditions stemming from the defeat of 
Athens in 404 B.r.. 28 In any case, it was the outbreak of this struggle 
which ended forever Agesilaos' dreams of conquest and glory in Asia. 
The March Back from Asia 
After withdrawing from Pharnabazos' territory, Agesilaos began 
to make plans for his spring offensive. He made strenuous diplomatic 
overtures to Greeks and barbarians to induce their defection from the 
Great King and to accept his leadership. He al~o toured extensively 
during these weeks to restore stability to Greek cities in which bloody 
factional strife (the legacy of Lysander's dekarchies) had undermined 
civility and order. He was able to achieve this without resorting to 
violence, banishment or executions. After composing the cities' in-
ternal strife and greatly swelling his own ranks with defectors, he 
25Bruce, "Internal Politics and the Outbreak of the Korinthian 
War," Emerita, 28 (19601, 7 5-76. 
26Per1man, "The Causes and Outbreak of the Corinthian War," S 
14 (1964)' 66-68. 
27Kagan, "The Economic Origins of the Corinthian War," Parola 
del Passato,l6 (1961),321-41. 
28Hamilton, 183-84. 
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assembled his forces in the Thebe plain near the shrine of Astyrene 
Artemis, an area about 30 km. southeast of Abydos.29 Sometime during 
the winter, Agesilaos had made a dedication to the Ephesian Artemision 
which had been extensively damaged by a fire. This donation to help 
rebuild the temple has yielded our only bit of physical evidence of 
Agesilaos' presence in Asia during these two years. 30 That he would 
set aside some of the booty to dedicate a column to the goddess was 
important to his soldiers, Greek and non-Greek, as proof· of the king's 
dedication to higher powers.31 
With the arrival of Epikydidas in May of 394 to recall him 
from Asia, Agesilaos suppressed his bitter disappointment 
and submitted to the ephors' authority. h~ informed the Greek and bar-
barian allies of the Spartans' decision, but promised net to forget them. 
He said that as soon as matters in Europe were resolved, he would return 
to accomplish whatever they might need. At this, many of the allies burst 
into tears and volunteered to accompany him back to Greece. He then 
29xen. Hell. 4.1.41, Ages. 1.35-37; Plut. Ages. 15.1; for 
Astyra, see Jessen, RE 2.2, 1878. The site is near modern Kinazli. 
30The evidence is a column base in the British Museum whose 
dedicatory inscription Borker, "Konig Agesilaos von Sparta und der 
Artemis-Temple in Ephesos;• ZPT<" 37 (1980), 74-75, restores to rear'! 
\) / )' ~--1: Bc«n AEUS :AynatJ.aos a.VE8nKEV i\pTElH u 1 • Wesenberg, "Agesi l.aos . 
im Artemision;• ZPE,41 (1981), 178-79, believes that the inscription was 
intentionally mutilated after Sparta surrendered the Asian Greeks to 
Artarxerxes in 387 (see ch. 6). 
31 Xenophon (Ages. 5.7) and Plutarch (Ages. 14) describe 
Agesilaos' careful attention to, and respect for, even barbarian 
places of worship. 
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appointed Euxenos harmost after assigning him 4,000 troops to safeguard 
and garrison the cities.32 
In order to determine which troops to take with him and which 
to leave behind 'tvith Euxenos, as in the previous year, he instituted a 
series of competitions. He did this after observing that many of his 
troops seemed more eager to remain in Asia than to cross over into 
Europe. He also wanted to be certain of the Ionian and Aiolic troops' 
readiness, since so many of these men had volunteered to accompany him. 
The final decision, he announced, would be made near Sestos after the 
army had crossed the Hellespont. Contests would be held in each of the 
follov:ing categories: one for the city sending_ the best contingent, one 
each for the captain of the best equipped hoplites, peltasts, archers 
and cavalry. The winning captains of hoplites and cavalry would receive 
beautifully 'tvrought sets of armor, while those in the other categories 
would earn wreaths of gold. The value of the armor and wreaths amounted 
to no less than four talents. When the army reached the area of Sestos, 
Agesilaos chose the Lakedaimonians Menaskos, Orsippos and Herippidas and 
one man from each allied city as judges. After the distribution of 
prizes, Agesilaos led his army along the same route as Xerxes had almost 
a century before when the Persians had invaded Greece. 33 
32 Xen. Hell. 4.2.3-5, Ages. 1.38; Plut. Ages~ 15.5. See also 
Meyer, Vol. 5, 230 and Beloch, 3.1, 72. · 
33 Xen. Hell. 4.2.5-8, Ages. 1.39; Plutarch (~. 15.5-8) 
writes that Agesilaos gave the finest example of obedience to 
legitimate authority ever seen by returning from Asia at the ephors' 
summons. Hamilton, 219, believes that Epikydidas' description of 
the outbreak of war in Greece further exacerbated Agesilaos' resent-
ment of the Thebans. 
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While the army was breaking camp at Sestos, Agesilaos wryly 
observed that 10,000 of the king's archers were driving him out of 
Asia. The reference was to the bribes disbursed by Timokrates to the 
anti-Spartan leaders in Greece and the fact that many Persian coins 
were stamped with the figure of a bow~an. 34 As the army passed through 
Hellespontine Thrace, Agesilaos sent envoys ahead to ask but one 
question: would they permit the Greeks safe passage? All tribes ehose 
to receive the army in a friendly spirit except the Trallians. 35 This 
people, to whom even Xerxes had paid a transit fee, asked for 100 talents 
of silver and an equal number of women as the price of passage. 
Agesilaos responded that they should come and take what they wanted, 
prompting the Trallians to draw themselves into battle formation. 
Agesilaos, however, routed and killed many of them with little or no 
allied losses. After this the allies encountered no further resistance 
and arrived at Amphipolis. 36 
While encamped near Amphipolis, Agesilaos received two legations. 
The first came from the island of Thasos which lay some 80 km. to the 
east. The purpose of this mission was clearly flattery. 37 A second more 
34Plut. Ages. 15.6 and Mor. 2llb. The figure in the Moralia is 
30,000 archers. Whichever is correct, it is clear that Epikydidas had 
briefed Agesilaos well about Persian monetary initiatives in Europe. For 
the type of coin in question, see Regling, RE 2A.2, 2316-22, and Kraay, 
369,with notes and bibliography. 
35 Plut. Ages. 16.1, Mor. 211C. For a discussion of the fiercely 
independent, semi-civilized tribe, see Lenk, RE 6A.l, 407. 
36xen. Hell. 4.3.1; Plut. Ages. 16.1-3. 
37 See Jacoby, Fr.Gr.H. 2B.l, no. 115.22 under Theopompos 
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serious legation under Derkylidas arrived from Sparta whose purpose was 
to inform Agesilaos about the outcome of the battle of Nemea. 38 
as preserved in Athenaios, Deipnosophistai 657b/c. The Thasians 
hoping to win Agesilaos' favor brought cattle, sheep and some of their 
exotic island dishes. The king, however, remarked that only beef and 
mutton were fit for consumption by soldiers of Lakedaimon and distributed 
the exotic items to the helots who were welcome, he said, to perish from 
the food's ill effects. According to Plutarch (~.210d), the Thasians 
offered to deify Agesilaos, claiming it was in their power to do so. 
He dismissed them, however, sAyi~g that they should make themselves gods 
first before offering to do so for others. This offer was meant to be 
reminiscent of the Samian deification of Lysander (see ch. 2). 
38The anti-Spartan coalition accelerated its activities when 
it became clear that Sparta was mobilizing in the Peloponnesos 
and had summoned Agesilaos home from Asia. Timolaos of Korinth urged 
swift action to check the Spartans before they could assemble the full 
allied levy, but the coalition, by squabbling over command positions 
and phalanx depth, lost the opportunity to act on his advice. When the 
allied army reached the Korinthia and fell to pillaging, the coalition 
finally drew up its forces on the eastern slope of the dry Nemea river 
bed. The two camps were separated by only 1.85 km. when the armies. 
finally engaged. Xenophon (Hell.4.2.13-23) and Diodorus (14.83.1-2) are the 
only ancient authors to preserve a record of this encounter. Diodorus' 
version is very summary, providing only the numbers ranged on either 
side of the river bed and the casualties. Xenophon's description is 
much longer and lists the contingents by city. In his reckoning, 
the Peloponnesians had 13,500 to the coalition's 21,500. Kromayer, 
Antike Schlachtfelder 4, 595-96, suggests that Xenophon (who was 
travelling with Agesilaos at this time) neglected to include almost 
9,000 Achaian, Mantineian and Tegeate hoplites in spite of mentioning 
that the Spartans had collected them en route. Diodorus similarly 
appears to have ommitted the 6,000 Athenians. The actual figures, 
therefore, were 21,500 coalition troops against the Peloponnesians' 
23,500. In different sectors of the field different sides had the 
advantage until the Spartans detached and routed the Athenians (who had 
changed places with the timorous Thebans because the latter refused to 
face the Spartans). At this the rest of the coalition line broke and 
fled to Korinth whose pro-Spartan citizens locked them out and sent a 
legation to Lakedaimon to sue for peace. Diodorus tells us that the 
allies lost 1100 men to the coalition's 2800 and Xenophon notes that 
the Spartans erected a trophy. Epigraphical evidence of Athenian 
participation in the battle survives and is discussed by Tod, GHI, nos. 
104/05. Pausanias (1.29.11) describes this stele which lists eleven 
fallen cavalrymen of a 600-man contingent. TI1is is perhaps a listing of 
only one tribe's fallen. In any case the battle was indecisive, although 
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Derkylidas reported that only eight Lakedaimonians had perished, while 
a great many of the enemy had fallen. Perhaps only eight Spartiates 
fell, but a figure of 1100 seems more likely for the allied side. 
Agesilaos then decided that it would be well to inform the Asian Greeks 
of this victory and remind them of his promise to return. 
fore, sent Derkylidas back to the Hellespont (July 394). 39 
He, there-
Agesilaos then left Amphipolis and led the army into Makedonia 
after sending envoys to King Airopos to ask for safe conduct. Airopos, 
suspecting that the Lakedaimonians were weak in cavalry, at first re-
fused. When Agesilaos ordered all animals to be mounted, thus creating 
an impression of a much larger cavalry force than he actually had, 
Airopos abandoned his bellicose posture and allowed the army to pass. 40 
In Thessaly a somewhat different situation confronted the allies. 
Here they could not merely request safe passage becaus~ like the 
Chalkidikians, most Thessalians had sided with the anti-Spartan 
the Peloponnesians seem to have enjoyed a slight advantage. For a full 
analysis of numbers, topography and interpretation of this encounter, 
see Pritchett, "The Battle Near the Nemea River in 394 B.C.," Studies 
in Ancient Greek Topography~ Part 2, 74-84; Cavaignac, "A propos de la 
bataille du torrent du Nemee," REA,27 (1925),273-78; Anderson, Military 
Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon, Berkeley, 1970, 141-50; 
Kromayer, Schlachtenatlas, Griesch. Abt., maps 1 and 2, 29-30; and 
finally Accame, Ricerche intorno alla Guerra Corinzia, Naples, 1951,65-87, 
who discerns a potent anti-Theban bias in Xenophon's entire description 
of this battle which occurred in July 394. 
39xen. Hell. 4.3.2-3. Derkylidas, Xenophon writes, was fond of 
travel. 
40Plut. Ages. 16.4; Polyainos 2.1.17; Paus. 3.9.12. 
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coalition. Medias now repaid the Boiotians for their help by 
harassing the allied column when it had crossed into Thessaly east 
of Olympos and had begun to march up the Peneios River toward Larissa. 
Agesilaos, understanding the implications of his reception in Thessaly, 
attempted to detach the Larisaians through diplomacy. He sent Xenokles 
and Skythes to the city, but the inhabitants arrested them. Against 
the indignant advice of his counsellors, Agesilaos decided not to be-
siege the city. Rather, he chose to secure the envoys release by 
. . 42 
negot1at1on. 
Since entering Thessaly, Agesilaos had ordered the troops to 
march 
) / 
sv nAa101~ with half the horsemen in front and half behind 
the square to counter Thassalian harassment. The Pharsalian Poly-
charmos began to press the allies so vigorously south of Larissa that 
Agesilaos ordered all his cavalry to the rear except those forming his 
own body guard. This convinced Polycharmos and his men that it was not 
the right moment to engage Agesilaos' hoplites, so the Thessalians 
began an orderly withdrawal. Agesilaos, however, suddenly decided to 
attack his adversaries and ordered his mounted bodyguard to wheel about 
and pass the word to the rearguard horsemen not to allow the Thessalians 
a retreat. The sudden rush of the allied horsemen took Polycharmos by 
surprise. Most of his men fled in confusion back toward Pharsalos and 
Polycharmos with a few others, who chose to resist, fell fighting. 
41Diod. 14.82.1-2; thus it is evident that Agesilaos could not 
have followed precisely the same path as Xerxes had. 
42 Plut. Ages. 16.5-6. 
Agesilaos took some horsemen captive and erected a trophy between 
Mt. Pras and Mt. Narthakion43 to celebrate his victory. He was 
especially pleased that the cavalry he had personally recruited and 
trained were successful against a people who prided themselves on 
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horsemanship. The next day he crossed the borders of Achaia Phthiotis 
into eastern Lokris and the Spercheios valley near Mt. Oite, a 
44 friendly re~=i~ory. 
Here he was met by the ephor Diphridas who bade him enter 
Boiotia at once. Agesilaos had intended to augment further his forces 
before marching southeast along the Kephisos into hostile territory, but 
once again he obeyed the ephors' command. Arriving with Diphridas were 
fifty of the strongest and fittest young men from Lakedaimon to serve 
as the king's personal bod¥guard and honor him for his services to the 
state. He then gave an order that two morai,one from the Korinthia 
and one from Orchomenos1 join him, announced to his troops that the day 
was at hand for which they had left Asia and set out. He led the army 
along the Kephisos past Chaironeia and Lebadeia to the outskirts of 
Koroneia on the northern flanks of Mt. Helikon. 45 
On 14 August 394 B.C. there occurred a partial solar eclipse and 
43xen. Hell. 4.3.3-9; Plut. Ages. 16.6-8. Mt. Narthakion 
some 6-8 km. south of Pharsalos and its peak is 1011 meters high; 
Stahlin, RE 16.2, 1760-61. Mt. Pras is immediately to the east. 




44Plut. Ages. 17.4; the Spercheios forms the southern boundary 
of Thessaly. The army would have passed by Lamia, crossed the river 
and encamped between the eastern flanks of Oite and the pass of Thermo-
PYlai. 
45
xen. Hell. 4.3.10; Plut. Ages. 17.3-4. 
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Agesilaos received word of the Peloponnesians' sweeping naval defeat near 
Knidos and the death of his brother-in-law1 the navarch Peisandros. 
Although shocked and in sorrow at the news, the king ordered those who 
had brought the tidings to announce that Peisandros had died, but that 
the Peloponnesian fleet had been victorious. He then put on a garland 
and offered the sacrifice for glad tidings. He also sent portions of 
the victims to the leaders of the several contingents of his army to 
46 keep up their spirits. Shortly after the sacrifice, the vanguard of 
the coalition army arrived from the Isthmos. Buoyed by their king's 
good spirits, the Lakedaimonians gained the upper hand in a minor 
k . . h 47 s ~rm~s . 
The Battle of Koroneia 
With the arrival of the main coalition army from the Isthmos, 
the two sides drew up into battle formation. Having received orders to 
enter Boiotia from Diphridas the ephor, Agesilaos' purpose was clearly 
to inflict a decisive defeat on the coalition, neutralize and detach 
Boiotia and trap the Argives, Athenians and Korinthians at the Isthmos 
between two Peloponnesian armies. With the loss of the hegemony's 
naval component in the shoals and waters of the Knidian Chersonese, 
46
xen. Hell. 4.3.13-14; Plut. Ages. 17.5; Polyainos 2.1.3. This 
incident shows yet again that Agesilaos was gifted with superior leader-
ship ability and, in his fifty-first year, possessed a thorough under-
standing of human nature. 
47 Xen. Hell. 4.3.14. 
. ... , -
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Agesilaos had double incentive to carry the day. He had already told 
his Asian Greek allies that the day of decision for which they had 
marched from Asia was at hand. 48 A successful issue would have made 
a return to Asia Minor feasible. Second, the Peloponnesians were in 
an excellent position to chastise severely the Thebans for having in-
cited the war, an incentive which was paramount for every allied 
soldier in the field. 
Although Agesilaos had left 4,000 men in Asia, he had been able 
to recruit others in his homeward march from Sestos. Thus, the allied 
army which was deployed in three components stood at a strength of some 
20,000 men. When they had left camp, Agesilaos with the Lakedaimonian 
wing occupied the right side of the line as tradition dictated. In ttl~ 
center Herippidas commanded the Asian Greek soldiers and finally the 
49 Phokians and Orchomenians were arranged on the allied left. Opposed 
to them were the Argives on the coalition left, the Lokrians (eastern 
and westerw, Ainianians, Euboians, Korinthians and Athenians in the 
middle and the Boiotians on the right. 50 The coalition line faced in a 
northerly direction, while that of the allies looked south toward the 
48 Plut. Ages. 17.2. 
49
xen. Hell. 3.4.15; Ages. 2.9; Plut. Ages. 18.1-2; Diod. 14.84.1. 
See also Kromayer/Veith, Schlachtenatlas, Griech Abt., 28, map 3 and 
Pritchett, Studies in Ancient Greek Topography 2, 93-95. 
5°The general terrain of the battle had the Kopaic marsh to the 
east and Mt. Helikon to the south (and the town of Koroneia), the 
Herkyna river to the west and the Kephisos to the north. Just to the 
southeast of the battle lines lay the temple of Athena Itonia (today the 
Chapel of the Metamorphosis). See Kromayer/Veith, ibid and Pritchett, 
ibid. 
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flanks of Mt. Helikon. Since the coalition troops were the same who 
had fought at Nemea a month before, they would have numbered about 
20,000 also. Once again, therefore, the two sides were evenly matched, 
51 
although the allies had more peltasts. 
As at Nemea, the Thebans raised the war cry and attacked first, 
this time charging into the Orchomenians and Phokians. When Agesilaos 
signalled the Lakedaimonian wing to advance, the Argives fled to 
Mt. Helikon. The center of both lines held, but when Agesilaos dis-
covered that the Thebans had broken through to the allied baggage train, 
he wheeled his own men about to aid the routed Orchomenians and Phokians. 
During this manoeuvre, the coalition center began to give way to 
Herippidas' Asian Greeks and undertook a steady withdrawal to join the 
Argives on the slopes of Helikon. When the Thebans realized that their 
Argive and other comrades were retreating, they regrouped for a charge 
southward to rejoin their fellows. Agesilaos, rather than opening his 
52 line to let them pass, decided to meet their charge head on. During 
the course of this bitterly fought, hand-to-hand combat, Agesilaos him-
self sustained several wounds and had to be carried away to safety. Had 
it not been for the vigorous efforts of the fifty Spartan youths sent 
with Diphridas to be his honor guard, Agesilaos would have lost his 
51 Xen. Hell. 4.3.15, Ages. 2.9. 
52Rather than letting the Boiotians pass and taking them in the 
rear as they retreated, Xenophon (Hell. 4.3.19, Ages. 2.12) in a classic 
understatement writes that Agesilaos displayed great courage by not 
choosing the safest course. Jlutarch (Ages. 18.4) more realistically ob-
serves that the king was carried away·by passion and martial ardor. This 
effort was perhaps necessary, however, if the Spartan plan to crush and 
l •f 53 ~ e. Eventually most of the Boiotians escaped to Mt. Helikon to 
join their comrades, but many others died in the Spartan onslaught. 
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As they lay wounded near the Spartan camp, Agesilaos forbade 
the slaughter of eighty enemy soldiers who had taken refuge in the 
nearby temple of Athena Itonia. On the following day, in order to test 
the enemy, he ordered his troops to wear garlands and erect a trophy. 
The Boiotians made no mmre to offer battle, but instead sent envoys re-
questing a truce to recover the dead. Agesilaos granted this request 
and ordered his army to withdraw to the west. The Spartans abandoned 
hope of subduing Boiotia while the coalition forces retreated to occupy 
the Isthmos.54 After the allies reached Delphi, where the Pythian 
games were in progress, Agesilaos received medical attention for his 
many wounds and dedicated 100 talents, a tenth of his Asian booty, to 
Apollo. He then ordered the polemarch Gylis to conduct pillage in 
western Lokris. This venture was indecisive, however, and Gylis with 
seventeen other Spartiates lost his life. 
When the games were over and Agesilaos had recovered 
sufficiently to travel, he dismissed the various contingents of the 
army and sailed home from the Krisaian Gulf. Marching back through 
Megaris and the Isthmos was, of course, out of the question, because 
detach the Boiotians from the coalition were to work. If the largely un-
scathed Boiotians succeeded in rejoining ·their comrades on Mt. Helikon, 
the Spartans would have lost their chance to put an early end to war. 
Unfortunately for the Spartans, this is precisely what happened. 
53 Xen. Hell. 4.3.18-19, Ages. 2.12; Plut. Ages. 18.3. 
54see Pritchett, 95. 
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the coalition had secured that area in force, thus blocking the allies' 
55 path. The bulk of the Peloponnesians probably crossed over from 
Antirhion to Rhion at the western end of the Gulf of Korinth where the 
channel separating the northern land mass from the Peloponnesos is 
only about 2 km. wide. 56 
From Koroneia to the Failed Peace of 392 
Although the Thebans enjoyed the first success of the war at 
Haliartos and were elated by their performance at Koroneia when their 
comrades from other poleis had broken and run, 57 the Spartan alliance 
controlled the field at both Nemea and Koroneia. The encounters, how-
ever, were inconclusive and the chance to crush Boiotia had slipped 
from the Spartans' grasp three times in as many months. The Lake-
daimonians' three greatest commanders had failed to attain this crucial 
military objective; Lysander had died, Pausanias was in exile and a 
seriously wounded Agesilaos had been compelled to withdraw to the com-
parative safety of Phokis and disband his army. Thus the Korinthiar. War, 
as it came to be known, while mildly encouraging for the coalition, was 
55 Xen. Hell. 4.3.17-4.4.1, Ages. 2.9-16; Plut. Ages. 18.5-19.3. 
Summary accounts of the battle appear in Diod. 14.84.1-2; Paus. 9.6.4; 
Nepos Ages. 4.5; Frontinus 2.6.6; Polyainos 2.1.3-4; and Justin 6.4.13. 
Xenophon's account of this battle is particularly detailed and vivid be-
cause he participated in it as Plutarch (Ages. 18.1) tells us and 
Xenophon himself (Anab. 5.3.6). Diogenes Laertius (2.6) also makes note 
of Xenophon's trek back to Europe with Agesilaos. 
56see Bolte, RE lA.l, 844-45; Rhion is located just northeast 
of modern Patrai. 
57 Plutarch (Ages. 18.9) writes that they believed themselves un-
defeated, if not technically victorious in the battle. 
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primarily a triumph for the diplomacy of Pharnabazos, Tithraustes and 
58 Artaxerxes. 
In order for the Persian grand strategy to succeed, it was not 
enough that an anti-Spartan coalition come into being in Greece. As noted 
earlier, 59 in the early spring of 395 a democratic faction seized con-
trol of the government at Rhodes and expelled the Spartan garrison. 59 
Soon afterwards the new government intercepted a huge Egyptian grain 
fleet which put in to what the Egyptians believed was still a pro-
Spartan port. 60 In addition to affecting Agesilaos' strategy in Asia 
Minor, this coup provided Konen with another base of operations in the 
Aegean. 61 In 396 Pharax, a Lakedaimonian navarch, had sailed with 
thirty ships to aid Dionysios I of Syracuse in his struggle against 
62 Carthage. This reduced the Peloponnesian fleet in the Aegean from 120 
58xenophon (Hell. 4.4.1, 14) notes that after Koroneia the 
land war bogged down into a series of skirmishes in the Korinthia. 
The coalition's advantage was not solid, however,.as the Korinthian 
oligarch's lockout of the soldiers fleeing from the Nemea riverbed 
and subsequent overtures to Sparta for a separate peace clearly show 
(Xen. Hell. 4.2.23 and Demosth. 20.52-53). Hamilton, 223,notes that 
in spite of limited resources, the Athenians decided to rebuild their 
long walls. See Tod, GHI, no. 107. 
59see ch. 4. 
60P. 15.1-3; Died. 14.79.4-7; and Justin 6.2.1-3. 
61Hamilton, 227, and Bruce, "The Democratic Revolution at 
Rhodes," CQ,ll (1961),166-170. 
62Diod. 14.63.4 
to 90 ships, which in turn moved Agesilaos, after his appointment as 
supreme navarch63 in late summer of 395, to order the restoration of 
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the fleet to its original strength. Konon, however, had more than 
doubled the Persian fleet from eighty ships64 to 170 with the addition 
of eighty triremes from Sidon and ten from Kilikia (late winter 396/95, 
just prior to the Rhodian revolt). 65 With the death of Tissaphernes, 
Konon was forced to confront one of the most embarrassing problems of 
that era for a commander. Since his Persian supporters were in default 
of their funding promises, he had fallen fifteen months in arrears of 
pay for his sailors and marines. 66 He, therefore, sailed from Rhodes 
to Kaunas in order,to confer with Tithraustes and Pharnabazos. After 
m~eting with the satrap and chiliarch, the latter gave him 220 talents 
from the personal fortune of the newly deceased Tissaphernes. Tith-
raustes then left for Babylon after placing Ariaios and Pasiphernes in 
charge of Lydia and Karia and sent Timokrates to Greece. In the mean-
time, a revolt had broken out in Kaunas and spread as far as the base 
in Rhodes before Konon was able to suppress it (summer 395).67 Rather 
than risk the sporadic and half-hearted support of satraps and 
chi1iarchs, 68 Konon decided to deal directly with the Great King after 
63xen. 2.4.27-28; Plut. Ages. 10.9; Paus. 3.9.6; see also ch. 4. 
64niod. 14.79.6. 
65p. 9.1-2; Diod. 14.79.8. 
66p. 19.2; Isok. 4.142. 




suppressing the revolt and disbursing the 220 talents to his men. 
He, therefore, placed two Athenians in charge of the fleet at Rhodes, 
sailed to Kilikia, travelled overland to Syrian Thapsakos and finally 
sailed down the Euphrates to Babylon where he pled his case with 
Artaxerxes. 69 By the winter of 395/94, Konen had secured Artaxerxes' 
personal assurances of monetary support and had chosen Pharnabazos as 
his collaborator to force a decisive enr0unter with the now numerically 
inferior Spartan fleet under Agesilaos' brother-in-law, Peisandros. 70 
For a month or two, no such encounter materialized. Both 
fleets conducted minor operations and made their final preparations. 
Agesilaos had ordered that the Peloponnesian fleet be restored to its 
original strength of 120 ships, but by early August, the fleet still 
stood at only ninety ships. The Lakedaimonians' base was Knidos, 
while Pharnabazos, having learned of Peisandros' presence,was at 
Loryma with ninety triremes. Konen had joined him with a few ships, 
while most of the Greek component of the Great King's fleet was moored 
71 
at Rhodes. 
69Diod. 14.81.4-6; Justin 6.2.11-16; Nepos Conon 3.2-4.2. Both 
Justin and Nepos preserve the amusing anecdote about Konen's refusal to 
perform npocrK6vncrts which caused an exchange of letters through interme-
diaries in order to conduct business. One of these intermediaries was 
Tithraustes who had just returned from Sardis (P. 19.3). Nepos mistakenly 
attributes the death of Tissaphernes to Konen's pleading at Pharnabazos' 
behest on this occasion; but as Westlake, "Decline and Fall of Tissapher-
nes," Historia, 30 (1981), 257-79, has shown, Tissaphernes' fate had been 
sealed as much as a year before his demise. 
70Agesilaos, of course, was conducting extensive forays and 
pillage in Pharnabazos' satrapy at this time; see ch. 4. 
71 Diod. 14.83.4-5. Isokrates (4.142-44) writes that the 
Persian fleet was barely able to defeat Peisandros' 100 ships and ~enophon -- --
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Peisandros finally decided to try the issue. At the beginning 
of August he set sail from Knidos with eighty-five ships. His fleet 
rounded the southern coast of the Knidian Chersonese (the western 
"finger"), sailed through the straits between Loryma (on the tip of the 
southern "finger") and Ialysos on the island of Rhodes and put in near 
Physkos. 72 Konon then brought up the Greek component of the Persian 
fleet from Rhodes to confront the adventurous and over-eager Peisandros. 
He was quickly joined by Pharnabazos and the ninety ships from Loryma. 
Now greatly overmatched, Peisandros realized his only hope was to 
break through the advancing Persian line of 170 ships. He gallantly 
led the advance on the right (western) wing, against Pharnabazos' ships 
but his allies on the left panicked at the sight of Konon' s Greeo:~s and 
fled shoreward. Peisandros nonetheless pressed forward and thirty-
five Lakedaimonian ships managed to break through and return to 
Knidos. Fifty ships were either abandoned by their crews or sunk in 
the Persian advance and Peisandros died fighting. Some 500 crewmen 
were captu~ed while the rest escaped on shore.73 
(Hell. 4.3.11-12) writes that Peisandros' fleet was much smaller than the 
Persian flotilla. Meyer, Vol. 5, 202, n.3, has written, hier ist 
Klarheit nicht zu gewinnen, but Diodorus' figures are likely to be 
reliable. 
72Meyer, RE Suppl. 11, 1090-91: The modern name of the site 
is Marmaris. See also Honigmann, RE 19.1, 569-70, for an excellent map 
of the Rhodian Peraia of which Physkos was a member polis. 
73xen. Hell. 4.3.11-12; Diod. 14.83.5-7. Brief notices of the 
sea battle appear in Isok. 4.142; Justin 6.3; Nepos Conon 4.1-4; 
Didymos 7.45; and Polyainos(1.48.5)who writes that in order to deceive 
the Lakedaimonians about his precise place in the Persian line, Konen 
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Immediately after their sweeping victory, Konon and Pharnabazos 
undertook a diplomatic offensive throughout the Aegean. Many of the 
ioleis visited came over to their side and the Spartans lost nearly 
their entire maritime realm. The only region to reject these overtures 
was the Hellespont where Derkylidas' vigorous leadership stiffened 
resistance to the Persians at the crucial strait of Sestos and Abydos 
despite Konen's blockade and Pharnabazos' pillage. 74 Some of the 
poleis which came over to Konon and Pharnabazos were Kos, Nisyros, Teas, 
Chios, Karpathos, Knidos, Chios, Mitylene, Erythrai and even Ephesos, 
the Spartans' Asian headquarters for six years under Thibron, 
Derkylidas and Agesilaos: 75 
After securing the entire Aegean basin (with the exception of 
the Hellespont) in the autumn of 394, Konon was instructed to carry the 
ordered two identical flagships fitted out and another officer to dress 
exactly as he had. Beloch, 3.1, 76, n.l,rightly dismisses this anecdote 
as abgeschmakte. The reports given by Nepos and Justin are so summary 
that Meyer (Vol. 5, 235, n.l and Theopomps Hellenika, 80) considers them 
worthless. The versions of Xenophon and Diodorus are not contradictory, 
therefore one can reconstruct the battle from them. Burchner,RE 11.1, 
9185 under Knidos mentions the Lion monument unearthed east southeast of 
the city which had been erected to those who died in the sea battle. 
74xen. Hell. 4.8.3-6; Cawkwell, "A Note on the Heracles Coinage 
Alliance of 394 B.C.," NC,l6 (1956), 69-75,and "TheiTN Coins Again," 
JH~83 (1963), 152-54, argues that a short-lived symmachy sprang up in 
the Aegean after Knidos to assure independence from all outside domina-
tion, Spartan, Athenian or Persian. See also Hill, Greek Historical 
~. 62-66, nos. 32-33,and Hamilton, 230-31. Cawkwell,moreover, be-
lieves that most of the 40 Lakedaimonian ships which survived the 
Knidian debacle simply "slipped away quietly," that is, defected to the 
victorious Konon or sailed home. At least a few likely returned to the 
Peloponnesos. 
75xen. Hell. 4.8.3-6 and Diad. 14.84.3-4. 
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naval war to Lakonia itself the following spring. He accordingly set 
sail with Pharnabazos for the Kyklades in early 393. He occupied and 
garrisoned Melos, using it as a base to ravage the Peloponnesian coast. 
Later he took Kythera for a similar purpose. There the satrap heartened 
the coalition with a generous disbursal of funds. This was a most 
welcome gesture since the land war had settled into a series of raids 
and skirmishes which 2ccomplished little apart from destruction of 
croplands in the Korinthia. As noted earlier, the Korinthians were in 
fact divided as to the wisdom of continuing the war. After the battle 
of Nemea in July 394, a pro-Spartan faction in the city had locked out 
the fleeing coalition troops and offered to negotiate a separate peace 
with the Spartans. At the prospect of repeated damage to their fields, 
the martial ardor of even the most committed anti-Spartan Korinthians 
must have cooled. In the summer of 393, Qowever, they put Pharnabazos' 
money to good use and outfitted a fleet. Because the naval component 
of the Peloponnesian forces had been sheared off near Knidos,76 the 
Korinthians were able to regain control of the Gulf by autumn. After 
visiting the Isthmos, Konen persuaded Pharnabazos to relinquish control 
of the fleet in exchange for a promise to fund it from revenues collected 
around the Aegean. He then sailed home to the Peiraeus to be honored 
with Euagoras at the end of his twelve-year absence. He quickly 
76The seriousness of this blow to Spartan strategy is well 
attested in ancient literature, e.g. Andok. 3.22; Isok. 4.154, 9.56; 
Diad. 14.84-4; Plut. Artax. 21; and Justin 6.4.1. See also Meyer, 
Vol. 5, 235-36; Beloch, 3.1, 77-78 and Hamilton, 230-31. The most 
obvious consequence of Peisandros' defeat and the disbanding of the 
harmosts and garrisons was the loss of the tribute originally in-
stituted by Lysander in 404 (see ch. 2). 
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assumed responsibility for the rebuilding of Athens' long walls, using 
his share of Pharnabazos' money to enlist his own crewmen, large 
numbers of Athenians and even some Boiotians. The walls were soon com-
pleted and were of uniformly excellent quality. They had rectangular 
towers at regular intervals and eventually came to be known as 
"Kononian" because the navarch had supervised most of their reconstruc-
tion.77 Thus the year 393 drew to a close. As uo-ceci above, the 
Persians and the coalition seemed on the verge of achieving their pur-
pose. Their brilliant naval and diplomatic strategies had created a 
stalemate on land and stripped the Peloponnesians of their maritime 
fiefdom in the Aegean basin. 
.,.. 
It is, therefore, not surpris~ng that the 
Lakedaimonians in the spring of 392 should turn to diplomacy. 78 
Antalkidas, Tiribazos and the Failed Peace of 392 
When Agesilaos departed from Delphi in the late summer 394 after 
depositing his one-hundred talent tithe, evidence surfaced in 
Lakedaimon of an elaborate plot by Lysander to alter the Lykourgan 
politeia. Many of Lysander's followers resented Agesilaos and the 
wounded king sought ways either to blunt their influence or reconcile 
them. In the course of an investigation of Lysander's personal effects, 
77xen. Hell. 4.8.6-12; Diodorus 14.84.3-85.3; Plut. Ages. 23.19; 
Nepos Conon 4.5; and Isok. 5.64. See also Swoboda, RE 11.2, 1329. 
For the statues in his and Euagoras' honor, see Isok-.-9.57 and Paus. 
1.3.2. 
78 Grote, Vol. 7, 522-24; Beloch, 3.2, 80-81; Meyer, Vol. 5, 
245-46; and Hamilton, 232-33. 
a speech written for him by Kleon of Halikarnassos was discovered in 
which abolition of the hereditary kingship was urged in favor of an 
elective one.79 Agesilaos was angered at this revelation and wanted 
to make it public, but the wisdom of the ephor Lakratidas prevailed 
and the matter remained a secret. 80 This incident in the autuw~ 
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of 394 is our last notice of Agesilaos until his campaign against the 
Argives in the spring of 391. 81 
As ncted above, the land war had bogged down in the Korinthia 
where the Peloponnesians controlled Sikyon and the coalition had 
occupied Lechaion. In the winter of 393/92, the Spartan navarch 
Podanemos had secured the southern shore of the Korinthian Gulf by 
bottling up in Lechaion the Korinthian ships financed by Pharnabazos. 
79Plut. Lys. 30.3-5, Ages. 20.2, Mor. 212c. 
80Lakratidas supposedly advised Agesilaos that it would be 
better to bury the speech than exhume Lysander. Several scholars 
have recently taken this incident as evidence for a tripartite 
political alignment in Sparta during these years. In addition to 
Lysander's ~TatpE(a , they argue the existence of a faction loyal 
to Agis' aims (and eventually to those of Agesilaos) and to Agesipolis, 
the youthful son of the exiled Pausanias. See Rice, Why Sparta 
Failed, Diss. Yale 1971; Hamilton, 241-43; Cawkwell, "Agesilaos and 
Sparta," £Q.,26 (1976), 62-84; Seager, "The King's Peace and the Balance 
of Power in Greece, 386-362 B.C.," Athenaeum,52 (1974), 36-63; and 
ch. 2. 
81Because of Knidos and Koroneia, some scholars have seen the 
two-and-a-half year hiatus as evidence that Agesilaos was out of favor. 
See Smith, "The Opposition to Agesilaos' Foreign Policy, 394-371 B.C." 
Historia,2 (1954), 274, 278 and Hamilton, 243-44. 
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The Peloponnesians, however, still controlled Phokis and Orchomenos 
in western Boiotia. Also, neither the Peloponnesians nor the coali-
tion had been able to achieve any real gains after Agesilaos' failure 
at Koroneia to detach Boiotia and isolate the Athenians, Argives and 
wavering Korinthians near the Isthmos.82 In the spring of 392 the 
war party in Korinth committed an atrocity at the festival of Artemis 
Eukleia in wh~-~h 120 pro-Spartan oligarchs were murdered and some 500 
driven into exile. The purpose of this coup was to eliminate the 
growing opposition of some groups to continuing the war. The Athenians, 
Boiotians, Argives and democratic Korinthians feared that Lakonizing 
aristocrats, whose lands were suffering the ravages of war, would make 
peace with Sparta. 83 Some of the exiles who had fled to the Akrokorinth 
were persuaded to return under amnesty, but the democratic faction was 
already taking steps to create a sympolity with Argos. 84 Two young 
leaders of the exiled group, Pasimelos and Alkimenes, soon grew disen-
chanted with the excesses of the democratic faction, some of whose 
Argive allies had entered the city and were removing boundary stones. 
82xen. Hell. 4.4.1-13; Diod. 14.86; and Aristeides 2.370. See 
also Meyer, Vol. 5, 242-43,with notes. 
83xen. Hell. 4.4.1-6; Diod. 14.86.1. Most of the older men died; 
only the more youthful had been able to flee. 
84rbid. Also, Grote, Vol. 7, 495-98; Beloch, 3.1, 79-80; Meyer, 
Vol. 5, 243. Kagan, "Corinthian Politics and the Revolution of 392 
B.C.," Historia,ll (1962), 447-57, believes that three factions were 
vying for power, the democrats who favored war, oligarchs who favored 
war and the landed aristocrats who wanted peace and a restoration of 
their ancient prerogatives. The oligarchs prior to the coup controlled 
the state in this view. 
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These occupiers began referring to Korinth as "Argos" which Pasimelos, 
Alkimenes and their supporters found particularly galling. 85 From 
this group of young oligarchs and aristocrats would come the attempt 
later that summer to hand over the city to Praxitas, the Spartan 
harmost at Sikyon. 
Although the allies gained a slight advantage by the opening 
months of 392, clearly some Spartans felt a need to expl~4e Jiplomacy 
as a solution to the alliance's quandary. Because they had lost the 
Aegean revenue with their naval debacle in 394 and were faced with 
depletion of the 900 talents brought from Asia by Agesilaos, the ephors 
sent Antalkidas to Sardis to treat with Tiribazos,the new satrap of 
Lydia and Karia. 86 
The original purpose of the mission was to conduct b~lateral 
discussions with the satrap and convince the Persians to withdraw 
financial support from the coalition. The Lakedaimonians were no longer 
a factor in the Aegean, Antalkidas asserted, and were even willing to 
relinquish their insistence on independence for the Greeks of Asia. He 
held that Athens' revived naval strength was the greatest threat to 
Persian interests. When the coalition received word of Antalkidas' 
85xen. Hell. 4.4.4-6 and Diod. 14.86.3, 92.1-2. Argives and 
Korinthians were~share common citizenship, coinage and other 
appurtenances of a single state. Hamilton, 268-70, believes that this 
union was effected in two stages, the second in 389. Thus Xenophon's 
description of it as complete in 392 is anticipatory. 
86Tiribazos, formerly the satrap of Armenia, replaced the 
rebellious Ariaios after the latter had taken over for the executed 
Tissaphernes. See Beloch 3.1, 81, n.l; Meyer, Vol. 5, 245-46; and 
Schaefer, RE 6A.2, 1435. 
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initiative, the Athenians invited the Argives, Boiotians and 
Korinthians to join them in a visit to Sardis, since the interests of 
all were clearly at stake. Upon the arrival of the coalition's lega-
tion Antalkidas, who had won over Tiribazos to his side, cunningly 
proposed that all islands and cities (except those in Asia, of course) 
be autonomous. This clause was intended to strike at the Argives who 
had begun the annexation of Korinth, the Athenians who feared for 
Skyros, Lemnos and Imbros on the route to their Euxine grain sources, 
and the Boiotians at the head of whose league stood the Thebans. The 
dissolution of all three of these entities into their component poleis 
would leave Sparta supeme in Greece. Needless to say, the terms pro-
posed by Antalkidas were completely unacceptable to the coalition so 
the conference broke up, achieving neither a 
\ ~ , Kotvn Etpnvn nor a 
bilateral alliance of Sparta and Persia.87 
By the summer of 392, Antalkidas' failure and the arrival of 
Strouthas in Sardis made it clear that further military and naval 
exertions were necessary if Sparta were to achieve her purposes. 
Accordingly the Spartans took Tiribazos' money and outfitted a small 
fleet to secure the Korinthian Gulf against the ships in Lechaion which 
Pharnabazos and Konen had paid for in the previous year. 
87 Xen. Hell. 4.8.12-17. Tiribazos could not conclude a peace 
without Artaxerxes' approval, so he secretly gave Antalkidas money to 
raise a fleet and arrested Konen as an enemy of the Great King. When 
Tiribazos travelled to the court, however, Artaxerxes,still bitterly 
resenting the pillage of his lands by Thibron, Derkylidas and 
especially Agesilaos, replaced him with Strouthas who then released 
Konon and overtly favored Athens. Although Konen sailed for Kypros a 
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Since Koroneia the Peloponnesians had no means of communication 
by land with their allies in Phokis and Orchomenos. When Pasimelos 
and Alkimenes, leaders of the clandestine opposition in Korinth, secretly 
offered to admit Praxitas, harmost of Sikyon, into the Korinthian port 
of Lechaion, a splendid opportunity arose to strengthen the alliance's 
hand. Under cover of darkness, Praxitas led a detachment of troops to 
the walls of the port where Pasimelos and Alkimenes opened the gates 
for them. In the ensuing struggle, the Peloponnesians were unable to 
take Korinth itself, but they occupied and demolished a segment of the 
long walls. In the succeeding days, Praxitas' forces captured Sidous, 
Krommyon and Epieikeia in the Megarid before he disbanded his army and 
withdrew to Lakedaimon.88 
To secure their access to central Greece across the straits at 
Rhion, the Spartan navarch Podanemos (393/92) undertook an offensive to 
counter the Korinthians' shipbuilding enterprise which Pharnabazos had 
funded. Because of the satrap's generosity, the Korinthians in their 
new ships controlled the entire gulf between Rhion and Lechaion by the 
spring of 392. 89 
free man, he fell ill there and died by the spring of 391. See 
Swoboda, RE 11.2, 1332-33. Ryder, Kaine Eirene, 30-31, believes that 
Plato's Me;ex. (245a-b) and Didymos (7.20) show the Athenian reluctance 
to cede Greek Asia to Artaxerxes also caused the effort at Sardis to 
fail. 
88 Xen. Hell. 4.4.6-13. 
89xen. Hell. 4.8.10. 
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Podanemos' Lakedaimonians now challenged the Korinthians under 
their navarch Agathinos for superiority in the Gulf. In a minor engage-
ment, Podanernos lost his life and his second officer Pollis had to with-
draw because of wounds. Herippidas succeeded Podanemos as navarch for 
the rest of the summer and compelled the Korinthians now under Proainos 
to abandon Rhion. 90 
In Athens the spectre of a Lakedaimonian occupation of Attika 
had arisen once again with Praxitas' capture of Lechaion and his breach 
of the Korinthian long walls. In central Greece, the Boiotians were 
still faced with hostile forces in Phokis and Orchomenos, and the 
Korinthians' temporary naval advantage had evaporated with Herippidas' 
successful action near Rhion. Only the Argives, who had begun the 
annexation of Korinth, had reason left to continue the struggle. With 
these things in mind, the Athenians made an overture to Sparta in late 
summer or early autumn for a peace. The Spartans were amenable,despite 
their enhanced position, because they still faced the opposition of 
Artaxerxes and Strouthas. Although Andokides pled well before the 
Athenian assembly the people rejected the proposa1. 91 
90
xen. Hell. 4.8.11. These events at Lechaion and on the Gulf 
near Rhion occurred after Antalkidas' failed mission to Sardis. 
Although minor, the two victories clearly enhanced the Peloponnesians' 
position. The coalition's only gain was the rebuke to the pro-Spartan 
Tiribazos whom Artexerxes had replaced with the pro-Athenian Strouthas. 
91our only sources for this second attempt in Sparta are 
Andokides' speech, On the Peace with the Spartans (3.17-18 clearly alludes 
to the summer of 392), its hypothesis and Plut. Moralia 835a. Xenophon 
Qiell.4.8.12-15),Didymos(7.17-20),and Plato (Menexenos 245b)mention only 
the Sardis conference. 
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Because the Korinthians were badly divided by factional strife92 
and the Argives would resist any effort to dissolve the nascent sym-
polity, there could be enthusiasm for a general peace only among the 
dissidents who supported Pasimelos and Alkimenes. Although the 
Boiotians, who regarded Orchomenos as a rival and a threat, were willing 
to come to terms, as were the Spartans, the opportunity for a general 
peace passed with the rejection of Andokides' proposals by the Athenian 
demos. The reasons for their rejection in spite of Andokides' vigorous 
advocacy are two. First, the proposed settlement would offer the 
Athenians nothing they did not already have. Unlike what the Great 
King proposed in Sardis, the Spartans would leave the Euxine grain route 
secure (and the integrity of the Boiotian league except for Orchomenos), 
while insisting only that the coalition be dissolved and that the 
Argives withdraw from Korinth. Radical democrats, however, and others 
who resented Sparta's ascendancy, thwarted Andokides' purpose in order to 
complete the task begun by Konon and even recover some part of their 
former maritime realm. A strong anti-Spartan coalition funded by 
Strouthas was a more attractive prospect than a sterile peace. 93 
Although Agesilaos is nowhere attested in our sources from the 
autumn of 394 to the spring of 391, one might well ask whether his 
influence is discernible in this singular year.94 The conclusion that 
92see Kagan, 447-51, who places this intense infighting in high 
relief. 
93see Beloch, 3.1, 82-83; Meyer, Vol •. 5, 248-49; Ryder, 32-33; 
and Hamilton, 258-59. 
94Because of the muddled chronology of Xenophon and Diodorus 
he did have a hand in the events of 392 seems inevitable. That his 
collaborator Herippidas 95 finished the navarchy of the deceased 
Podanemos and reasserted Peloponnesian control of the straits of 
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Rhion is the first significant item. Second, his younger half-brother 
Telutias96 became navarch for 392/91. In the matter of the first peace 
conference in Sardis, it is abundantly clear that Agesilaos and 
Antalkidas were conteu~iuus rivals and that the king, as much as the 
Athenians, found the notion of ceding Greek Asia to Artaxerxes 
repugnant and unconscionable. 97 In this case Agesilaos emerges as 
the idealist, while Antalkidas is much more the practical man of 
affairs. As for the conference at Sparta in th~ autumn, it matters 
little whether the proposed settlement was the same as that in Sardis98 
(and the former's peculiar arrangement of events on land and sea after 
Koroneia), a slim possibility exists that the Sardis conference occurred 
after the initiative in Sparta. In that case the Isthmian games 
mentioned by Xenophon (Hell. 4.5.1) would be those of 392 (see Grote, 
Vol. 7, 523-25, who believes that the only peace conference of 392 was 
the one in Sardis), and Andokides' speech would have occurred in the 
autumn of 393. This reconstruction,which forces considerable 
compression of events,seems much less feasible than the more flexible 
chronology which takes Xenophon's reference to the Isthmian games as 
those of 390. See Ryder, 167-69,and Martin, "Sur une interpretation 
nouvelle de la Paix du Roi," Mus. He1v., 6 (1949), 127-39. 
95Herippidas had replaced Lysander as chief advisor to 
Agesilaos in 395 and campaigned with him extensively: see chs. 3 and 4. 
96see Xen. Hell. 4.4.19 and Meyer, Vol. 5, 245, 251. 
97rsokrates, Epistle 9.8-12; Plut. Ages. 23.2, Moralia 213b. 
98wilcken, "Zur Entstehung und Zweck des K'Onigsfriedens," 
Abhandlung der Preussischen Akademie, Phil.-hist Klasse, no. 15, 
1941, 4-11, suggests that ceding the Asian Greeks to Artaxerxes was a 
common feature in both proposals despite Andokides' suppression of it. 
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or different in some important respects. 99 Agesilaos would not have 
found acceptable the lenient and congenial terms offered to the Thebans, 100 
even if the Great King's interests were not an issue. After Knidos and 
Koroneia, his influence perhaps waned, 101 but by the spring of 39l,in 
the wake of two failed efforts to secure a peace, it is evident that 
Agesilaos and his friends surged once again to the fore and, in fact, 
dominated Spartan policy for the rest of the war and 
Wilcken also believes that the conference in Sparta preceded the one in 
Sardis. Both suggestions have been ably refuted by Martin, 128-31; 
Ryder, 32; Smith, 278; and Hamilton, 254-55. 
99Andokides 3.15-18: see also Hamilton, 254, and Ryder, 32-33. 
100As is clear from his treatment of the Theban embassy sent to 
inquire about a settlement in 390 and after the ratification of the 
King's Peace in 386 (Xen. Hell. 4.5.6, 9-10) antipathy to Thebes wa.s 
still a major component of his foreign policy. 
lOlsmith, 278, n.l,and Hamilton, 239. 
102see Smith, 278,and Hamilton, 239, who believe that the 
failure to reach a negotiated settlement made Agesilaos' domination 
inevitable. Since a military solution was once again sought, it was 
only natural that Sparta should turn to her most successful soldier 
to achieve it. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE SECOND PHASE OF THE KORI~THI&~ WAR TO THE 
PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS (KING f s PEACE) -
After Strouthas replaced Tiribazos in Sardis ( F392 ), the 
angered Spartans recalled Thibron from exile and with Tiribazos' money 
h . A . M" l sent 1m to s1a 1nor. Except for Derkylidas in Abydos (who merely 
clung to a small Hellespontine area in order to resist Pharnabazos 
and Konon in 393/92), this was the first offensive against the Persians 
since Agesilaos had pillaged Pharnabazos' Mysian estates in the winter 
of 395/94. 2 
Over the fall and winter of 392/91 Thibron won back Ephesos to 
the Peloponnesians and made it his headquarters. By springtime he had 
brought over Magnesia,Priene and other small poleis in the Maiandros 
valley with an army of 8,000 men. Strouthas, however, had gathered a 
huge force of over 35,000 and had pitched his camp near that of the 
Greeks. With his best infantry and horsemen near the Koressos ridge, 3 
he suddenly attacked the careless and disdainful Thibron whose men had 
scattered for pillage. Thibron, his athletic flute player, 4 and most 
lxen. Hell. 4.8.17-19; Diodorus (14.99.1-3 ) supplies the 
numbers. 
2see ch. 5. 
3Burchner, RE 11.2, 1392 and 5.2, 2781 with map. The exact loca-
tion of this hill is unknown. 
4xenophon(Hell. 4.8.18)writes that Thibron and Thersandros, his 
flute player, were having a discus-throwing contest when the Persian 
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of the Greek army perished in the sudden Persian assault. Some Greeks 
were taken prisoner, but only a few escaped to safety on the Knidian 
Chersonese. 
The defeat and death of Thibron seriously weakened the 
Lakedaimonian war effort in Asia Minor. 5 That same spring (391), how-
ever, Agesilaos persuaded the ephors to launch an attack on the Argives 
who, in addition to their partial annexation of Korinth, h~d gained 
much in the war at little or no expense. Since the coalition still 
controlled access to central Greece through the Isthmos (the 
Peloponnesians had secured the straits of Rhion under Podanemos and 
Herippidas in the fall of 392), Agesilaos' campaign in the Argolid and 
Korinthia made excellent strategic sense. He spent most of the spring 
and summer laying extensive waste to Argive croplands, though he did 
not attempt to besiege Argos itself. When he discovered that the 
Korinthians and Athenians had rebuilt the segment of the wall that 
cavalry overwhelmed them. See Meyer, Vol. 5, 253, Theopomps Hellenika 
111-112; Beloch 3.1, 87, and Ehrenberg, RE 6A.l, 274-75. Polyainos (6.10.1) 
describes how Thibron's athletic flute-player was recruited. 
5The Spartans did not attempt to recover their losses until 
the spring of 390, when a delegation of Rhodian exiles arrived in Sparta 
to ask for help in staging an uprising in their homeland. Ekdikos, the 
navarch for 391/90,set sail with eight ships and put Kiphridas ashore 
in Ephesos. Diphridas tried to regain what Thibron had lost in the 
Maiandros valley and by a stroke of good fortune near Sardis, he captured 
Strouthas' daughter and her husband whose ransom provided him with 
enough money to pay his mercenaries for many months. Ekdikos sailed 
from Ephesos to Samos and finally to Knidos where he was able to gather 
up the survivors of Thibron's debacle. The Rhodian democrats, despite 
the oligarchs' toehold on the island, were still in control and had 
twice as many ships as Ekdikos who chose to remain at Knidos. When his 
navarchy ended in late summer, Teleutias, no doubt in part because of 
Praxitas had demolished the previous summer, 6 he marched from the 
Argolid through Tena to Lechaion and recaptured this stretch of the 
walls. At the same time his half-brother, the navarch Teleutias, 
with twelve ships attacked Lechaion by sea and set fire to the 
Korinthian shipyards. 7 With the approach of winter, Agesilaos dis-
8 banded the Peloponnesian levy and returned to Sparta. 
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In the spring of 390 Agesilaos again led out the Peloponnesian 
army. This season, however, the objective was not the Argolid, but 
the Perachora peninsula. The reason for this choice is three-fold. 
First, Korinthian exiles had informed the ephors that the city kept 
its livestock near the town of Perachora in the western region of the 
peninsula. Second, and more importantly, a successful campaign would 
virtually assure the Spartans an overland access to their Phokian and 
Orchomenian allies. It would no longer be necessary to rely solely 
Agesilaos, was named navarch for 390/89. He took the twelve ships at 
Lechaion, circumnavigated the Peloponnesos, added seven more at Sames 
and sailed to Knidos to relieve Ekdikos. In early spring 389, he 
captured ten Athenian triremes sailing to aid Euagoras who, after 
Konen's death in 391, had revolted again from Artaxerxes. Xenophon 
(Hell. 4.8.20-24) notes the irony of both the Athenians' and Teleutias' 
iniatives. See also Diod. 14.97.1-4. 
6 See ch. 5. 
7This, of course, occurred before the ephors sent Teleutias to 
replace Ekdikos at Knidos. Xenophon (Hell. 3.4.19) writes that Eupolia, 
mother of the navarch and the king~rejoiced that both her sons achieved 
glory on the same day, one by taking the foes' walls, the other his 
ships. 
8xen. Hell. 3.4.19, Ages. 2.17; Diad. 14.97.5; Plut. Ages. 
21.1-2. For the events of 391, see also Meyer, Vol. 5, 250, 253 and 
Beloch, 3.1, 85, 87-88, both with notes. 
144 
on the precarious and circuitous approach across the Gulf of Korinth. 
Finally, Agesilaos would be in a position to drive a wedge between 
Argos and Korinth, thereby forestalling the momentum of the sympolity 
begun by the atrocity of 392. 9 Since in Asia-Diphridas had achieved 
merely modest success near Ephesos and Teleutias had secured only 
Knidos for the Spartans, a decisive coup in Europe would greatly 
strengthen the Peloponnesians' slight strategic advantage after the 
collapse of the peace initiatives in 392. 
While en route to Perachora, Agesilaos discovered that the 
Argives and Korinthians were preparing to celebrate the Isthmian games. 
The Argives in fact had taken charge, but fled to Korinth along the 
roaci from Kenchreiai10 as soon as they saw the Peloponnesian column 
approaching. Rather than pursue the fleeing enemy, Agesilaos decided 
to remain and offer to Poseidon the unfinished sacrifices that the 
Argives had abandoned. He then directed the Korinthian exiles to 
celebrate the games. Later in the year when the Peloponnesians had 
withdrawn, the Argives celebrated the games again and many of the 
competitors were proclaimed victors twice. 11 
9see ch. 5 for a description of the massacre at the feast of 
Artemis Eukleia. 
lOKenchreiai was the Korinthian port on the Saronic Gulf; see 
Philippson, RE Vol. 11.2, 167-70. 
llxen. Hell. 4.5.1-2. 
When Agesilaos arrived at Perachora, he discovered that the 
town was heavily fortified and its defenders commanded by Iphikrates 
of Rhamnous. 12 In a classic feint, Agesilaos withdrew his troops as 
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if to attack Korinth itself. The citizens in fear of betrayal from 
within sent an urgent request for help to the garrison at Perachora. 13 
Iphikrates accordingly led his peltasts out to defend Korinth and 
passed the Peloponnesians in the night. Aeesilaos now had unopposed 
access to Perachora and the livestock nearby. He ordered the main body 
of the army to proceed along the coastal road by the "Hot Springs,"l4 
but he assigned one mora15 to advance along the heights of Mt. 
Geranion16 to his right. 
12For a brief discussiop of Iphikrates' importance in the 
history of tactics, see below. 
13The memory of Pasimelos and Alkimenes' cooperation with 
Praxitas in 392 would still have been quite fresh. See ch. 5. 
Perachora was also known as Peraion in antiquity; see Meyer, RE 
19.2, 564-66 and The Blue Guide to Greece, 252. 
l4Ancient Therma (modern Loutraki); the hot springs gush 
forth at 31°C; see Meyer, RE 5A.2, 2376 and The Blue Guide to Greece, 
252. 
15The ~ which consisted of 600-900 men was the basic unit 
of the Spartan army. See Lammert, RE Vol. 16.1, 251-52. The most 
important ancient references are Thuc. 5.68.3; Xen. Hell. 2.4.31; 
Lak. Pol. 11.4; Diod. 15.32; and Plut. Pelop. 17. 
16see Philippson, RE 8.1, 1236-37. The highest point is 1370 
meters, while the average elevation along the ridge is 800-1000 m. 
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When night fell, a chill set in, accompanied by rain and high 
winds. The mora on the Geranion ridge had no means to kindle camp-
fires, so Agesilaos ordered ten men to carry fire in earthen pots to 
the soldiers on the heights with instructions to light as many fires 
as possible. When the now depleted defenders in Perachora saw great 
numbers of campfires on the ridge and in the plain, they assumed that a 
huge army would soon invest their town and fled in the night to the 
temple of Hera on the westernmost tip of the peninsula. 17 Once again 
Agesilaos' understanding of human nature and tactical brilliance were 
quite in evidence. 
By deceiving the Korinthians into summoning Iphikrates and the 
Perachorans into fleeing their town by night, Agesilaos was able to 
occupy the nearby fortress of Oinoe18 without shedding a single drop 
of blood. wnen his soldiers had liberally partaken of the captured 
stores, the army marched out to the Heraion where the Perachorans with 
their wives, children and livestock had taken refuge. Realizing the 
futility of resistance, they surrendered to Agesilaos and placed their 
fate in his hands. He decided to turn over to the Korinthian exiles 
those who had participated in the massacre two years earlier during the 
Eukleia festival. All others were to be sold into slavery along with 
17
xenophon (~.4.5.3-5) records that a fire broke out that 
night in the nearby temple of Poseidon. For this shrine and the two 
dedicated to Hera on the Perachora peninsula, see Meyer, RE 19.2, 565. 
18This Oinoe should not be confused with the Athenian fortress 
on the Boiotian frontier some 55 km. to the northeast. See Meyer, RE 
17.2, 2236-37,under Oinoe (7). 
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their animals and possessions. 19 
The envoys of several poleis chanced to be present while the 
Peloponnesians were disposing of the captives' persons and 
possessions. Among this group were the Boiotians,who were anxious 
to treat for peace, since their land now lay exposed to a Spartan 
invasion. Agesilaos, however, refused even to acknowledge their 
presence despite an introduction by Pharax, the former navarch and 
Theban proxenos at Sparta. The king contented himself by sitting on 
a circular block and gazing exultingly at the great welter of prisoners 
and booty. In addition to his personal grudge against the Thebans, 
Agesilaos realized that a mere cessation of hostilities between the 
Boiotians and Peloponnesians would not be sufficient. Harsh chastise-
ment, most probably including dissolution of the Boiotian league, would 
be req~ired for a peace based on Spartan supremacy in central Greece. 
Unfortunately, Agesilaos' complacency in the afterglow of the 
bloodless military victory and diplomatic snub to the Thebans did not 
last very long. A messenger from Lechaion arrived with news of the 
near annihilation of th~ mora assigned to garrison the Korinthians' 
northern port. 20 The king hastened past Loutraki (Therma) with his 
19 Xen. Hell. 4.5.5-6. Agesilaos by freeing Iphrikrates' 
men from garrison duty had unwittingly made possible the destruction of 
the mora; see below. This was the only unfortunate consequence of 
his ruse. 
20After Agesilaos had outwitted the Korinthians into summoning 
Iphikrates from Perachora, the Athenian peltast commander lost little 
time in plotting a contre-temps in revenge. Part of the mora in 
Lechaion consisted of Amyklaians who customarily returned home for the 
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tent companions and a small bodyguard. Upon arriving in Lechaion, he 
learned that the bodies of the fallen had been recovered, so he ordered 
his men to ground arms and rest. The next day they marched back to 
the Perachora Heraion where Agesilaos commanded that the remaining 
prisoners and property be sold. 21 
Agesilaos than summoned the Boiotian legates and asked them 
why they had come. They now mace ~o mention of peace, but requested 
safe conduct to Korinth to join their own troops. The king laughed, 
saying they did not want to see their soldiers, but rather the results 
22 
of their allies' good fortune. He offered to escort them personally 
Hyakinthia festival even if they were on campaign. The polemarch thus 
offered to escort these men to an area about 5 km. south of Sikyon. 
When the company reached that point, the polemarch, after sending the 
Amyklaians ahead with a small cavalry detachment, began the march back 
to Lechaion. Iphikrates, however, had laid an ambush in which his 
specially trained peltasts,supported by Kallias' Athenian hoplites, would 
attack the unsuspecting 600 Spartans. By a series of brilliant thrusts 
and retreats, Iphikrates' peltasts slowly wore down the Spartans' numbers 
and will. Even the appearance of the horsemen who had escorted the 
Amyklaians was not enough to retrieve the situation. The Spartan 
cavalry escaped to Lechaion while the crippled mora occupied a small hill 
about 370 m. from the sea and 3 km. from Lechai~ The Peloponnesians 
eventually sent boats to rescue their beleaguered comrades, but Kallias' 
hoplites killed many of them on the beach and even in the surf as they 
struggled frantically to reach the boats; Xen. Hell. 4.5.11-18; Plut. 
Ages 22.2; Paus. 3.10.l;and Nepos, Iphicrates 2~ 
21 Xen. Hell. 4.5.7-9; Plut. Ages. 22.1-2. 
22Beloch, 3.1, 86; and Grote,Vol. 7, 515,write that this was the 
most portentious and humiliating defeat inflicted on Spartan hoplites 
since Sphakteria in 425 B.C. in that it seriously undermined the Spartan 
reputation for invincibility. Grote, ibid., Hamilton, 284-86 (who per-
ceives a rare dramatic power in Xenophon's description of this defeat 
and its affect on Agesilaos) and Anderson, Military Theory and Practise, 
121-31, also suspect that the figure of 250 dead is low and that Kallias' 
hoplites played a larger role than Xenophon admits in enhancing the 
proportions of the mora's defeat. 
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to see what might follow upon the Athenians' victory. When he reached 
the area near Korinth, he did not dismantle Iphikrates' trophy, but cut 
down all remaining fruit trees which, he remarked to the Thebans, pro-
duced no sign of resistance from the defenders in the city. He then 
marched back to Lechaion and sent the Theban legates to the Thespian port 
of Kreusis. 23 In the wake of the Athenians' victory, Agesilaos departed 
with the defeated ~ after assigning a fresh one to Lechaion, On ~he 
homeward march, he led his troops into cities late in the day while 
setting out very early in the morning. He left Arkadian Orchomenos 
'before dawn in order to pass by Mantineia in the darkness, because the 
Mantineians were accustomed to rejoice at Spartan misfortunes. 24 
With the dispersal of the main Peloponnesian army, Iphikrates 
was able to recapture the towns in the Megarid which had fallen to 
Praxitas two years earlier. The Spartans' control of the Isthmos and 
access by land to Phokis and Boiotian Orchomenos were once again cur-
tailed. This limited them to conducting harassment of the coalition 
by sea from Lechaion.25 
23xen. Hell. 4.5.9-11. Iphikrates' improvement in peltast war-
fare had far-reaching implications. By 390 B.C. the well-trained and 
innovatively equipped peltast had become a formidable component of 
strategy. The ancient evidence for Iphikrates' reforms appears in 
Diodorus 15.44.2-3; Nepos Iphicrates 1; Polyainos 3.9.17; and Plut. 
Mor. 187a. 
24 . 
Xen. Hell. 4.5.18-19. Xenophon notes that all Spartans 
mourned the death of those fallen in battle except the families of the 
deceased. These would paradoxically rejoice in the misfortune since 
their husbands, sons, and brothers had achieved glory by making the 
supreme sacrifice for the state (Hell. 4.5.10). 
25xen. Hell. 4.5.19. Xenophon wrote that after 392 the land 
Agesilaos' Campaign in Akarnania, 389-88 B.C. 
In the spring of 389 an Achaian legation arrived in Sparta 
to request aid against the Aitolians who with their Athenian and 
Boiotian allies were attempting to detach Kalydon, a town on the 
northern shore of the Patraic gulf. Kalydon had originally been 
Aitolian but since 417 it had been incorporated into the Achaean 
league. 26 In order to hold the town in the last few years, the 
Achaians had been compelled to garrison it. The Aitolians' latest 
harassment provoked the Achaians to seek help from Sparta. The 
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Achaians, whose function in the Peloponnesian alliance was crucial to 
Sparta, 27 made it clear that they would secede unless the requested 
aid were provided. Therefore Agesilaos and his supporters easily 
persuaded the ephors to call out the ban and the king, after assuming 
d 1 d th to Rhl.·on. 28 B f · th t "t th comman , e e army e ore crossJ.ng e s raJ. s, e 
army, which consisted of two Lakedaimonian morai and two from allied 
war bogged down and that most subsequent military actions were conducted 
by mercenaries (Hell. 4.4.14). Except for Agesilaos' expeditions to 
Akarnania to secure the Spartans access to Central Greece through Rhion 
and Agesipolis' campaign in the Argolid, the most important struggles of 
the war (from 389-87) occurred not around Korinth, but in the Aegean and 
near the Hellespont, the Spartans' last toehold in Asia; see Grote, Vol. 
7, 517; Meyer, Vol. 5, 252-53; and Hamilton, 287. 
26Thuc. 5.82.1-2. See Larsen, "The Early Achaean League," 
Studies Presented to David~· Robinson, Vol. 2, 804. 
27As Larsen, 807-08, has shown, since 417 the Achaians were re-
sponsible for controlling the straits of Rhion which separated the 
Patraic and Korinthian Gulfs and guaranteed access to central and 
northern Greece for the Peloponesians when often, as in the Korinthian 
War, the Isthmos was in hostile hands. 
28 Xen. Hell. 4.6.1-3. 
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£oleis, was joined by the full levy of Achaians. When the 
Peloponnesian force arrived in the vicinity of Kalydon, the 
Akarnanians withdrew to the safety of their walled towns and se-
questered their livestock in the more rugged and inaccessible regions 
of their land near the Ambrakiote Gulf. 
Agesilaos sent heralds to the Akarnanian capital Stratos to 
inform the citizens that u~l~as they abandoned their alliance with the 
Athenians and Boiotians, the Peloponnesian army would lay waste to 
their land section by section. When the Akarnanian assembly rejected 
these terms, Agesilaos began making good on his threat. 29 
The Peloponnesians cut and burned the Akarnanian croplands 
so thoroughly that the army's advance was only about 2.2 km. daily. 
This lulled the Akarnanians into a false sense of security which in 
turn induced them to bring most of their animals down from the mountains 
while continuing the tillage of land unscathed by the invaders. Aware 
that his ruse had succeeded, Agesilaos suddenly advanced almost 30 km. 
in a single day on the fifteenth or sixteenth day from his crossing at 
Rhion. He arrived at the southern shores of Lake Ambrakia at the foot 
of a ridge to the east where the Akarnanians had gathered their herds. 
The swiftness of the march stunned the defenders, allowing the 
Peloponnesians to capture nearly all the horses, cattle and sheep along 
with many prisoners. On the next day Agesilaos held a public sale of 
29 Xen. Hell. 4.6.3-4. 
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the booty. 30 
The Akarnanians did not give up. They dispatched a force of 
peltasts whose harassment from the heights was so effective that the 
Peloponnesians were forced with some losses to descend into the plain. 
During the night the peltasts departed and Agesilaos began his with-
drawal the following day. As the Peloponnesians marched with the 
lake on one side and the spurs of the ridge on the other, t.he peltasts 
suddenly re-appeared to press their attack. Agesilaos realized that 
he could advance no farther because of the intensity of the Akarnanians' 
assault. Accordingly, he ordered his hoplites and cavalry, after draw-
ing the enemy out, to counterattack before they could retreat to the 
safety of the ridge. When the Lakedaimonians pressed their attack to the 
ridge, they encountered the Akarnanian hoplites in battle formation. 31 
The Akarnanian hoplites stood their ground against the 
Lakedaimonian cavalry, but gave way to the Spartan hoplites. After 
erecting a trophy on the flanks of the ridge, Agesilaos continued his 
withdrawal to the southeast. As the army approached the Lake Trichonis 
region, the king again pillaged and burned extensively. At the 
30 Xen. Hell. 4.6.5-6. See Klaffenbach, RE 7A.l, 89-90, for a 
map of the region of Trichonis and the western lake called Lysimacheia. 
Hirschfeld, RE 1.1, 1151, discusses the topography of Akarnania. 
Oberhummer, RE 13.1, 707, describes the area of the modern Lake Ambrakia 
and the ridge-on its eastern shores as the site of Agesilaos' sudden 
coup in 389. This region was known as Limnaia in antiquity and lies 
some 30 km. northwest of the fertile area of the Acheloos plain between 
Lakes Lysimacheia and Trichonis. See also The Blue Guide to Greece, 
457-58, where Agesilaos' campaign is misdated to 391. --
31xen. Hell. 4.6.7-11. 
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insistence of the Achaians, he attempted to reduce some of the walled 
" 32 towns, including Stratos, but met with no success. At the approach 
of autumn, Agesilaos wanted to break off the campaign until the follow-
ing spring. The Achaians, believing that he had accomplished nothing 
since not a single town had surrendered, wanted him to stay to hinder 
the Akarnanians' fall planting. Agesilaos, however, thought this un-
wise, because the more the Akarnanians planted in the fall, the more 
they would have to lose the next summer.33 
The army approached Rhion through rugged Aitolian mountains 
unmolested because the Aitolians hoped that Agesilaos would help them 
regain Naupaktos, as he had aided the Achaians in securing Kalydon. 
While the Peloponnesians were crossing over to Rhion, Athenian triremes 
(which had sailed down the Acheloos river from Oiniadai) harassed them 
from the Patraic side of the straits, but could not prevent their safe 
passage. 34 
In early spring 388, Agesilaos again gathered the Pelopcnnesian 
army to fulfill his pledge to the Achaians. As he had surmised some 
months earlier, the Akarnanians sent legates to Sparta with an offer 
to conclude a peace. They joined the Peloponnesian alliance when they 
learned of the preparations for another invasion of their land. They 
32xen. Hell. 4.6.12. 
33xen. Hell. 4.6.13. 
34xen. Hell. 4.6.14. 
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reasoned that even in the safety of their walled towns, they would in 
effect be under siege if Spartans were to destroy their crops. The 
35 Lakedaimonians accepted their terms and peace was thereby concluded. 
With the successful conduct of this campaign, it became clear 
that Agesilaos had gained the upper hand in Lakedaimonian politics 
and was gradually becoming the most powerful and influential figure 
in the st~tc. His rivalry with Antalkidas and the supporters of 
Lysander was not fully resolved, but the outlines of his plan for a 
Spartan hagemony in European Greece were now clearly emerging.36 
In addition, Agesilaos' Akarnanian campaign guaranteed Spartan 
access through Rhion to central Greece, the loyalty of the Achaians and 
friendly relations with Arkadia and Aitolia. 
Agesipolis in Argos: The Aegean and Hellespontine 
Struggle 
Although Agesilaos and his younger brother Teleutias had en-
joyed a great deal of success in the summer of 391 at Lechaion, the 
shocking blow to Spartan prestige inflicted by Iphikrates in 390 had 
emboldened the Argives. Before Agesilaos and Teleutias solidified their 
hold on Lechaion, 37 the king in 391 had ravaged Argive croplands, but 
35 Xen. Hell. 4.7.1. A synopsis of this campaign also appears 
in Plut. Ages. 22.5 and Polyainos 2.1.10. 
36see Meyer, Vol. 5, 288-89 and Hamilton, 287. 
37Praxitas, harmost of Sikyon, in collusion in 392 with the 
pro-Spartan Korinthians, Pasimelos and Alkimenes from within Korinth had 
provided the first chance for the Spartans to break the coalition's 
grip on the Isthmos. See ch. 5. 
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his absence in 389 after the Athenians' slaughter of the mora offered 
the Argives an opportunity to complete their sympolity with Korinth. 
In spite of the embarrassment caused by the loss of the mora to 
Iphikrates and Chabrias, the Spartans had seriously weakened the 
coalition's control of the Isthmos by the time of Agesilaos' Akarnanian 
venture in 389. In the absence of Sparta's most formidable leader, the 
Argives decided to act. They launched a f11ll-scale attack on Korinth, 
occupied the city and surrounding area except Lechaion, removed the 
boundary stones, and simply referred to Korinth as "Argos."38 
Thus in 388,after the Akarnanians joined the Peloponnesian 
alliance, the time had come once again to chastise the Argives. Although 
they still held Lechaion, the Spartans' g~ins in the Isthmos were at 
risk. Since Agesilaos ha~ been able to avoid a second invasion of 
Akarnania, the ephors instead called out the ban against Argos, placing 
38 Xen. Hell. 4.4.6; Diod. 14.91.2-9.2.1. As noted in ch. 5, 
Xenophon's account of the coup in Korinth of 392 (Hell. 4.4.2-5) seems 
to compress the two-stage assimilation of the city by the Argives into 
a single season. The actual completion of the sympolity is much 
more likely to have occurred in 389 when the Argives could seize on 
Sparta's preoccupation in Akarnania to garrison Korinth and forestall 
any further attempt at internal disruption by pro-Spartan oligarchs. 
It was precisely this fear of betrayal from within which led the 
panicky democrats to summon Iphikrates from Perachora in 390 when 
Agesilaos' army suddenly turned back from the Geranion ridge toward 
the city. Thus Hell. 4.4.6 belongs not to 392, but 389. Similarly 
Diodorus' discussion, while preserving the proper sequence of events 
(14.86.1 and 14.91-92), is hopelessly muddled chronologically, since 
he dates the democratic coup and the Argive invasion to 394 and 393 re-
spectively. For an excellent reconstruction of the very difficult 
chronology of these years, see Hamilton, 269-70, who bases his argument 
on Griffith, "The Union of Corinth and Argos," Historia 1 (1950), 236-56. 
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39 
the young king Agesipolis in command. Because of the Argive occupation 
of Korinth, the Spartans reasoned that war against Athens and Boiotia 
was dangerous when an unmolested hostile polis lay on their borders. 
Because the Argives were in the habit of pleading "holy truces" to 
avoid invasion (except for Agesilaos' incursion in 391, this technique 
had evidently been effective), Agesipolis consulted with Zeus at 
Olympia and Apollo at Delphi before invading the Argolid. Since both 
gods responded favorably, the young king went ahead. He succeeded in 
penetrating as far as the city's walls and plundered extensively before 
unfavorable omens and sacrifices at the end of the summer induced him 
to withdraw. 40 
While Agesilaos, Teleutias and Agesipolis were securing the 
Spartans' access to central Greece through Rhion and trying to reg~in 
access at the Isthmos, the warring parties were not idle in the Aegean 
and the Hellespont. Because of Konen's success, Pharnabazos' support 
in 394/93 and the failure of Antalkidas and Tiribazos to conclude a 
Sparto-Persian peace in 392, many people in Athens began to work 
39since his father Pausanias chose exile at Tegea in 395/94 
after the fiasco at Haliartos, the Spartans appointed a regent to 
serve in his place (see ch. 5). Because this was his first field 
command in a war which had lasted for seven years by 388, Agesipolis 
must have become king (i.e. reached the age of 30) in his own right 
either this year or in 389. 
40 Xen. Hell. 4.7.2-7. Meyer, Vol. 5, 26~ and Beloch 3.1, 94, 
date this incursion to 387 to coincide with Antalkidas' mission to 
Sousa and the Peloponnesian offensive by land and sea in the Helles-
pont. Niese, RE 1.1, 805, is non-committal,suggesting either 388 or 
387. Hertzberg, 118, dates the incursion to 390 since he accepts the 
the chronology of Diodorus. Grote, Vol. 7, 519-22,and Hamilton, 288, 
assume that Xenophon's narrative is continuous and take 388 after the 
Akarnanian settlement as more likely. 
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1 1 f . 1 . 1 f h . . 1 41 open y at east or a part1a rev1va o er mar1t1me rea m. In 
spite of Antalkidas' ultimate failure to mollify Artaxerxes, such 
nee-imperialism can not have received much encouragement when the pro-
Spartan Tiribazos arrested Konon. Konon's release by Strouthas eased 
concern at Athens, but the navarch's death in Kypros some months 
42 later (391) led to the ascendancy of the moderate Thrasyboulos. 
After Ekdikos and Telenti.e.s ~ad secured Knidos in the summer 
of 390 to help the pro-Spartan uprising in Rhodes, 43 Teleutias captured 
ten Athenian triremes sailing to aid Euagoras' revolt against the king. 44 
Despite Teleutias' modest success at Knidos in giving the pro-Spartan 
oligarchs a Rhodian toehold and Agesilaos' campaigns in Perachora and 
Akarnania, some Athenians believed that the Spartans were too weak to 
resist Athenian expansion in the Aegean. 45 This group also feared a 
41some early evidence for this assertion 
28-29; and Bengtson, Staatsvertrage 2, 176-177. 
was indisputable; see Bengtson, 182-84. 
appears in Tod, GHI 2, 
By 390 this activity 
42
s c1 " · · " ' ' 4 4 "' ee oche, La Pol1t1que Etrangere d Athenes de _Q_ ~ 33~a.C., 
20; Perlman, "Athenian Democracy and the Revival of Imperialist Expan-
sion at the Beginning of the Fourth Century B.C." _Q',63 (1968), 262; and 
Hamilton, 289-91. 
43see ch. 6, footnote 5. The chronology for these years is 
muddled, as Beloc~ 3.1, 87-88,and Meyer, Vol. 5, 254, n.l, have shown, 
but a good reconstruction is obtainable by considering the Spartan 
navarchs. Thus Podanemos and Herippidas 393/92, Teleutias 392/91, 
Ekdikos 391/90, and Teleutias 390/89 all served as chiefs of the Spartan 
navy. 
44As Meyer, Vol. 5, 258, has shown, this occurred in early 389. 
For Athens' treaty with Euagoras, see Bengtson, Staatsvertage 2, 182. 
45The resounding success of Chabrias and Iphikrates against the 
Spartan~ in 390 undoubtedly bolstered Athenian confidence. 
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revival of Spartan naval strength and wished to dislodge Derkylidas from 
Sestos and Abydos. 46 The two most prominent leaders of this faction 
were Ergokles and Thrasyboulos who induced the assembly to authorize 
construction of forty ships. Thrasyboulos intended to help the 
Rhodian democrats, but before sailing to Rhodes he needed money, allies 
and mercenary support. He, therefore, composed civil strife between 
the Odryssian Amadokos and the Thrad.an Seuthes who then allied !:hc-. .. -
selves to Athens. 47 In Byzantion, after overthrowing the oligarchy, 
he sold the right to collect the five percent shipping tax to the 
popular leaders. The Chalkedonians, opposite Byzantion in Asia, now 
also came over to his side. He then sailed to Lesbos where he led the 
Mytilenians against Methymna. After the Spartan harmost Therimachos 
fell in battle, most of the Lesbian poleis came over to Thrasyboulos. 
Those that did not he plundered for money to hire mercenaries. 48 
Before making a landing in Rhodes, Thrasyboulos sailed around the coast 
46These Hellespontine straits, of course, controlled the 
Euxine grain route; see Lysias 22. Derkylidas had been harmost there 
since July of 394. See ch. 5. 
47xen. Hell. 4.8.26; Diod. 14.94.2; see Bengtson, 
Staatsvertrage 1. 185-87. 
48xen. Hell. 4.8.28-30;also Diodorus (14.94.3-4) writes that 
a storm sank twenty-three of Thrasyboulos' ships off Ephesos before he 
led the uprising on Lesbos. The speeches of Lysias (nos. 19.22, 27, 28, 
and 29) and Aristophanes' Ekklesiazousai 814-18, which date to 391-87 
B.C.,make it clear that the Athenian treasury was almost depleted, which 
made Thrasyboulos' gathering of booty essential. See also Grote, Vol. 7, 
529-30; Beloch, 3.1, 90-92; Meyer, Vol. 5, 259-61; Hamilton, 295. 
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of Asia Minor to Aspendos on the estuary of the Eurymedon River49 
northwest of Kypros. He had been hiring mercenaries while increasing 
his fleet strength all along, but because of an ill-advised raid by 
his men, the Aspendians fell upon his camp one night and killed him 
in his tent (spring 388 B.C.). 50 The Athenians sent Agyrrios tore-
place him when they learned of his death. 51 
Because Derkylidas had been ineffective against Athenian re-
surgence in the Hellespont, the Spartans replaced him with Anaxibios, 52 
who arrived at Abydos with three triremes and money to hire 1,000 
mercenaries. The Athenians that same spring (388) countered by sending 
Iphikrates with eight ships and 1,200 men. 53 After some indecisive 
. 
49see Ruge, RE 6.1, 1334; today the Kopru-Su. The Eurymedon 
estuary, of course, was the site of Kimon's victory over the Persians 
in 466 B.C. The ruins of Aspendos lie near modern Serik. 
50xen. Hell. 4.8.30; Diod. 14.99.4-5; Nepos, Thrasyb. 4.4 and 
Aristophanes' Ploutos 550, the production of which in the spring of 
388 fixes the time of Thrasyboulos' death; see Meyer, Vol. 5, 259, 
n.l, and 261. 
5lxen. Hell. 4.8.31; ironically the Athenians had ordered 
Thrasyboulos and his comrades back to Athens to stand trial. As 
Lysias' orations 28 and 29 and Demosth. 19.180 show, Ergokles, 
Nikophemos and Aristophanes were condemned to death and Pamphilos, who 
had failed on Aigina (see below),was fined. The basic reason for these 
things was that Thrasyboulos and his demagogues were seriously under-
mining Athenian relations with Persia and draining the treasury. 
52Anaxibios had much experience in the Hellespont as navarch 
in 400 B.C.; Xen. Anab. 6.1.16, 7.1.3, 11, 20,36, 7.2.5, 8. See also 
Judeich, RE 1.2, 2082. 
53rphikrates had left Korinth the previous summer (389) after 
the Argive incursion. Xenophon (Hell. 4.8.34) writes that he went home 
to Athens because the Argives said they did not need him any more after 
he killed some Korinthian Argolizers. Diodorus (14.92.1-2) states that 
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skirmishes, Anaxibios gre•v careless and was killed in an ambush near 
Kremaste while returning from Antandros. Iphikrates' peltasts had 
killed 12 Spartan officers and over 250 other Peloponnesians and 
I Abydenes. With Derkylidas' departure and Anaxibios death, the 
Athenians were firmly in control of the grain route and the tide in 
the Hellespont seemed to be turning against the Spartans (summer 388). 54 
The Struggle on Aigina 
Spartan fortunes, however, were not entirely black, as during 
the previous summer they had undertaken a campaign of piracy against 
the Athenians from Aigina. The Athenian response ~vas to send 
Pamphilos,who blockaded the island with ten ships and landed a hoplite 
force. After completing his collection of tribute in the islands, 
Teleutias hastened. to the Aiginetans'aid. He drove off the Athenian 
ships, but Pamphilos had built a fortress and continued his depreda-
tions by land. At the end of the summer, Hierax replaced Teleutias. 
who sailed home.55 
the Athenians recalled him because he wished to seize power in Korinth 
for himself. Hamilton, 296-97, believes Diodorus' explanation is more 
likely since the Athenians would not wish to antagonize their Argive 
allies, while conducting operations in the Aegean and Hellespont. 
54 Xen. Hell. 4.8.35-39. See also Grote, Vol. 7, 535; Beloch, 
3.1, 92; Meyer, Vol. 5, 265-66; and Hamilton, 294 all of whom observe 
that while the Athenians were in full control of Hellespontine shipping, 
the Spartans were confined to Sestos and Abydos. 
55xenophon (Hell.~ 5.1.1-4) writes that, although Teleutias faced no 
great danger or loss during his second tenure as navarch and effected 
no clever ruse, he had been immensely popular with his men. This 
according to Xenophon is the true test of a commander's worth. 
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Hierax placed his adjutant ( > / ETitOTOAEUS ) Gorgopas in command 
of twelve ships at Aigina, while he sailed to Rhodes. Gorgopas 
quickly reduced Pamphilos to a state of siege which moved the 
Athenians to outfit a fleet for the rescue of their beleaguered hop-
lites. After only four months, the Spartans under Gorgopas were free 
again to continue their piracy against Athenian shipping in the Saronic 
Gulf (autumn 389). 56 
In the spring of 388, the Athenians outfitted thirteen ships 
under Eunomos to resist the Spartans' piracy. That this measure was 
necessary57 despite severe depletion of the city's finances is 
abundantly clear from the testimony in Lysias' prosecution of the grain 
dealers. 58 In the fall of 388, Antalkidas replaced Hierax as navarch. 
He put into Rhodes with the entire fleet, but sent Gorgopas (Hierax's 
adjutant) back to Aigina with his original twelve ships.59 .The new 
navarch then appointed his own adjutant Nikolochos commander of the 
56xen. Hell. 5.1. 1-5. Eteonikos was the previous commander. 
57xen. Hell. 5.1.5. The campaigns of Thrasyboulos and Iphikrates 
in the Hellespont in 389-88 were simultaneous with those of Pamphilos and 
Eunomos in the Saronic Gulf; see above. 
58see Lysias 22.8 especially for a price-fixing conspiracy in 
a period of scarce supplies in the winter of 388-87: also Meyer, Vol. 5, 
262-63 with notes. 
59This was likely a reward for Gorgopas' effectiveness against 
Pamphilos' Athenians in autumn 389. 
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remaining twenty-five ships, ordering him to sail to the relief of the 
beleaguered Abvdenes,60 
Early in 387, Nikolochos' twenty-five ships reduced Tenedos, 
plundered it and put into Abydos. The Athenians countered this move 
by assembling thirty-two ships from the northern Aegean and Hellespont. 
They then blockaded Nikolochos at Abydos. 61 
In the Saronic Gulf, Gorgopas had managed to capture four of 
Eunomos' triremes the previous fall (388) in a daring pursuit and 
battle off Cape Zoster by moonlight. He thereby reduced the Athenian 
fleet strength in this area to a mere nine vessels for the winter of 
388-87. 62 Gorgopas' success, however, was cut short because of Euagoras' 
request for help which moved the Athenians to dispatch Chabrias with 
ten ships in the spring of 387.63 Before sailing to Kypros, he put in 
at Aigina where he laid an ambush for Gorgopas' men and the Aiginetans. 
Gorgopas and 350 others died in the struggle and because the remaining 
60xen. Hell. 5.1.6; this of course means that the entire 
Peloponnesian fleet numbered only thirty-seven vessels in the winter of 
288-87, a remarkable contrast to the 120 trireme~ afloat ten years 
earlier (see chs. 3 and 4). It is also mute, but eloquent testimony to 
the Spartans' depleted resources. 
6lxen. Hell. 5.1.7. 
62xen. Hell. 5.1.8-9. 
63xen. Hell. 5.1.10. As noted before, Euagoras had revolted 
from the Great King about a year after Konon's death. At the time he 
had requested and obtained an alliance with Athens (390 B.C.). 
Agesilaos' brother Teleutias,who was navarch in 390/89,captured the 
first ten ships sent by the Athenians to help their Kypriote friend 
and benefactor. See Xen. Hell. 4.8.24 and Bengtson, Staatsvertrage 2, 
182. 
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Peloponnesians and Aiginetans refused to serve under Eteonikos64 without 
pay, the Athenians again controlled the Saronic Gulf. 65 
By the early summer of 387, with the single exception of 
Thrasyboulos' death near Aspendos in 388, Athenian fortunes seemed to 
be better than ever on the surface. Iphikrates' ambush near Kremaste 
had caused the death of more than 250 Spartan allies and Anaxibios, 
who had replaced Derkylidas as harmost in Abydos (388). Antalkidas' 
adjutant Nikolochos had blundered into a blockade at Abydos in the 
spring of 387 and shortly thereafter Chabrias' trick on Aigina had 
broken the ephors' two years of piracy in the Saronic Gulf. Because of 
66 the treaties with Akoris of Egypt in 389 and Euagoras in 390, the 
Athenians seemed to be assured of ships and grain in their struggle 
against Sparta, even if the treasury was dangerously depleted. 67 The 
reasons for the failure of Athens and her coalition allies to bring 
the Spartans (whose fiscal resources were also near exhaustion) to 
their knees must be sought in Sardis and Sousa. 
64Eteonikos commanded the Spartan force on Aigina in 389 when 
Pamphilos' troops first landed. He was aided by the arrival of 
Teleutias from Rhodes, see Xen. Hell. 5.1.1-2. 
65 Xen. Hell. 5.1.11-13. 
66For these treaties with rebellious subjects of the Great King, 
see Bengtson, Staatsvertrage 1, 182-84. 
67That the Spartans were resolved to harass Athenian shipping 
in the Saronic Gulf even though their sailors on Aigina refused to 
serve under Eteonikos without pay is clear from Xenophon's testimony. 
The Hellenika (5.1.13-24) recounts the brilliant nocturnal raid on the 
Peiraeus and coastal piracy off Attica which Teleutias undertook in 
order to obtain booty and pay for the sullen sailors. Because this 
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The Diplomatic Navarchy of Antalkidas and the King's Peace. 
While Agesipolis was in the Argolid and Anaxibios was wrangling 
with Iphikrates in the Hellespont, a profound change occurred in the 
Persian attitude to the Greeks. Because of the rising tide of 
Athenian nee-imperialism marked by attempts to win over former Aegean 
allies and undisguised aid to rebellious Persian subjects, the Great 
King decided to replace the pro-Athenian Strouthas in Sardis with 
Antalkidas' friend Tiribazos. As noted above, after extending Gorgopas' 
command in Aigina and placing his adjutant Nikolochos in charge of the 
remaining Peloponnesian ships, Antalkidas travelled to Sousa to curry 
favor with Tiribazos and the Great King. 68 Tiribazos, with whom 
Antalkidas had become friendly during the failed peace of 392, supported 
e 
the navarch's position vigorously. This time Artaxerxes was persuaded 
that Persian and Spartan interests had coalesced because of the hostile 
behavior of Athens. 69 He, therefore, concluded a peace with the 
Spartans and sent Tiribazos to Sardis to replace Strouthas and to help 
occurred during Antalkidas' navarchy in spring 387, Agesilaos' influence 
most likely lay behind the decision to send Teleutias to continue 
Gorgopas' earlier good work. 
68Fall and winter 388-87; see Xen. Hell. 5.1.6. 
69Meyer, Vol. 5, 265-66; Beloch 3.1, 89; and Hamilto~ 298,all 
note that Athens' aggressively independent foreign policy since 392 
had eroded any basis for cooperation with Persia. Beloch in fact 
observes that the aid to Euagoras and Akoris had placed Athens in a 
virtual state of war with the Great King. 
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70 Antalkidas bring Athens to heel. The Spartans also requested aid from 
Dionysios I of Syracuse whom they had helped in 396. 71 With the twenty 
Syracusan ships and some twenty-five from Daskyleion, Antalkidas' naval 
strength stood at over eighty ships. 72 The Spartan navarch quickly 
proved himself the equal in tactical cunning to Agesilaos' brother 
Teleutias. He was able to split the Athenian fleet in the Hellespont 
and break the blockade at Abydos where his adjutant Nikolochos had 
been trapped with twenty-seven ships. 73 Because of Teleutias' 
70At the same time another close friend of Tiribazos named 
Ariobarzanes took charge of the Daskyleion satrapy while Pharnabazos 
travelled to Sousa to marry Apame, one of Artaxerxes' daughters. In 
addition to fulfilling one of his satrap's long desired hopes (see 
chs. 3 and 4), the Great King eliminated the last influential Persian 
supporter of Athens, thereby isolating Iphikrates and the Athenian 
navarch Diotimos near Abydos. See Xen. Hell. 5.1.28 and Plut. Artax. 27. 
71For this aid to the beleaguered tyrant some nine years 
earlier, see ch. 4 and Diod. 14.63.4. 
72 Xen. Hell. 5.1.28. The Athenians had failed to detach the 
Syracusans from Sparta in 393, as Sparto-Syracusan ties going back 
to 414 B.C. prevailed (see Bengtson, Staatsvertrage 2, 137-38). For 
Athens' approach to Syracuse in 393, see Tod GHI 2, no. 108 and 
Lysias 19.9. 
73He isolated Iphikrates' eight ships at Chalkedon and his 
Syracusan ally Polyxenos caused Thrasyboulos of Kollytos (not to be 
confused with his more famous namesake who had died a year before; see 
Schwahn, RE 6A.l, 575,under Thrasyboulos(6))to abandon the western 
approach to the Hellespont. Thus Thrasyboulos' eight ships were 
captured by an ingenious feint which also lured away enough of the 
thirty-two triremes blockading Abydos to permit Nikolochos to break 
free. See Xen. Hell. 5.1.25-28. 
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operations from Aigina and Antalkidas' recovery of the Hellespont 
with Persian help, the Athenians realized that they had no hope of 
successfully prosecuting the war. The Lakedaimonians, if pressed, 
could reduce Athens to starvation as Lysander had in the winter of 
405/04, since Antalkidas had closed off the Euxine sources. Similarly, 
Teleutias could intercept any Egyptian grain from his base on Aigina. 
By early summer, theref0~e. the Athenians were prepared to sue for 
peace. 
None of the other members of the anti-Spartan coalition was 
any more eager to keep up hostilities. The Argives could no longer 
plead "sacred truces" to avoid Spartan pillage of the Argolid. Because 
the Korinthians had bee~ subsumed into Argos, their policy naturally 
coincided with that of the Argives with the exception of those who 
bitterly resented the Argive occupation of their homeland. Although 
the Thebans had contributed little to the war for some years, they 
still faced harassment from Sparta's Phokian allies and the harmost 
in Boiotian Orchomenos. Even the Spartans,who clearly enjoyed the 
advantage,were weary of the struggle. They had maintained garrisons 
at Orchomenos and Lechaion, while keeping watch over wavering or dis-
loyal allies at great expense. Their recent i~ability to pay the 
soldiers and sailors on Aigina and the fact that they could barely keep 
forty ships in service are eloquent testimony to their fiscal exhaus-
tion.74 When Tiribazos invited the belligerents to assemble in Sardis, 
74At the outbreak of the war in 395, the fleet strength stood 
at 120 ships, ninety in Asia Minor and thirty in Sicily. The financial 
all came to hear the formal announcement of the Sparto-Persian 
alliance and the terms on which the Great King would make peace with 
the other Greeks. 75 
Agesilaos, Antalkidas and the King's Peace 
When the envoys of the several poleis had convP.ned at the 
satrapal residence in Sardis, Tiribazos read them the text of the 
Sparto-Persian treaty and terms for the settlement. The Greek cities 
in Asia were to remain tributary to Artaxerxes. All other Greek 
poleis, large or small, were to be autonomous except Skyros, Lemnos 
and Imbros which would remain under Athenian control. Finally, 
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Artaxerxes promised together with those faithful to the treaty to bring 
the full might of the Persian empire to bear against any polis re-
jecting it.76 Having heard these rather lugubrious terms, 77 the 
and physical depletion of all Greek poleis by early summer 387 is noted 
by Grote, Vol. 7, 547-48; Beloch, 3.1, 94-95; Meyer, Vol. 5, 268-69; and 
Hamilton,311-312. 
75Bengtson, Staatsvertrage 2, 188-92, has compiled a complete 
listing of all ancient references to the terms of the peace as laid 
down in Sardis by Tiribazos. Xenophon's (Hell. 5.1.31) account is 
clearly the best and most detailed. 
76
xen. Hell. 5.1.31; Diod. 14.110.3; Plut. Ages. 23.1-5. 
77niodorus (14.110.4) records that the Athenians, Thebans and some 
other Greeks found the treaty's first clause, which abandoned the 
Asian Greeks to the Great King, repulsive. 
coalition's envoys had only to report to their home poleis and re-
convene in Sparta during the winter (387/86) for formal ratification. 
With the adjournment of the conference in Sardis, one might 
well ask why Agesilaos, an adversary of Antalkidas and fiercely 
opposed in 392 to surrendering the Asian Greeks, 78 would allow 
precisely such a thing for the sake of peace with Persia in 387. 
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The answer must be sought in several areas. The most important reason 
for his change of heart was the growing difficulty of waging a war on 
two fronts. The Peloponnesian alliance simply did not have the resources, 
human or fiscal, to defeat the coalition and keep the Asian Greeks 
free. When Agesilaos left Sestos in 394 he promised to return to Asia 
Minor as soon as matters were settled in Europe. 79 At Koroneia, 
though he controlled the field, he unfortunately failed to detach 
Boiotia from the coalition. Also his brother-in-law's naval disaster 
near Knidos prevented the Spartans from containing subsequent 
Athenian expansion in the Aegean. Finally the gradual Argive-Korin-
thian sympolity (392-89), despite his and Teleutias'best efforts near 
Lechaion, severely limited Spartan access to central Greece through 
the Isthmos. All of these things combined to make an inglorious and 
desultory war of attrition inevitable. A second concern surfaced 
78Plut. Ages. 23, Mor. 213 b. 
79see ch. 5. 
with Chabrias'and Iphikrates'annihilation of the~ near Sikyon in 
390: not only did Sparta have to contend with hostile Greeks and 
Persians, but there were growing indications of recalcitrance within 
her own alliance. 80 A third reason for Agesilaos' change of heart, 
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however reluctant, was the strong resistance to his influence and the 
war ag~inst Persia from the supporters of Antalkidas. 81 In 392 
Agesilaos had been a~~e to prevail because of the Athenian refusal to 
cede the Asian Greeks and Artaxerxes' anger at Spartan depredations 
at Knidos, Ephesos and Abydos. In 388 Sparta's sinking fortunes in 
Asia Minor and the Athenian naval revival, which now irritated 
Artaxerxes more than the Spartans' toeholds at Abydos and Knidos, 
forced Agesilaos to concede that Antalkidas was correct. The Spartans 
would either have to surrender the Asian Greeks for peace with the 
Persians or yield to the hostile coalition in Europe. As painful and 
distressing as it must have been to him, Agesilaos chose to preserve 
Spartan security at home at the cost of reneging on his promise in 394 
80Agesilaos was compelled to lead the survivors of the defeated 
~ home with caution to avoid exposing them to ridicule, especially 
from the Mantineians (Xen. Hell. 4.5.18). Also the Phliasians 
refused to allow any Spartans into their city until Iphikrates in-
flicted a sudden defeat on them near their own walls (Xen. Hell. 4.4.15); 
see also Legon, "Phliasian Politics and Policy in the Early Fourth 
Century B.C." Historia, 16 (1967), 325-26. During these same years 
(391-89) the Spartans resented their allies' cowardice in battle against 
Iphikrates' peltasts (Hell. 4.4.17). 
81Didymos 7.19; Plut. Artax. 21; see also Meyer, Vol. 5, 265, 
n.2; Smith, "The Opposition to Agesilaos' Foreign Policy, 394-3il B.C.," 
Historia, 2 (1954), 274,believes that Antalkidas and the king cooperated 
in 392, but Plutarch's testimony (Ages. 23) and Isokrates' Archidamos (11-
12) make this highly unlikely. 
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at Sestos. 82 
The ratification of the peace in Sparta during the winter was 
not without its stormy moments. The autonomy clause provoked resent-
ment among the Argives and their democratic supporters in Korinth. 
Similarly, the Thebans bitterly resented Agesilaos' insistence that 
all members of the Boiotian league sign individually. Theban reluctance 
eventually collapsed, however, when Agesilaos threatened to declare 
war. Also the Argives, facing a similar threat, withdrew from Korinth. 
The Spartans restored the oligarchs, thereby ending the Korinthian ex-
perience with democracy. The Korinthian democrats fled into exile in 
fear for their lives and an oligarchic Korinth rejoined the Peloponnesian 
alliance. 83 
When these matters were settled early in 386 B.C., the Greek 
world after eight years of warfare was again at peace. The anti-
Spartan coalition had been dissolved. With the reluctant cooperation 
82see Wilcken, 12,and Hamilton 307, n.27. Meyer, Vol. 5, 265, 
n.2,also believes that by 388 Agesilaos reluctantly agreed to lay 
aside his differences with Antalkidas to secure the best settlement 
possible for Sparta. He obviously knew that the European situation 
was much more threatening than the Asian. 
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xen. Hell. 5.1.32-36. Xenophon is completely silent about 
Agesilaos' change of heart by 387 and only briefly discusses Antalkidas' 
brilliant diplomacy in Sousa. Wilcken, 17-18, and Hamilto~ 316, n.56, 
quite plausibly suggest that the reason for his reticence is that the 
terms of the Sparta-Persian peace (which made the general settlement 
possible) reflected poorly on Agesilaos who had promised to defend the 
Asian Greeks' autonomy. That Agesilaos could insist so vehemently on 
a literal interpretation of the autonomy clause against the Thebans and 
Argives attests to the effectiveness of his rival. Antalkidas' persua-
sion of the Great King to include a threat of force against any polis 
resisting the peac~ thereby making Agesilaos' bellicosity possible. 
of Agesilaos and Antalkidas the Lakedaimonians had achieved three 
things: they brought Korinth back into their own alliance, they 
dissolved the Boiotian league and they humiliated once again their 
ancient enemies,the Argives. Because of the navarch's diplomacy and 
the king's change of heart, the Spartans had regained full access to 
the Isthmos and were poised under Agesilaos to extend their hegemony 
throughout European Greece. 84 
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Artaxerxes' gain from the peace is apparent. The Persians would now 
be free to bring their rebellious subjects in Kypros and Egypt to heel 
while the Spartan hegemony in Europe would preclude the form~tion of 
any hostile coalitions in Greece. See Justin 6.6.1-3; and Died. 14.111. 
Olmstead, History of the Persian Empire, 395, suggests that 
Xerxes had failed! 
84Ryder, Kaine Eirene, 36, rightly observes that the major 
role played by the Persians in the settlement of 387/86 means that 
• b •d d \ ;) / Th• 0 b T 1t cannot e cons1 ere a ture Kotvn e:tpnvn. 1s 1s so ecause tne 
peace was not forged on a basis of common interest among the Greeks. 
See also Wilcken, 18-19; Hamilton, 316-18; Meyer, Vol. 5, 269; and 
Beloch, 3.1, 95-96. On the subject of Agesilaos' change of heart and 
European Greek attitudes to their compatriots in Asia, Seager and 
Tuplin, "The Freedom of the Greeks of Asia," JHS,lOO (1980), 141-54, 
believe that it was during the period of Spartan intervention from 
400-387 that the notion of the Asian Greeks as a collective entity 
first arose. Wesenberg, "Agesilaos im Artemision," ZPE,41 (1981), 
175-180, suggests that the Ephesians tried to scratch Agesilaos' name 
off the column base in the restored temple some time after 386 because 
the Spartans had abandoned them to Artaxerxes. 
CHAPTER VII 
AGESILAOS AND SPARTA'S HEGEMONY IN GREECE, 386-382 ~·f· 
The most significant result of the King's Peace in Europe was 
that it redounded greatly to the advantage of the Spartans. 1 In 
Asia, the Persians realized a long-term goal of their foreign policy. 
The peace dictated by Artax~rY-es and Sparta explicitly stated that 
the Greeks of the Aegean seaboard were to be possessions of the Great 
King.2 The Persians could now direct their energies in the West to 
the suppression of revolts in Egypt3 and Kypros. 4 After nearly a 
decade and a half, they had finally ridden the northwestern satrapies 
of the Spartans' irritating and injurious presence, while simultaneously 
freeing a great pool of mercenaries for the campaigns against Akoris 
and Euagoras. 5 The other Greeks of Europe and the Aegean gained little 
or nothing from the peace which gave Sparta a nearly free hand to 
consolidate her power on either side of the Isthmos of Korinth. In 
1
see Hertzberg, 131; Hampl, Die ~iechischen Staatsvertrage des 
~Jahrhunderts YQl:Christi Geburt, 83; Meyer, Vol. 5, 288; Beloch, 3.1, 
99-100; Grote, Vol. 8, 26-27; Seager, "The King's Peace and the Balance 
of Power in Greece, 386-62 B.C.," Athenaeum,52 (1974), 39-40; and 
Hamilton, 323-25. 
2
xen. Hell. 5.1.31; see also Bengtson's complete collection of 
references to the peace, Staatsvertrage 2, 188-93. 
3rsok. 4. 140; Demosth. Contra Lept. 76; Nepos Chabrias 2.1; 
Justin 6.6.3. 
4rsok. 4.162, Euag. 62; Diod. 15.2.3. 
5As Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers, Oxford, 1933, 1-57, has 
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marked contrast, however, to their earlier purpose, the Spartans under 
the leadership of Antalkidas and a reluctant Agesilaos surrendered 
the Asian Greeks to the Persians. 6 
With the conclusion of the peace in early 386, the dissolution 
of the Argive-Korinthian sympolity and the fragmentation of the 
Boiotian league, Agesilaos stood poised to enhance Sparta's position 
, ( , 
as ~pocrTaTns of the ~c3~~ and nYE~WV of the Greek world in Europe 
and the Aegean. 7 To secure his grip in Boiotia, Agesilaos restored the 
Plataians to their home town which an earlier generation of Spartans 
had destroyed, thus forcing the inhabitants to flee to Athens. 8 He 
continued the occupation of Boiotian Orchomenos by a garrison and 
shown, there was a dramatic surge in the number and variety of 
mercenaries during the Peloponnesian War. After 404 B.C., such figures 
as Klearchos of Sparta, Koiratadas of Thebes, Chabrias and Iphikrates 
of Athens elevated mercenaries to an importance equal or surpassing 
that of the citizen hoplite. With the exception of Agesilaos' 
innovative use of cavalry (see ch. 4), the Spartans were the only ones 
to make no significant advances in mercenary·warfare. The chief 
reasons for the rise of the mercenary were impoverishment attendant 
upon warfare, the decline of agricul~ure and overpopulation. See Isok. 
4.167, 5.122;and Diod. 14.23.4. 
6rt is ironic that the Asian Greeks, whose dreams of autonomy 
were dashed by the settlement of 386, entered into a period of great 
material prosperity. The off-shore islands also experienced a re-
surgence of material well-being which continued to elude the war-torn 
Greek mainland. The only possible exception was Sames whose citizens 
and economic base had been devastated by bloody factional strife for 
over a decade. See Meyer, Vol. 5, 286-87 and Olmstead,396-97. In 
support of his Panhellenist ideals Isokrates in the Panegyrikos, On The 
Peace, and Letter to Archidamos (Agesilaos' son) takes a gloomy view of 
the economic and social ills in Greece after 386 B.C. 
7 Grote, Vol. 8, 2; Beloch 3.1, 95; Meyer, Vol. 5, 208-09; and 
Ryder, 35-36,all observe that since no~e but the Spartans gained from 
the peace, no polis could challenge or even resist whatever purposes 
the Spartans intended for years after the settlement. 
8Paus. 9.1.3; Isok. 14.14, 54. For the destruction of Plataia 
installed a garrison in Thespiai. 9 
In the wake of the lugubrious surrender of Asian Greece and 
I 
the Spartans activities in Europe in early 386, someone reproached 
Agesilaos by saying "Alas for Hellas, when Lakonians are Medizing." 
The king answered, "Not at all, rather the Medes are Lakonizing."10 
While what he said was true, the king's ready wit could not disguise 
the fact that a major shift in Spartan policy had occurred. 
Although he had abandoned his earlier Panhellenism when he 
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realized that he would be unable to fulfill his promise to the Greeks 
of Asia, Agesilaos was in fact at the zenith of his power and influence 
in Lakedaimon. He had emerged from the Korinthian War as the-dominant 
force in Spartan politics and would quickly assume nearly full control 
in 427, see Thuc. 3.68, 5.32; Isok. 4.126, 12.101; and Plut. Lys. 14. 
9xen. Hell. 5.4.15-20; Isok. 14.14-15; and Diod. 15.32-37. 
Ryder, 4 7, writes that Sparta's flimsy pretex.ts for meddling in the 
internal affairs of other poleis on either side of the Isthmos show 
that little more than expediency dictated her course of action. 
10 Plut. Ages. 23.2, Artax. 22.2, and Mar. 213b. Olmstead, 396-
416, and Meyer, Vol. 5, 286-87, describe in great detail the gradual, 
but relentless encroachment of Greek cultural, numismatic and military 
influence throughout the western regions of the Persian realm. Greeks 
held positions at the highest administrative levels, a practice begun 
over a century before, but greatly accelerated by the King's Peace. 
Among the most salient results of this trend in the quarter century 
after 386 was the successful resistance to central authority made 
possible in many areas by use of Greek mercenaries. 
f f . 1" 11 o ore1gn po 1cy. Even during Antalkidas' brilliantly effective 
navarchy (388-87), Agesilaos had secured the Aiginetan command for 
his brother Teleutias, when the sailors refused to serve under 
Eteonikos without pay. 12 Earlier Teleutias had served as navarch on 
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two separate occasions (392/91 and 390/89), a most unusual development, 
since by tradition no man would hold that office more than once. 13 In 
addition to his campaigns from 391-388, this indirect evidence hints 
strongly at Agesilaos' influence in shaping Spartan public opinion and 
policy. His deference to the ephors, loyalty to his friends and rap-
port with the ordinary citizenl4 made possible his supremacy in the 
state at this period and for many years to come. It i~ interesting to 
note that unlike his elder brother Agis or contemporary Pausanias, the 
Spartans never put Agesilaos on trial. 15 
Before he could expand Spartan influence beyond the Isthmos, 
Agesilaos wanted to be certain of allied loyalty in the Peloponnesos. 
At the conclusion of the Korinthian War, the Spartans routinely 
11 See Grote, Vol. 8, 26, 32; Meyer, Vol. 5, 280-89; Cawkwell, 
"Agesilaos and Sparta," 74-77; Smith, "The Opposition to Agesilaos' 
Foreign Policy," 275; Parke, "The Development of the Second Spartan 
Empire," 373, Rice, "Agesilaos, Agesipolis and Spartan Politics," 166. 
12 See ch. 6. 
13 Xen. Hell. 2.1.7; Aris. Pol. 127la; see also Meyer, Vol. 5, 
254, n.l, and 259, n.2 for chronology. 
14 See ch. 2. 
15For Agis' trial in 418 B.C., see Thuc. 5.63 and Gomme et al., 
Vol. 4, 89-90. Pausanias was tried and acquitted in 403 (Paus. 3.5.2), 
but fled into exile after an unfavorable verdict in 395 (Xen. Hell. 
3.5.25; Paus. 3.5.6; Diod. 14.89.1). 
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. d 11' d . . 16 garr~sone many a ~e c~t~es. Once Agesilaos had broken all 
lingering resistance to the King's Peace, 17 he directed his attention 
to nearby allies whose allegiance had wavered or become suspect. 
Mantineia was the first polis to experience the new direction of 
Agesilaos' foreign policy. 
The Fate of Mantineia and Phlious 
------- --
A certain restiveness under the Spartan yoke in the earliest 
years of the fourth century is well attested. Fearful of an imminent 
Spartan invasion in 395, the Boiotians had sent an embassy to Athens. 
The Theban speakers listed a number of grievances against Sparta in 
the Athenian assembly. ~ey observed that many allied poleis, even 
those in the Peloponnesos, resented the Spartans' arrogance. The 
Lakedaimonians, they claimed, had failed to allot a fair share of the 
spoils of war to free men in 404 B.C. and had placed perioikoi and 
16 Xen. Hell. 5.1.29. 
l7see ch. 6 for details of his dissolution of both the Boiotian 
league and the Argive-Korinthian sympolity. There is some ancient evi-
dence that Sparta and Thebes contracted an alliance in 386 B.C.; see 
Isok. 14.27; Plut. Pelop. 4.5; and Aristeides 173. Bengtson, 
Staatsvertrage 2, 193, writes that the existence of this is doubtful. 
Buckler, 11The Alleged Theban-Spartan Alliance of 386 B.C." Eranos, 78 
(1980), 179-85, argues that a formal treaty ratified by oaths is un-
likely because of Thebes' prohibition against Sparta's Olynthian 
campaign in 383, Sparta's lack of any reference to such a treaty 
before the seizure of the Kadmeia, and Leontiades' claim that Thebes 
under Ismenias had been hostile to Sparta since 404 B.C. Also 
Agesilaos' most consistent trait, his peculiar antipathy to Thebes, 
makes such an alliance unlikely. Buckler is either correct, therefore, 
in asserting that Isokrates lied about this treaty for his own rhetori-
cal purposes or he may have exaggerated an informal liaison between 
Leontiades' pro-Spartan faction and a S)rmpathetic group in Lakedaimon. 
If there were such an informal relation, it bore fruit dramatically 
with Phoibidas' coup (see below). 
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helots in control of free cities. 18 
Another sign of discontent surfaced in 391 when the Phliasians 
requested a Spartan garrison to protect them from Iphikrates' 
mercenaries. Before Iphikrates' successful attack, however, the towns-
men for some time had refused to admit any Spartans within their walls. 
The Spartans complied with the Phliasian request, but despite their 
sympathy for the city's oligarchic exiles, they did not insist that 
the democratic government take these exiles back. Also, they left the 
city without tampering in any way with its laws. 19 That Agesipolis 
used Phlious as a base to launch his incursion against the Argives 
indicates that the city was still loyal to the Spartans in 388. 20 
Perhaps because of that cooperation Agesilaos decided to post?one the 
Phliasians' ch~stisement until he had dealt with the Mantineians whose 
1 1 h . 21 oya ty was muc more errat1c. 
18 Xen. Hell. 3.5.12. 
19xen. Hell. 4.4.15. 
20Legon, "Phliasian Politics and Policy in the Early Fourth 
Century B.C.," Historia,l6 (1967), 326-28, contends that in 388 the 
city was still democratic. The government allowed the Spartans to 
mass their troops at Phlious as a gesture of good will. The Spartans, 
preoccupied with the war, had no intention of forcing an oligarchy on 
the city at that time. 
21No better illustration of Parke's remark ("The Second Spartan 
Empire," 37) that Sparta under Agesilaos was converting the alliance 
into an ~pxr) occurs than her treatment of Mantineia and Phlious. 
Cawkwell, "Agesilaos and Sparta," 75, notes that these poleis were the 
two great anomalies in the Spartan alliance. Because of their walls 
and prosperity, they had evolved along somewhat independent lines and 
had become democracies. 
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Relations between Sparta and Mantineia had long been strained. 
Because of a common border and Mantineia's tradition of democracy, 
Agesilaos decided to make an example of this polis after all matters 
pertaining to the King's Peace were settled. An excellent pretext for 
intervention arose with the expiration of the thirty-years' treaty be-
tween the two cities which was concluded in 417 after the Spartans' 
d f f bi d A . d M . . M . . 22 e eat o a com ne rg~ve an ant1ne1an army near ant1ne1a. 
Agesilaos' inherent piety would not obstruct his designs since the 
sacred oaths were no longer in effect. 23 
At the treaty's expiration, the Spartans had a list of 
grievances against the Mantineians. They considered the Mantineians 
unreliable allies because they had supplied grain to the Argives 
during the Korinthian War while pleading "holy truces" .in order not 
to participate in allied campaigns. Especially galling to Agesilaos 
was the fact that he took the remnants of the mora defeated by 
Iphikrates in 390 past Mantineia at night to avoid ridicule at the 
Spartans' misfortune. Finally, Agesilaos and many Spartans did not 
22Thuc. 5.81.1. Gomme et al., Vol. 4, 148, note the chronolo-
gical puzzle in Xen. Hell. 5.2.2, since by his account the treaty 
would have expired in 387, not 386/85. Diodorus (15.5.3) would fix the 
year as 385 B.C. The agreement seems to be a truce rather than an 
alliance, but Mantineia remained attached at least nominally to the 
Peloponnesians. 
23For Agesilaos' scrupulous adherence to sworn compacts, see 
ch. 4. 
f h 't.! • • d 24 approve o t e r ant1ne1an emocracy. 
In the spring of 385 the Spartans dispatched a legate to 
Hantineia with an ultimatum. The demands were simple: the citizens 
would either tear down their walls or face an invasion. 25 The 
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oligarchic faction, which was out of power at this time, was secretly 
in sympathy with the Spartan demands. Moreover, many of the wealthier 
Mantineians would not be affected by the demolition of the walls or 
the dwellings t·lithin them because their estates were in the countryside. 
Some were even enthusiastic about Spartan intervention since it would 
give them a chance to regain control of the government. 26 
Despite the oligarchic sentiment of some citizens when the 
ultimatum was delive~ed, the city decided to resist. Agesilaos excused 
himself from the expedition (spring 385) on the grounds that the 
Hantineians had rendered many serYices to his father during the 
M . • 27 essen1.an campa1gns. The younger king, therefore, found himself in 
the possibly uncomfortable role of le~ding an army against the 
24 Xen. Hell. 5.2.2. Diodorus (15.5.2-3) writes that the 
Spartans had no intentions of honoring the autonomy clause in the 
Peace of Antalkidas when it was inexpedient to do so. He states 
that, in many poleis, they would stir up factional strife in order 
to impose governments loyal to themselves. Ultinate responsibility 
for this policy must be laid at Agesilaos' feet. 
25 Xen. Hell. 5.2.1-3; Diod. 15.5.2 
26 Xen. Hell. 5.2.3, 6-7. 
27This is a reference to the aftermath of an earthquake in 
464 B.C. which prompted an uprising of Messenian helots. See Diod. 
11.63-64. 
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Mantineian democrats who had been on· excellent terms with his exiled 
father Pausanias. 28 This development shows that Agesilaos was 
equally adept at political and military tactics. By declining command 
and letting the ~of the campaign rest on Agesipolis' shoulders, 
the elder king likely neutralized any opposition to his own purposes. 
Were Agesipolis to reduce the city, the Spartans would have properly 
chastised the democrats and installed a government loyal to Sparta. 
If he should falter in the field, Agesilaos could simply come to his 
rescue. In either case for the Mantineians, the result would be the 
same. 
29 
When an invasion appeared inevitable, the Mantineians appealed 
to Argos and Athens for aid. Because neither polis had the strec1gt~ 
or will to risk a war, the Mantineians were compelled to stand alone. 
When even the sight of the a~lied army failed to induce them to pull 
down their walls, Agesipolis began to ravage their land. As this too 
proved insufficient for his intent, he ordered one half of the army to 
dig a trench around the city under the other half's protection. When 
the trench was finished, the Lakedaimonians built a wall of their own. 
The Mantineians did not entirely lack sympathizers during the siege, 
28 Xen. Hell. 5.2.3. 
29Rice, "Agesilaus, Agesipolis and Spartan Politics, 386-379 
B.C.," 168, argues that Agesilaos cleverly manoeuvered the ambitious 
young king into assuming command to suppress internal resistance to 
his domination. It is possible, however, that Agesipolis merely sought 
to attain renown on the "field of honor" since his only campaign \vas 
the incursion against the Argolid in 388. Agesipolis may well have 
been in basic accord with Agesilaos' leadership as indeed most Spartans 
were at this time. 
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for some neighboring peoples would smuggle provisions to the defenders 
at night. 30 That this could happen proves the existence of a cer-
tain discontent with the Spartans even among their closest neighbors. 
Agesipolis finally cut off this clandestine supply line by releasing 
a pack of dogs whose nocturnal barking would betray the presence of 
anyone approaching the walls. 
Although the city no longer received external support because 
of Agesipolis' dogs, the citizens had laid in a great supply of grain 
from the autumn harvest. As a result there was no prospect for a 
quick surrender until the young king hit upon another ruse. He 
noticed that winter rains had greatly swollen t~ Ophis River which 
ran through the city. 31 He, therefore, decided to dam the river in 
order to flood the city. The rising waters turned the whole town into 
a shallow pond and began to dissolve the baked mud bricks of the walls. 
As it slowly became apparent that the Spartans would be able to breach 
the weakened ramparts, the inhabitants chose to break off their 
resistance. Since they would be forced to tear down their walls anyway, 
they decided to do so as allies of the Lakedaimonians rather than their 
prisoners of war. The Spartans accepted the Mantineians' surrender, 
but added a stipulation that after the demolition of the walls, the 
30Polyainos 2.24.1. 
31Frazer, Pausanias' Description of Greece, Vol. 4, 205, de-
scribes what the river's course may have been in antiquity since there 
is no trace of the waterway today. He surmises that the citizens may 
have diverted the channel to keep the water from flowing through the 
town when they rebuilt it in 370. See also Meyer, RE 18.1, 649 under 
Ophis (1). --
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city be broken up into its constituent villages. In the future the 
Mantineians would receive not one, but several Spartan officers in 
/ 
charge of foreign troops ( ~Evayol ). 
Because the city's Argolizers and leading democrats feared for 
their lives after the surrender, the exiled Pausanias made his son 
32 promise to permit these people to depart in safety. As the sixty 
or so men set out, the Mantineian oligarchs had more difficulty in 
restraining their anger than the Spartans did. 33 
With the conclusion of the Mantineian affair in early 384, 
a group of exiled Phliasians sympathetic to Sparta saw a chance to be 
restored to their homeland. They had observed, with encouragement, 
the Spartans' garrisoning of small Peloponnesian poleis during the 
last two years in conformity to Agesilaos' purposes. The installation 
of pro-Spartan oligarchies in these smaller cities had now been followed 
by the chastisement of the anti-Spartan demos at Mantineia. Moreover, 
32Pausanias was living some 18 km. to the south as a suppliant 
in the temple of Athena Alea in Tegea. See ch. 5. 
33
xen. Hell. 5.4.2-7; Diodorus (15.5,12) writes that the city was 
divided into five villages, not four as Xenophon recounts. Jacoby, 
Fr. Gr.H., 2A.l, 64, no. 29, preserves this account as an Ephoros 
fragment. Pausanias(8.8.5-8)describes Agesipolis' siege and its out-
come as does Polybios(4.27.6)who censures the Spartans for abusing 
their allies. See Walbank, An Historical Commentary on Polybios, 
Vol. 1, 475-76, who writes that Polybios' source perhaps was Ephoros, 
but more likely was the anti-Spartan Kallisthenes of Olynthos. 
Plutarch, Pelop. 4-5, writes that in a pitched battle Epameinondas saved 
a wounded Pelopidas from Mantineia's Arkadian mercenaries. Although 
some of Leontiades' pro-Spartan supporters may have witnessed the siege, 
it is unlikely that there were any pitched battles or formal treaty · 
between Sparta and Thebes which would induce two such strongly anti-
Spartan Thebans to be present at Mantineia's demise. See Buckler, 
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the Phliasians' support of the Spartans during the Korinthian War had 
scarcely been enthusiastic under the democracy. 34 Thus taking heart 
at the Lakedaimonians' heavy-handed treatment of luke-warm allies, the 
oligarchic exiles sent a deputation to Sparta in the summer of 384. 
They asserted that while the city was in their hands, Phlious had 
always admitted Spartans within the walls and had participated in all 
allied campaigns. Under the democracy, they continued, the Phliasians 
were unwilling to serve in the allied army and until 391 barred the 
Spartans alone of all men from the city. The ephors considered the 
exiles' charges serious enough to send a legation to Phlious. The 
legates maintained that the exiles, who were friends of the Lakedai-
monians, had suffered unjust expulsion. The ephors, therefore, deemed 
it right that the city take back the exiles and restore ~hem to their 
property. Further, if any dispute about the restoration of expropriated 
property should arise, the Phliasians were to refer the matter to an 
impartial court of inquiry. Because the democrats feared that the 
exiles' friends and relatives would betr~y the city, should the Spartans 
"The Alleged Theban-Spartan Alliance of 386 B.C.," 184-85, who along 
with Grote, Vol. 9, 247, n.3,and Reincke, RE 19.1, 376, rejects this 
account as spurious and deriving from Plutarch's Alk. 7.3 and 
ultimately Plato's Symposium 220e-22lb. 
34As noted inch. 6 (Xen. Hell. 4.4.15), the Phliasians had 
refused to admit any Spartans into their city until suffering a defeat 
at the hands of Iphikrates' mercenaries in 391. At that time the 
Spartans did not insist that they take back their oligarchic exiles. 
Parke, "The Second Spartan Empire," 64, argues that the reason for this 
was Spartan deference to their allies, but Legan, 328-29, much more 
convincingly suggests that it was simply inexpedient to aid the exiles 
because of the full-scale war around Korinth and in Asia Minor. 
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invade, the government accepted the terms laid down by the league. 35 
The Philiasian matter was thus settled temporarily by intimidation 
rather than force. 36 
Spartan Adventurism Beyond the Isthmos 
While Agesilaos' policies were firmly taking effect in the 
Peloponnesos, an opportunity for Spartan expansion to the northern 
Aegean literal arose early in 382. A delegation from Akanthos and 
Apollonia, 37 two cities in the Chalkidike, and from Amyntas III of 
Makedonia arrived in Lakedaimon to seek Spartan aid against the grow-
ing power of the Chalkidic league. The chief spokesman for this combin-
ed legation was Kleigenes of Akanthos whom the Spartans invited to 
address the Peloponnesian assembly. In his speech Kleigenes called 
35 Xen. Hell. 5.2.8-10. 
36cawkwell, 76. Rice, 172, and Legon, 330-31, correctly 
point out that the ephors did not even give the Phliasians a chance 
to respond to the exiles' charges. Moreover, the charges were weak 
at best since the Phliasians had joined Agesipolis' incursion into 
the Argolid in 388. Thus the ephors were not interested in deciding 
the matter on its merits, perhaps even believing that the charges 
would not stand up. Since Agesilaos for two years had been working 
to install pro-Spartan oligarchies, it is safe to conclude that 
mere expediency lay at the core of the ephors' decision. 
37Akanthos (modern Ierissos) lies astride the Strymonic and 
Singitic gulfs just north of Xerxes' canal; see Pietschmann, RE 1.1, 
1147. Apollonia was situated about 17 km. to the northeast oy-
Olynthos; see Hirschfeld, RE 2.1, 114. 
the Peloponnesians' attention to the league's forcible absorption of 
many Chalkidic cities and several of the major Makedonian towns, 
including Pella. He claimed that the league also had won over the 
nearest Thracians and had made friendly overtures to the Athenians38 
and Thebans. Although many Chalkidic poleis resented the Olynthian's 
league, only the Akanthians and Apollonians had thus far resisted 
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absorption. ¥.~~igeues then pointed out that when the league's legates 
demanded support for the campaign against the Makedonians, the 
Akanthians, Apollonians and the Makedonian king decided to appeal to 
Sparta. 39 Finally, the speaker noted that with access to the vast 
tracts of Thracian timberland and the silver deposits of Mt. Pangaion 
near Amphipolis the Olynthians' league could become a naval menace in 
concert with Athens. Torone had recently joined the league,as had 
Potidaia,which meant that the entire Pallene peninsula would soon fall 
into the Olynthians' hands. Finally, he stated that even the 
38
rn fact, they contracted an alliance with the Athenians in 
383 B.C. See Tod, GHI, Vol. 2, no. 119 and Bengtson, Staatsvertrage 
2, 199-200. 
39Amyntas III had contracted an alliance with the Chalkidic 
league when an Illyrian invasion of the Hakedonian highlands 
occurred in 393 B.C. Amyntas was routed in battle after turning 
over great tracts of lower Makedonia to the Chalkidikians for protec-
tion and he initially despaired of his throne. With the aid of some 
Thessalians, however, he was able to repel the Illyrians and regain 
control of upper Makedonia in only three months. He asked that the 
Olynthians restore the land he had ceded to them, but they refused. 
Relations between Amyntas and the league deteriorated until by 384 
the league supported the pretender Argaios. In the early spring of 
382, Amyntas decided to join Akanthos and Apollonia in an appeal to 
Sparta. For these events, see Diad. 14.92.2-4; Isokrates Archidareos 
46; and Aelian y.H. 4.8.3. Meyer, Vol. 5, 296-97 with notes; Tod, no. 
111; Bengtson, 178-80; and Grote, Vol. 8, 42-48,all believe that 
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Akanthians and Apollonians would not be able to hold out much longer 
unless the Spartans acted. 40 
Despite earlier inattention to such things, Agesilaos and his 
supporters quickly realized the implications of what Kleigenes had 
reported. Here was an entity in the Chalkidike which was subverting 
the autonomy of Greek cities by voluntary or forcible absorption. 
, 
Sparta as TipocrTaTns of the King's Peace could restore the Akanthians, 
Apollonians and other Chalkidic Greeks to their TI&Tptot TIOAlTEtal, 
while simultaneously expanding her own influence in the Northern 
Aegean. No Spartan force had even passed through that part of the 
Greek world since Agesilaos' returned from Asia. 41 
When Kleigenes had concluded his addr~ss,42 the Spartans con-
vened the full allied assembly which quickly and supinely voted to mount 
an expedition against the Ch.alkidic league. 43 To insure a prompt 
Amyntas III, the father of Philip II, became king in 393 B.C. Beloch, 
Vol. 3.1, 101-03 and 3.2, 58-62, believes that Amyntas II was king 
when the 50-year pact with the league was concluded in 393. Kaerst, 
RE 1.2, 3006, dates Amyntas III's accession to 389 and the 50-year 
treaty to 389/88. All scholars agree that Makedonian chronology for 
the ten years after Archelaos' death in 399 is greatly muddled. 
40xen. Hell. 5.2.12-19; Diod. 15.19.3. 
41That is since the summer of 394; see ch. 5. 
42Rice, "Agesilaos, Agesipolis, etc.," 176; Cawkwell, 
"Agesilaos and Sparta," 77; Seager, "The King's Peace, etc.," 41 
observe that Kleigenes makes not a single reference to the Peace or 
Sparta's role as TipocrT~Tns • The entire appeal is to the material 
and military advantage which the Spartans could gain. Ryder, Koine 
Eirene, 47, believes that the Olynthians' threat to Sparta's hegemony 
was exaggerated. 
43xen. Hell. 5.2.20. 
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check against the seizure of any more cities by the Olynthians, the 
joint delegation urged the dispatch of an advance force. The ephors, 
therefore, hastily gathered a contingent of 2,000 men composed of 
Skiritiai,44 ?eodamodais, perioikoi and helots under Eudamidas to 
march north. Before setting out, Eduamidas asked that his brother, 
Phoibidas,be given command of a similar force to follow somewhat 
later. 45 Eudamidas was able to garrison some cities on the 
Makedonian and Thracian coasts when they requested his aid. After he 
detached Potidaia from the Olynthians' league, he occupied it and 
made it the Spartans' headquarters for the rest of the war. 46 Most 
important, however, was Eudamidas' request that the ephors send 
another 2,000 men under his brother Phoibidas. That some Spartans 
contemplated a venture fully as weighty as the Olynthian campaign is 
strongly hinted by the gathering of this second contingent. 47 
44These people who perhaps were perioikoi lived at the 
northern frontier of Lakedaimon. It was in their territory that the 
Spartans performed the traditional border sacrifices before setting 
out on a campaign. See Geyer, RE 13A.l, 536-37. The chief ancient 
references to this people are Thuc. 5.67-68; Xen. Hell. 5.2.24, Lak. 
Pol. 12.3, 13.6; and Diod. 15.32.1. 
45cawkwell, 77, clearly discerns Agesilaos' handiwork in the 
Spartan decision to mount the expedition. He points out that the 
first three Spartans to take the field were all partisans or relatives 
of the elder king. 
46xen. Hell. 5.2.23-24. 
47xenophon as a Lakonophile and friend of Agesilaos could never 
bring himself to admit openly that the elder king had a direct hand in 
the gathering of Phoibidas' troops. Diodorus' epitome of Ephoros, who 
had no such compunctions, no longer distinguished the two brothers' 
separate commands. Rather Diodorus makes Phoibidas polemarch of the 
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The Seizure of the Kadmeia 
Phoibidas, supposedly en route to join his brother at Potidaia 
in late summer 382, precipitated a remarkable turn of events in central 
Greece.48 Acting on secret instructions and with the collusion of a 
pro-Spartan polemarch in Thebes, he evolved a plot to seize the 
Kadmeia. Just outside the city walls near the gymnasion Phoibidas 
encamped his troops where he received a cordial deputation from 
Leontiades. Ismenias and Androkleidas, the leaders of the rival 
faction which controlled the government, however, refused even to 
acknowledge the Spartans' presence. Because of most Thebans' intense 
anti-Spartan sentiment, the council had passed a decree forbidding any 
Theban from joining the Lakedaimonian expedition to the Chalkidike. 
It was, therefore, necessary for Leontiades and Archias' rival faction 
to make their traitorous proposal in secret. Leontiades offered to 
lead the Lakedaimonians to the Kadmeia which was the seat of the 
Theban government. He assured Phoibidas that once the akropolis was 
in Spartan hands, the city's submission and great glory for the Spartan 
officer would quickly follow. 
entire allied force which, he writes, eventually grew to over 10,000 
men. Hence Eudamidas, the brother who first engaged the Chalkidic 
forces and secured a reliable base on the Pallene just 13 km. south 
of Olynthos, has been largely forgotten in the afterglow of Phoibidas' 
notoriety. Plutarch (Ages. 24.1) explicitly states that suspicion of 
Agesilaos' complicity quickly arose after Phoibidas' light rebuke by 
the authorities. 
48Meyer, Vol. 5, 293, dates Eudamidas' mission to the spring 
and Phoibidas' coup to August 382 B.C. Beloch, 3.2, 232, citing 
Aristeides(258), ·who states the Pythian games were in progress, also 
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After the clandestine rendezvous Phoibidas withdrew from the 
_gymnasion as if to join his brother Eudamidas in Potidaia. A short 
time later while the council was in session away from the Kadmeia be-
cause the women were celebrating the Thesmophoria, Leontiades rode 
out to the Spartans and led them back to the city. It was mid-summer 
and the streets were deserted when the Spartans arrived. Phoibidas 
led his men directly to the akropolis wh~~e ~e completed his seizure 
of the city without a single drop of bloodshed. It remained only for 
Leontiades to convene an assembly, alert the citizens of their changed 
situation, and introduce them to their new masters. 49 
Some 300 Thebans were able to escape to Athens before the 
new, meekly pro-Spartan government took over. Ismenias, however, was 
not as fortunate, as Leontiades ordered his arrest and extradition 
to Sparta for trial. Another polemarch was appointed in Ismenias' 
stead and Phoibidas' overthrow of the Theban government was complete.50 
When news of the coup reached Lakedaimon, many were angered 
and shocked at what they perceived as a gross overstepping of authority 
and a serious violation of the autonomy clause in the King's Peace. 
dates the seizure to Aug. 382. Grote, Vol. 8, 56, n.2; Cawkwell, 79; 
and Rice, 180,all concur. Reconstruction of subsequent chronology is 
facilitated by fixing the date of Phoibidas' coup. 
49 Xen. Hell. 5.2.25-29; Plut. Ages. 23.6-7, Pelop. 5; Diad. 
15.20.2; Polybios 4.27.4; Isok. 4.126; Nepos, Pelop. 1.2-3. Plutarch 
(Mor.576a) writes that Lysandridas was Ismenias' replacement as 
polemarch. · 
50xen. Hell. 5.2.30. 
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Agesilaos, however, quickly came forward to exonerate his friend by 
stating that Spartan officers were expected to show initiative and 
that the only standard by which Phoibidas should be judged was whether 
his actions had served the state. 51 Although the accused was relieved 
of command and fined, Agesilaos easily persuaded the Spartans to re-
tain a harmost and garrison at Thebes. The light censure of Phoibidas 
and the decision to sustain the occupation of the Kadmeia were deep-
ly disturbing to many Greeks far beyond the borders of Lakedaimon. 52 
Yet another measure of Agesilaos' control of Spartan policy 
despite some intern~l opposition was the trial and execution of 
Ismenias. His bitter factional rival Leontiades was the chief witness 
against him. He began his indictment by noting that, for over twenty 
years, the Thebans had consistently failed to cooperate in Spartan 
enterprises. They refused to join the attack on the Peiraeus in 403 
during the revolt against the thirty in Athens. They snubbed Agesilaos 
at the outset of the Asian campaign in 396. Ismenias and Androkleidas 
had gladly taken Timokrates' bribes and launched the attack on Phokis 
in 395,which was the casus belli of the Korinthian War. Finally, 
Leontiades noted, Ismenias' government had recently threatened with 
punishment any Theban who might march with the Spartans against the 
Chalkidic league. Leontiades ended his plea by observing that under 
51
xen. Hell. 5.2.32; Plut. Ages. 23.6-7 and Diod. 15.19.4. 
Grote, Vol. 8, 59, thinks the ephors' disavowal of Phoibidas was 
hypocritical since he was acting on their instructions to neutralize 
Thebes. 
52see note 49 and Diod. 15.20.3. 
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his government, Thebes would no longer be an obstacle to the Spartans 
and insisted that the Medizing war-monger be made to pay for his crimes 
53 against Hellas. 
To Agesilaos and his supporters and even to the elder king's 
opponents who had suffered in the Korinthian War, Leontiades' charges 
carried some weight. Although some Spartans were uneasy about not re-
maining loyal to the oaths taken in 386, Agesilaos' partisans again 
prevailed. Ismenias was arraigned before a panel of three Spartan 
judges and one each from the several allied states. In spite of a 
vigorous defense on his own behalf, he was found guilty of all charges 
and subsequently executed. With the installation of the pro-Spartan 
oligarchy, the Thebans were not only subservi~nt, but co-operated with 
the Lakedaimonians in more ways than were demanded. 54 
53 Xen. Hell. 5.2.33-34. Meyer, Vol. 5, 292-93, points out that 
while Thebes had taken no hostile steps against Sparta, her refusal to 
join the Olynthian expedition was not something which the Spartans 
could overlook. Beloch, 3.1, 104, believes that the Spartans 
(especially Agesilaos) were looking for a pretext to seize control 
of Thebes because of the hostility of Ismenias and Androkleidas' 
government. Buckler, "The Alleged Theban-Spartan Alliance of 386 
B.C.," 184, believes that Agesilaos' failure to mention any violation 
of a separate treaty's terms in justifying Phoibidas strongly suggests 
that there was no such treaty. Had there been a separate pact between 
Sparta and Thebes, the latter's failure to cooperate against Olynthos 
would have been an excellent excuse for punitive action. 
54xen. Hell. 5.2.35-37. Beloch, 3.1, 104-05, succinctly writes 
that the outcome of the trial was never in doubt. Grote, Vol. 8, 59-
61, perceives an iniquity in charging Ismenias with Medism when the 
Spartans themselves had cooperated openly with the Persians and 
abandoned the Greeks of Asia to Artaxerxes only five years before. 
He compares Ismenias' fate to that of Theramenes at the hands of 
Kritias in 404 B.C. 
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Retrospective 
The events of the years from the spring of 386 to the autumn 
of 382 reveal with great clarity the adventurism of Sparta under 
Agesilaos. Although Antalkidas was an obvious opponent of the elder 
king55 and the young king, Agesipolis, was a rival of sorts, 56 as one 
would expect, because of his prestige among the Spartans, Agesilaos 
was the driving force in making and carrying out Spartan policy. 
After he abandoned any immediate hope for returning to Asia, he began 
to consolidate Sparta's grip on the alliance by forced occupation of 
57 
smaller poleis and districts in the Peloponnesos. When this pro-
cess was well underway, he directed the Spartans' energies to larger 
entities whose opposition or recalcitiance was more serious. After 
the dissolution of the Argive-Korinthian sympolity and the Boiotian 
league, he was able to persuade the ephors, assembly and younger king 
. fl' . '1 f h M · · 58 to 1n 1ct a s1m1 ar ate on t .e ant1ne1ans. The young king was 
the instrument of the elder's policy, since Agesilaos' object was 
clearly the subjection and dispersal of Mantineia into its original 
villages. Should Agesipolis falter in the field, which would have 
55 See chs. 5 and 6; they put aside their differences for a 
time during the latter's navarchy to achieve an acceptable and for 
Sparta, advantageous peace. 
56
niodorus (15.19.4) makes it clear that Agesipo1is was the more 
conciliatory of the two kings in his attitude to the allies. 
57 see Isok. 4.113-116 and Diad. 15.1.3-4, 5.1-2. 
58Rice, "Agesilaos, Agesipolis, etc.," 166-68, suggests that 
Agesilaos cleverly begged off conduct of the siege to neutralize any 
internal resistance. 
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been a serious blow to his prestige, Agesilaos could have assumed 
command and credit for the success. In any case, the young king was 
all too eager to succeed against the Mantineians and possibly only 
the intervention of his exiled father from Tegea prevented a blood-
bath. 59 
With Lysander's death at Haliartos in 395 and Pausanias' 
exile the following spring, there was no single figure in Sparta 
who could compete with Agesilaos' record of military, financial and 
diplomatic successes. Antalkidas' achievements as a negotiator 
and navarch quickly dissipated when he reverted to the status of 
private citizen (fall of 387). He and others perhaps did not share 
..... 
Agesilaos' enthusiasm for forcing docile, pro-Spartan oligarchies on 
the allies or for seeking to humiliate the Thebans, but in his reduced 
role, he could scarcely compete with the prestige of a king who held 
office for life. Also those unhappy with Sparta's failure to abide 
by the oaths of 386 guaranteeing autonomy could not expect the younger 
king to match Agesilaos' influence either.6° 
59
xen. Hell. 5.2.6. Rice's suggestion that Agesipolis was the 
hapless tool of the elder king's cunning is not nece~sarily borne out 
by the evidence. Diodorus' description of him as E1PnVtK~S and 
OlKatos while Agesilaos is termed ~tAontAE~OS and opacrTtKOS 
(15.19.4) is likely nothing more than rhetorical balance or contrast 
in Ephoros. Agesipolis showed no lack of martial vigor in 388 against 
the Argives (see ch. 6), in 385-84 against Mantineia or in 381-80 
against the Olynthians. It seems best to ascribe whatever differences 
existed between the two kings to the traditional rivalry of their 
respective royal houses. 
60Parke, "The Second Spartan Empire," 71,and Rice, 169, see in 
the events of the3e years and Agesilaos' domination of Spartan policy 
the full emergence of Sparta, not as ~YE~Gv of an alliance, but 
;a / 
rather as tyrant of an apxn. 
' .. -
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The process begun with the smaller poleis and Mantineia con-
tinued to evolve with the ultimatum delivered to Phlious. Agesilaos 
and his supporters were more than willing to crush recalcitrants 
simply for the sake of expediency. 61 The joint Makedonian, Akanthian 
and Apollonian appeal for aid against the Olynthians' league in 382 
suddenly provided Agesilaos with the long sought chance not only to 
expand Spartan influence to the northern Aegean, but to indulge his 
bitter resentment against Thebes. The Spartan's response to 
Kleigenes and the secret instructions issued to all Spartan officers 
in the field were perfectly consistent with Agesilaos' policy since 
the King's Peace and clearly reflect his control of the state. 62 
Phoibidas' seizure of the Kadmeia was the result of policy, not mere 
opportunism on the part of an overly ambitious officer. Agesilaos 
and his supporters had hoped to occupy Thebes to eliminate Sparta's 
only serious rival in central Greece. Because of his antipathy to 
Thebes, his great popularity in Sparta and his control of all aspects 
of policy, Agesilaos himself certainly was responsible for the "secret 
61see Legan, "Phliasian Politics, etc.," 330 and Rice, 169. 
62see Seager, "The King's Peace, etc.," 41-42. Cawkwell, 
"Agesilaos and Sparta," 77, believes that a combined reading of the 
evidence in Diodorus and Xenophon gives the complete background for 
the Spartan intervention in the north. Although Xenophon does not 
mention the pact with Amyntas, while Diodorus is silent about 
Akanthos and Apollonia, there is nothing in the two authors which is 
mutually exclusive or contradictory. Cawkwell also believes that the 
King's Peace was applicable to the Chalkidike, but not to Amyntas' 
realm in Makedonia. This would justify superficially intervention on 
behalf of Akanthos and Apollonia. 
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instructions" to reduce the city. 63 Xenophon naturally would emphasize 
Leontiades' treason and Phoibidas' rashness because implication in the 
deed would put his benefactor in a poor light. Evidence supplied by 
Diodorus and Plutarch, however, points to Agesilaos' culpability. 
With the fall of Thebes, the Peace of P~talkidas had become 
moot despite a tenuous pretext for intervention on behalf of Akanthian 
and Apollonian autonomy. In reality Agesilaos and the Spartans were 
. d l"d h . > / now po1se to conso 1 ate t e1r apxn throughout European Greece. 
Agesilaos put into effect a policy of chastising suspect allies, 
dismantling coalitions and even single poleis in order to impose 
docile, pro-Spartan oligarchies. With an aggressive, militaristic 
statecraft oddly reminiscent of Lysander's dekarchie2, Agesilaos' 
leadership completed Sparta's transition from C I nYE~WV to tyrant. 
63Rice, 180 and Plut. Ages. 24.1. 
CHAPTER VIII 
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE CHALKIDIC LEAGUE AND THE FALL OF PHLIOUS: 
THE LIBERATioN OF THEBES AND AGEsiLAoS'REACTION 
The War Against Olynthos 
With the Thebans docile and garrisoned, the Spartans could 
proceed with their campaign in the north. Eudamidas, brother of the 
notorious Phoibidas, had occupied Potidaia in the spring of 382 to 
prepare for the arrival of the full Peloponnesian levy. 1 The entire 
Pallene was secure for the allies when the Spartans appointed 
Teleutias commander of the full levy. 2 In addition to securing this 
appointment for his half-b~other, Agesilaos also persuaded the ephors 
to send dispatches to all allied poleis with orders to supply 
Teleutias with men and equipment according to the allies' joint 
resolution.3 Since the 
; 
O"KUTCJ.ACll were the official leathern dis-
patches sent by the ephors to Spartan commanders outside Lakedaimon, 4 
the success of Agesilaos' policy now becomes clear. Many Greek towns must 
1The chronology of the Olynthian War is muddled in places, but 
Meyer, Vol. 5, 298-99, n.5, places Eudamidas' mission in the spring of 
382. Beloch, 3.1, 103, concurs, while Grote, Vol. 8, 54-55, does not 
attempt to fix the date. 
2Ehrenberg, RE 5.2, 2367-68, dates 
382 and his death to the following summer. 
success and popularity, see ch. 6. 
Teleutias' march to summer 
For Teleutias' great 
3xen. Hell. 5.2.37; Diod. 15.21.1-2. 
4see Oehler, RE 3A.l, 691-92. 
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have received Spartan garrisons whose purpose was to assure adherence to 
Lakedaimonian aims. The closeness of the parallel to Lysander's 
dekarchies is unmistakable and not at all surprising. Although 
Agesilaos had not installed groups of ten5 to rule poleis controlled 
by Sparta, nor had he kept up the fleet's strength since the King's 
Peace, supinely pro-Spartan oligarchies sprung up wherever the 
Lakedaimonians had intervened. Agesilaos' purpose in obtaining command 
for his brother was to continue the policy of dissolving any leagues or 
federations and garrisoning individual poleis. 6 
5Agesilaos' great success lay in part in his perception that 
he must maintain at least formal subservience to the ephors and 
gcrousia (Plut. Ages. 2.5, 4.1-6). Unlike his former mentor Lysander, 
therefore, he would not impose governments solely on the basis of 
loyalty to himself. 
6Because of vagueness and ambiquity in the wording of the 
King's Peace, the Spartans were able to interpret the autonomy 
clause to their own ends. Many smaller poleis beyond the Isthmos 
and in the Aegean were freed from domination of the great powers and 
the Spartans' reputation as liberators was as high in 386 as it had 
been in 404. When Agesilaos' designs began to unfold, however, first 
with smaller 29leis, then Mantineia, Phlious and finally Thebes in 
382, her reputation, as during the dekarchs' tenure, lost some of its 
lustre. See Ryder, Koine Eirene, 39-45; Ehrenberg, The Greek State, 
113-19; and Busolt/Swoboda, Griechische Staatskunde, Vol. 2, 1327-30. 
Unlike previous epochs, Spartan activity under Agesilaos after 386 
was marked by a singular and uncharacteristic aggressiveness. The 
king and his supporters were no longer content to be leaders of the 
Peloponnesians, but they now aimed for hegemony over all Hellas to 
forestall the development of any league or coalition which might 
threaten their supremacy or force them into an unwanted war. As Ryder, 
37-38, observes, this interpretation of autonomy militated against 
Panhellenism based on opposition to Persia. Throughout Hellas, local 
patriotism, the desire to protect or increase wealth, and a pervasive 
war-weariness combined to foster Agesilaos' drive for hegemony. I 
disagree with Ryder that Lysias' Olympiakos of 384 indicates that 
Sparta's prestige as liberator was unimpaired; see Ryder, 44. Rather, 
because of the reduction of Mantineia and other smaller poleis, the 
cession of the Asian Greeks to the Great King and their alliance with 
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In order to achieve this purpose more efficiently, Agesilaos 
presided over a reorganization of the Spartan alliance. With the 
decision to go to war on behalf of the Makedonians and unaligned 
poleis of the Chalkidike against the Olynthian's league in 383, the 
Spartans reintroduced compulsory tribute and ordered every allied 
state to send soldiers to bring the army to a strength of 10,000 men. 
For the fi~st time since Lysander's dekarchies (404/03), all poleis 
in Greece bound to Sparta by treaty were required to send men or money 
for the campaign. The rate of commutation was three Aiginetan obols 
per day for each soldier, or twelve obols for a horseman. Failure to 
supply either men or money would result in a fine of one Aiginetan 
stater per day for each foot soldier absent from the levy. One reason 
for imposing this system was to counteract allied reluctance to comply 
with the constant demands on their manpower. 7 
After setting out, Teleutias was joined by Derdas, a vassal 
prince of Amyntas III. Derdas had long since proved his worth to 
Amyntas and now served as the Makedonians' contribution to the allied 
effort. His special strength was his horsemen of whom he led some 
400. 8 The Thebans, aware that Agesilaos' brother was in command of 
Dionysios, Lysias (Oly. 1,5,7) explicitly rebukes the Spartans for 
betraying their heritage as the guarantors of Greek freedom. With the 
seizure of the Kadmeia, Sparta had become a threat to the very ideals 
she had championed and the other Greeks held dear. See Ryder, 41-42; 
Ehrenberg, 117-119; and Busolt/Swoboda, 1331-33. 
7 Xen. Hell. 5.2.21-22. See also Busolt/Swoboda, 1328,and 
Ehrenberg, 116. With the submission of Phlious and Olynthos, 
Agesilaos completed the reorganization of Greece into ten districts 
at the outset of his Boiotian campaign in 378; see ch. 9. 
8Elimia is the mountainous region of upper Makedonia; see 
the full levy, also sent a contingent. Teleutias proceeded slowly to 
avoid antagonizing the allies beyond the Isthmos and to gather the 
full complement of his force. 9 
Upon occupying Potidai~which lay 11 km. south of Olynthos, 
the new harmost Teleutias tried to induce the Olynthians to fight a 
pitched battle. At first he avoided cutting trees down or burning 
crops, but finally he drew up his troops just under 2 km. from the 
walls. A sudden Olynthian cavalry sortie nearly put the allied force 
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to flight, but Derdas' men saved the day by forcing the Olynthians to 
withdraw.lO For the remainder of that year, the campaign deteriorated 
into a series of raids and pillage by both sides in which Teleutias 
partially reversed hir~self and began to cut down trees to impede the 
enemy's approach. 11 
In the spring of 381 the Makedonians, who had departed with 
the onset of winter, returned, but the Olynthian cavalry took the 
initiativ~. They penetrated as far as the vicinity of Apollonia, some 
17 km. to the north, while Derdas and his men were in town. The 
Makedonians launched a surprise attack, killed eighty Olynthians and 
drove the rest back to their city. 12 Because no one would venture out-
Kaerst, RE 5.1, 239; and Oberhummer, RE 5.2, 2367-68. Derdas ulti-
mately aided Amyntas III's succession~y killing Amyntas II in a 
quarrel; see Arist. Pol. 13llb. 
9Xen. Hell. 5.2.38-39; Diad. 15. 21.2. 
lOxen. Hell. 5.2.39-42. 
11xen. Hell. 5.2.43; Diod. 15. 21.2. 
12xen. Hell. 5.3.1-3. 
200 
side the walls, Teleutias changed his tactics to force the issue. 
He knew that the defenders could farm only a very small tract of land 
and that their supply of grain was low. He therefore ordered an 
extensive campaign of cutting down fruit trees and burning croplands 
as close as possible to Olynthos itself. His new strategy provoked 
the Olynthians to dispatch a cavalry force against a group of 
Peloponnesians across the river which flowed just west of the city. 
Teleutias, irritated by their temerity, ordered a counterattack, but 
the Olynthians suddenly wheeled about and killed one hundred of his 
men, including the Spartan hipparch. Teleutias then lost his head, 
ordering a full-scale assault on the city. The Olynthian hoplites 
poured out of the city to aid their retreating cavalry, however, and 
broke through the allied line when Teleutias himself fell in the 
fighting. The rest of his troops, who had advanced hastily and in 
disarray, scattered. The Peloponnesians fled to Potidaia; the 
Makedonians and Chalkidikians to Spartolos, Akanthos, Apollonia and 
elsewhere. Some 200 of the finest troops had died in the struggle, 
leaving the Olynthians to celebrate a major victory. 13 ·In addition 
to laying in considerable stocks of grain, they recruited many soldiers 
from their allies in the expectation that the Spartans would soon dis-
patch another army.l4 
13
xen. Hell. 5.3.4-6; Diodorus 15.21.2. 
14
xen. Hell. 5.3.8; Diodorus 15.21.3. 
The consternation in Sparta at the news of Teleutias' defeat 
and death was pervasive. The remnants of Lysander's faction, who 
perhaps still hoped to exploit the rich areas of Asia under the pre-
text of a Panhellenic crusade, could take little consolation at 
Agesilaos' personal loss. 15 Some Spartans, such as Antalkidas and 
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the younger king Agesipolis, who feared a revival of Athenian seapower 
and favored a much different interpretation of the autonomy clause 
than Agesilaos, 16 could not have been pleased with a d~bacle inflicted 
17 by a polis recently allied to Athens. Because of recruitment 
difficulties stemming from allied resistance to Sparta's constant 
demands for soldiers, the anger of the previous summer at Phoibidas' 
egregious coup, and now the setback in the north, it was necessary ior 
Agesilaos and his supporters to take decisive steps. As in the case 
of the Asian campaign, the Spartans placed responsibility for the war 
in a king's hands to shore up sagging prestige and resolve the impasse 
15For Sparta to act as rroocrTaTns of an anti-Persian crusade 
was not really feasible at this time, despite the sentiments bruited 
about at the great Panhellenic festivals. See Lysias' Olympiakos 
(1, 5 and 7),delivered in 384 and Isokrates' Panegyrikos(ll7, 121, 
125-28)which dates to 380 and bitterly decries the Spartans as 
oppressors unsuitable to lead free men against the common despotic 
foe. Also, as noted earlier, local patriotism, desire for prosperity, 
and a pervasive war-weariness combined to preclude such a "crusade," 
see footnote 6. 
16For Antalkidas' opposition to Agesilaos, see Plut. Ages. 
26.3-4, Mor. 227d and ch. 9. For the differences between the two 
kings, see Diod. 15.19.4 and ch. 7. 
17
see Bengtson, Staatsvertrage 1· 199. That Antalkidas and 
Agesipolis were not unduly wary of the Athenians can be appreciated by 
the fact that as early as 384, the city had contracted an alliance 
with Chios; see Staatsvertrage 1, 196-98. 
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created by the Olynthians' unlocked for victory. 18 Not Agesilaos, 
but Agesipolis took command and was accompanied by a council of thirty 
advisors, as the elder king had been in 396. 
In order to bolster the army's strength under Agesipolis, sons 
of foreigners raised at Sparta, ~6ewves ,19 and many perioikoi 
volunteered to march. The young king also received the support of 
Amyntas and Derdas whose enthusiasm was even greater than it had been 
for Teleutias. 20 Agesipolis had proved effective, if not brilliant 
against the Argives in 38821 and had carried out Agesilaos' policy at 
Mantineia in 384. 22 Because the younger king was a potential leader 
for a faction opposed to the elder king, Agesilaos perhaps found it 
expedient to allow conduct of the war to pass into his colle~gue's 
hands. 23 He could now firm up his base at home, while still achieving 
18
xen. Hell. 5.3.8; Diod. 15.22.2; see Cartledge, Sparta and 
Lakonia, 289. Smith, "The Opposition to Agesilaos' Foreign Policy," 
Historia,2 (1954), 48, believes that Teleutias' defeat in a war under-
taken by Agesilaos' supporters may have caused the elder king to fear 
for his supremacy. This is perhaps an exaggeration, but that many 
Spartans and Peloponnesians were unhappy with Agesilaos is undeniable; 
see below. 
19These were bastards of helot men and Spartan women. 
20 Xen. Hell. 5.3.9. 
2lsee ch. 6. 
22see ch. 7. 
23Parke, "The Development of the Second Spartan Empire," JHS 50 __, 
(1930),7~observes that Agesilaos' grand criterion for the entire period 
from 386-379 B.C. was expediency. This is the mark, of course, of any 
successful leader. Also dispatching Agesipolis to Potidaia could 
certainly be seen as expedient to Spartan interests as Agesilaos per-
ceived them. 
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the dissolution of the Chalkidic league. 24 
Upon arriving at the Pallene, Agesipolis and his advisors 
were no more successful than Teleutias in drawing the Olynthians out 
from their walls during the rest of 381. The coming of spring found 
h d f d h 11 . d 25 t e e en ers no more eager to engage t e a ~e army. The reasons 
for the Olynthians' reluctance are two: they had laid in a large 
supply of grain after defeating Teleutias and were in awe of the 
Spartans' military might and the size of the army. 
Agesipolis repeated the tactics of Teleutias by ravaging 
the countryside around the city. He also occupied the middle of the 
three Chalkidic "fingers," but as the season wore on, he fell ill with 
a high fever. Despite efforts to break the fever in the ~old springs 
24cartledge, 289, thinks that the disagreement between the 
two kings was principled. He notes that Agesipolis was the instrument 
of Agesilaos' policy at Mantineia and Olynthos. Although there was 
internal opposition to Agesilaos, Cartledge points out that until the 
end of his reign the elder king's supporters either won over or 
silenced adversaries. Rice, "Agesilaos, Agesipolis and Spartan 
Politics, 386-379_ B.C.," Historia,23 (1974),177, n.2, believes that 
Agesipolis had won the trust of many Spartans and allies especially 
by sparing, at his father's behest, the Mantineian exiles. By winning 
the war in the Chalkidike, Agesi.polis could install a faction loyal to 
himself in Olynthos and strengthen the internal opposition to 
Agesilaos, perhaps even wresting control from him. This is an in-
teresting view, but it rests primarily on speculation. It is more 
likely that most Spartans were agreed, though perhaps for differing 
reasons, that the Chalkidic league should be dissolved. In addition to 
Rice, 177-78, Cawkwell, "Agesilaos and Sparta," CQ,26 (1976\77-78 
and Parke, 73, see Agesipolis' appointment as manipulation by the elder 
king. Still on the matter of the Olynthians, the two kings were likely 
in substantial agreement; but there were some Spartans who did not com-
pletely agree with Agesilaos' purposes and methods. 
25
xen. Hell. 5.3.18; Diod. 15.22.2. 
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near the temple of Dionysos at Aphytis, 26 Agesipolis never recovered 
and died by mid-summer 380. The Spartans, having encased his body 
in honey, as was customary for a dead king, sent it home to his rela-
tives for buria1. 27 Agesipolis' exiled father Pausanias has left a 
tribute to his son in a Delphic inscription to commemorate his 
fourteen-year reign which began with the father's self-imposed exile 
in 394 after the battle of Haliartos.28 
The Spartans assigned Polybiades to Potidaia to conclude the 
war (fall 380). 29 This officer was the son of the ephor Naukleides 
who had accompanied King Pausanias to Athens in 403. 30 Since 
26Aphytis lies about 15 km. so~theast of Potidaia; see 
Hirschfeld, RE 1.2, 2801 and Princeton Encyclopedia of Classical 
Sites, 70. 
27xen. Hell. 5.3.19; Diad. 15.23.2; Paus. 3.5.9. Meyer, Vol. 
5, 298-99, n.5, closely connects Agesipolis' campaign with 
Agesilaos' siege of Phlious to fix the chronology. Diodorus, who 
places his death in 380, is to be preferred to Xenophon whose version 
is vague and imprecise because of his emphasis on Agesilaos at 
Phlious. 
28For the inscription, see Tad, GHI, val. 2, no. 120. 
29xen. Hell. 5.3.20; Diad. 15.23.3. 
30Aristeides 14.7; Athenaios 550d; Schaefer, RE 21.2, 1440. 
Rice, 178, and Cawkwell, 78, observe that Agesilaos'-supporters may 
not have been able to send one of their own to replace Agesipolis 
because of weakened influence. A more likely reason would be that 
Agesilaos was conducting the siege of Phlious. In any case, the 
younger king's supporters perhaps effected the appointment. 
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Polybiades' strategy was to reduce Olynthos to starvation, he in-
vested the city by land and sea. In late spring or early summer 
379, his campaign succeeded with the Olynthians' capitulation. They 
yielded to the harmost's tactical sense, his numerical superiority 
and famine by sending an embassy to Sparta to sue for peace. 31 In 
exchange for lenient terms and the dissolution of the Chalkidic league, 
the Olynthians agreed to become full allies of Sparta. 32 Following 
the Olynthians' example, other Chalkidic poleis also enrolled under 
the Spartan banner.33 
Agesilaos and the Fall of Phlious, 381-379 ~.f. 
The struggle against the ChaJ..kjdic league had begun as a pro-
ject nurtured and controlled by Agesilaos. Some historians have in-
ferred a decline in Agesilaos' influence because of resentment at the 
king's methods and his brother's considerable setback near Olynthos in 
381.34 \ihether this is so or not, an opportunity arose for Agesilaos 
31nemosthenes (19.264) almost makes it seem that Sparta, not 
Olynthos, sued for peace. Ryder, Koine Eirene, 45-47, discusses 
Sparta's uncharacteristic aggressiveness after 386 under Agesilaos 
and the differences between the two kings, See n. 6 above. 
32 Xen. Hell. 5.3.26. 
33niod. 15.23.4. 
34Rice, 178; Smith, 280; Parke, 72: Cawkwell, 78, suggests 
that Agesilaos' supporters perhaps obtained this command for him to 
shore up his sagging prestige. Another explanation is that 
Agesipolis was absent so a new "crisis" would come under Agesilaos' 
purvue, especially since Phlious was a Peloponnesian polis. 
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to take the field himself with the arrival of a legation from Phlious. 
Shortly after Agesipolis' departure in the summer of 381, a group of 
pro-Spartan oligarchs arrived in Lakedaimon. After Agesilaos had pro-
cured their restoration in 384, the ephors decreed that any disputes 
arising over confiscated property should be submitted to arbitration. 35 
On this occasion the oligarchs brought some Phliasian citizens to 
corroborate their claim that contrary to the settlement of 384, they 
were not receiving justice because the democrats controlled the boards 
of inquiry set up to restore disputed property. 36 After hearing their 
plea, the ephors were persuaded to call out the ban because word 
arrived from Phlious that the democrats had fined the oligarchs for an 
unauthorized visit to Lakedaimon. Here was precisely the pretext 
Agesilaos needed to stamp out the last major pocket of independence 
in the Peloponnesos. With Agesipolis in the Chalkidike he had a free 
hand to take charge of the levy in what was essentially a local 
35xen. Hell. 5.2.8-10; as noted inch. 7, Phlious was a small, 
but prosperous community just east of the Asopos River about seven km. 
northwest of Nemea; see Meyer, RE 20.1, 272-73 and the Princeton 
Encyclopedia, 707-08. In 384 the oligarchs had persuaded the Spartans 
to deliver an ultimatum to Phlious' democratic government without 
examining the merits of the exiles' allegations. See also Legan, 
"Phliasian Politics and Policy in the Early Fourth Century B.C.," 
Historia,l6 (1967),325, 327, and 321. 
36The Spartans bore a grudge against the Phliasians since 394 
for pleading "holy truces" to excuse themselves from participating in 
the battle of Nemea. Also they refused to admit Spartans into Phlious 
until Iphikrates' peltasts routed them in 391; Xen. Hell. 4.2.16, 
4.4.15. Legan, 330, n.2, believes that the democrats retained control 
in 391 because the Spartans were bogged down in a war on two fronts. 
See also ch. 7. 
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operation. 37 
As soon as sacrifices proved favorable, the king set forth 
to besiege the small city. He was met by several delegations offering 
him money to turn back, but he spurned them all. His response to 
their entreaties was that he was not marching to do injustice, but 
rather to rectify it. The only way for the Phliasians to avoid war 
would be to consent to the occupation of their akropolis by a Spartan 
garrison. The democratic government would obviously reject this con-
dition because it would set the stage for an oligarchic assumption of 
power.38 That Agesilaos would make such a demand the sole condition 
for peace shows that he intended to abolish the democracy. 39 
With the inevitable rejecti-on of his demands by the Phliasian 
government, Agesilaos led his troops to the outskirts of the polis 
and began to construct a wall of encirclement. In a sentence of 
37xen. Hell. 5.3.10-13. Xenophon notes in classic understate-
ment that nv 0~ COT~ ~yncrtA~ &xeo]i€v~ TctUTCt. He also observes 
that the Phliasian democrats erred in believing that the Spartans 
would not attack because Agesipolis was absent. By 381, however, it 
is likely that any activity on the near side of the Isthmos was 
considered "local," so it would not be necessary for the other king to 
remain in Lakedaimon proper. In addition the Phliasian oligarchs had 
a long-standing relationship with Agesilaos' family. An elder 
oligarch had been Archidamos' ~{vos while Prokles, a younger man, 
was ~EVOS to Agesilaos. 
38xen. Hell. 4.4.15. 
39Rice, 178, suggests that 
the Phliasian democracy to offset a 
Agesipolis' partisans at Olynthos. 
evidence to support this assertion, 
Agesilaos was determined to 
more lenient settlement by 
There is, however, no real 
even if it is true. 
crush 
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remarkable candor Xenophon comes as close to censuring Agesilaos 
as he can bring himself by writing that many Lakedaimonians said that 
for the sake of a few, they were becoming hateful to a city of over 
5,ooo. 40 
Because the defenders would hold their assemblies in full view 
of the besiegers, a measure was needed to counter the effectiveness 
of their resistance. Agesilaos therefore urged the exiles to make 
common mess with any sympathizers from the city who might flee the 
walls. The exiles were to supply arms and training to these defectors 
41 
without regard to expense. iJhen over 1,000 Phliasians eventually 
joined the allied force, even those opposed to Agesilaos' designs were 
compelled to admit that he was a man of great political and tactical 
sagacity. 42 Moreover, the Phliasian defectors were seen as useful 
comrades in arms and the number of defenders had now fallen to 4,000. 
As the siege wore on, by the next summer (380) matters had 
begun to stagnate when news reached the army at Phlious of Agesipolis' 
death on the Pallene. Because of the kings' somewhat differing aims 
40 Xen. Hell. 5.3.16. Hertzberg, Das Leben des Agesilaos II, 
157, 329, believes that such overtly political advocacy by Agesilaos 
undercut any hope for a Panhellenic crusade against Persia, but see 
footnote 6 above. 
41 Xen, Hell. 5.3.16. 
42 Xen. Hell. 5.3.17. Legon, 333, n. 61, observes that the 
one thousand who eventually defected, compared with the original 
5,000 heads in the assembly, gives a rough ratio of oligarchs to 
democrats. 
and personalities, some expected Agesilaos to rejoice at the demise 
of a rival, but the elder king showed a sincere regret as he and 
Agesipolis had been personal friends. 43 
By the spring of 379, Agesilaos realized that the Phliasians 
were holding out longer than he had expected because the city had 
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laid in a sizeable supply of grain and had voted to cut daily rations 
in half.44 Another reason for the city's staunch defense was the 
leadership of Delphian and a group of 300 die-hard supporters.45 This 
group would sally forth at night from time to time to harass the men 
who were building the siege wall. Throughout most of the siege, they 
had also kept up the spirits of the other defenders in the face of 
the enemy and defections by friends of the oligarchs.46 At last, 
however, the shortage of food grew critical which forced the 
courageous Delphian to request safe conduct to Lakedaimon. He told 
43xen. Hell. 5.3.19-20; Diad. 15.19.3-4. Isokrates (4.126) 
bitterly denounces the Spartans for their simultaneous campaigns 
in 380 at Phlious and Olynthos. 
44Hell. 5.3.21. Legan, 333-34, suggests that the defenders' 
last chance for successful resistance collapsed with Agesipolis' 
death. Because the Phliasians may have hoped for an equitable settle-
ment had the younger king lived, Agesilaos perhaps sensed that their 
last reason for holding out died with Agesipolis. Nonetheless they did 
hold out until the following spring, nearly a year longer. 
45see Kirchner, RE 4.2, 2517. Delphian is unknown except for 




Agesilaos that his supporters wished to leave the city's fate in the 
hands of the Spartan authorities. Unfortunately Agesilaos saw through 
Delphian's ruse and resented the slight to his own authority. He 
therefore sent word to the Spartans that he be allowed to decide the 
defenders' fate,after which he granted Delphian safe conduct. 47 
The Phliasian leader must have suspected Agesilaos' deceit 
for he and a "marked desperado" who was a master thief escaped in 
the night. This escape occurred after Agesilaos had ordered tighter 
security to prevent such things. When the legates returned to Phlious 
with news that Agesilaos would determine the settlement, the city 
surrendered. Rather than risk opprobrium, Agesilaos decreed that a 
committee of 100 citizens, fifty exiles and fifty who had stayed in 
the city, decide who would live and who would die. Thus he assured 
a pro-Spartan oligarchy would take power since this committee would 
also draw up the laws by which the city would be governed. 48 In 
effect the Phliasians would impose the oligarchy on themselves under 
the watchful eyes of the harmost and garrison which Agesilaos had 
funded for six months. Thus ended the experiment in democracy in the 
second of the two anomalous cities in the Peloponnesos which had 
47xen. Hell. 5.3.23-24. 
48 Xen. Hell. 5.3.25. Legan, 334, believes that all 100 members 
of the committee were oligarchs. Ryder, 52, believes that 50 were 
democrats. 
built walls and evolved away from aristocracy. 49 After a twenty-
months' siege, Agesilaos disbanded the Peloponnesian levy and led his 
own men back to Sparta. 50 
Sparta and Greece in the Autumn of 379 
Virtually all ancient sources agree that with the conclusion 
of the campaigns against Olynthos and Phlious, Sparta stood alone and 
unchallenged, the most powerful by far of all the Greek states. ~qy 
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dissent or independent course within the Isthmos or beyond it had been 
neutralized or crushed. Her alliance with the Persian dynasty was 
intact, she enjoyed cordial relations with Makedonia and in the far 
West, Dionysios I of Syracuse was still firmly committed and on friendly 
terms.Sl Under Agesilaos' leadership the Spartans had chosen to inter-
pret the autonomy clause of the King's Peace in a manner expedient to 
49cawkwell, "Agesilaos and Sparta," ~ 26 (1976), 75, believes 
that the fate of Mantineia and Phlious was sealed because they stood 
in violation of the basic thrust of Peloponnesian life. Democracies 
in large, populated centers protected by walls were anathema to a 
landed aristocracy which relied on "traditional values" for internal 
stability and cooperation with the Spartan alliance (not fortified 
towns) for security from external threats. 
50Brief allusions to the Spartan suppression of Phlious also 
appear in Xenophon's Ages. 2.21; Isok. 4.126 and Diod. 15.19.3. 
Isokrates'use of the present tense to describe in 380 the simultaneous 
operations at Olynthos and Phlious is quite apt. 
51These alliances date, of course, to the end of the Korinthian 
War. See Bengtson, Staatsvertr~ge 2, 188-95. 
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their own purposes. Within the Peloponnesos recalcitrant or un-
enthusiastic states suffered chastisement. The form of this chastise-
ment was usually the imposition of a harmost and garrison, the in-
traduction of a / / ~aTptos ~OAtTEta and absorption into the 
Peloponnesian alliance. The only exception was Argos, but the dissolu-
tion of the Argive-Korinthian sympolity in 386 had left the Argives 
helpless and isolated. 
Beyond the Isthmos the Spartans used the threat of Persian 
help to dissolve by force hostile coalitions threatful to themselves 
/ 
as ~poaTaTat of Hellas. The first victims of this narrow and rigid 
interpretation were the Boiotians who were compelled in 386 to dissolve 
their league. Similarly the Olynthians' league was dismantled in the 
wake of friendly overtures to the Athenians and Thebans. In every in-
stance, the individual states made separate treaties with Sparta, not 
the Peloponnesian alliance.52 
As noted earlier, except for lack of a strong naval presence and 
garrisons in Asia, Agesilaos~ leadership came to resemble Lysander's 
and even more that of his older half-brother Agis. 53 He displayed a 
strong and consistent antipathy to the Thebans which culminated in the 
secret orders to occupy the Kadmeia. For Agesilaos mere dissolution of 
52 See Ryder, 54and note 6 above. 
53Agis had chastised and then absorbed Elis into the Pelopon-
nesian alliance while Herippidas had occupied Herakliea of Trachis 
before Agesilaos' accession; see ch. 2. A sharp point of difference 
between Agesilaos and Lysander was that Agesilaos did not attempt to 
install narrowly constituted cliques loyal only to himself as had 
Lysander after 404. 
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the Boiotian league was not enough; the Thebans must be brought to 
heel for their final affront in refusing under Ismenias and 
Androkleidas to participate in the Olynthian war. This action is 
perfectly consistent with the king's grudge against Thebes ever since 
the spoilt sacrifices at Aulis. 54 With the occupation of the Kadmeia, 
the reduction of Phlious and the dismemberment of the Chalkidic league, 
Agesilaos' politics and policy had come to full and triumphant frui-
tion. 
The best ancient assessments of the Spartans' overweening 
presence in the Greek world of 379 B.C. are three. Xenophon writes 
that the Thebans and other Boiotians were completely in the 
Spartans' control, that the Korinthians' loyalty was unswerving, that 
the Argives had been humbled and the Athenians isolated while pll 
recalcitrants in the alliance had been punished. He concludes his re-
view of the Spartan apxn with the following remark: navTanacrtv ~on 
""' ', ...... () ';)~' , ~ /e KaAWS Kal acr~aAWS n apxn EuOKE1 aUTOlS KaTacrKEUacr at ••• 55 
54 See ch. 3. 
55Hell. 5.3.27. Xenophon uses the irony of the EOOKEl to 
introduce his version of the liberation of the Kadmeia. The 
Olynthian-Athenian treaty of 383 was dissolved when the Spartans absorb-
ed the Chalkidic poleis into their &pxn. See Bengtson, Staatsvertrage 
2, 199, 201. This completed the Athenians' ~Pn~@cr8at by Sparta. 
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Isokrates also describes the nature and extent of the Spartan 
hegemony, but does so in largely disparaging tones. His purpose, 
especially in the Panegyrikos and the Peace, is to decry the Spartans' 
(and other Greeks') unsuitability to confront their despotic foes to 
the east. His writings also contain an occasional reference to the 
Spartans' subdued naval presence in the Aegean in the years after the 
King's Peace. 56 
Diodorus' evaluation of the Spartan hegemony is even more 
blunt than Xenophon's. His description of the extent of Spartan in-
fluence accords well with that of Xenophon, but he adds that the 
basis of their power was the other Greeks' fear of their military, 
might. 57 In his description of events in 377/76, Diociorus mentions 
that the Spartans controlled the Cycladic islands of Skiathos and 
Peparethos. 58 In addition Agesilaos had extended the net of Spartan 
influence, if not control, to Thessaly and Makedonia with the conclusion 
56Isok. 4.117, 121, 125-28, 132, 175. Lysias' Olympiakos of 
384 had similar sentiments. See note 6 and Grote, Vol. 9, 34, n.l; 
Busolt/Swoboda, 204; and Ryder, 4~ for date. 
57niod. 15.23.3-5. Part of the Spartans' strength in this 
~ Ephoran version lay in ~OAUavepw~ta but as noted earlier the 
Spartiate population during these years had actually declined. What 
Diodorus must mean, therefore, is that the Spartans relied on their 
perioikoi and helots. See Cartledge, 307, and ch. 2. 
58niod. 15.28.2, 30.5. Other allusions to a Spartan naval 
presence in the Aegean occur in Plut. Pelop. 15.1; Demosthenes' de falsa 
legatione 4.25; Xen. Hel~. 5.4.56 and Lak. Pol. 14.2,4. See also Parke, 
41, 73; and Cawkwell, 79, who remarks that Agesilaos never fully 
grasped the potential of sea power even when he was supreme commander 
by both land and sea in 395 (ch. 4). 
of the Olynthian campaign. 59 
Throughout the period from 386-379 B.C. there was some 
grumbling about Agesilaos' aims and methods. In general Agesipolis 
and his supporters tended to be more tolerant of democratic leanings 
in Spartan allies and were not eager to to interfere directly in the 
allies' internal affairs. 60 Also there were those who perhaps still 
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yearned to exploit the rich areas of Asia or, more altruistically, to 
free the Asian Greeks from Persian suzerainty. This last group, 
perhaps the remnants of Lysander's supporters, must have long since 
given up hope of recovering the pre-eminence enjoyed by Sparta in 
Greek Asia from 404-394. The accorr~odation reached with the Great 
King in 387 effectively precluded any such ventures for the foresee-
able future. 
Because Lysander had been dead for sixteen years in the 
autumn of 379, and Agesipolis had died a year earlier, we must con-
elude that the great majority of the Lakedaimonians supported the 
hegemony forged by the elder king. 61 In point of fact, not only the 
59 see the speech of the Thessalian Polydamas (Xen. Hell. 6.1.2) 
delivered in 374, but with retrospective allusions. Thessaly and 
Makedonia were not formally bound to Sparta, but to some extent they 
had accepted Spartan leadership and guidance. 
60see Cawkwell, 75-77; Rice, "Agesilaos, Agesipolis and 
Spartan Politics, 386-379 B.C.," Historia,23 (1974), 165; Smith, 279-
80 and Hamilton, 326-27,for the notion of three distinct factions com-
peting for power in Sparta after 404 B.C. 
61cawkwell, 78, speculates that Agesilaos perhaps acquiesced 
to Agesipolis' conduct of the Olynthian war because he and his 
supporters may not have been in full control after Teleutias' defeat 
King's Peace, which ceded Greek Asia to the Persians, but political 
realities precluded any sort of Lysian or Isokratean Panhellenism 
based on a crusade against the Great King. 62 
Sparta's hegemony in the fall of 379 seemed assured and 
Agesilaos' policies triumphant. Although her position was secure, 
it was not unassailable as events would soon make clear. The 
emergence of new coalitions and political alignments in Greece which 
led to the overthrow of the Spartan hegemony began with the libera-
tion of Thebes. 63 
The Liberation of Thebes, Dec. 379 B.C. 
Apart from the implications for the Spartans, the coup at 
Thebes in early winter 379/78 B.C. was one of the swiftest and most 
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remarkable turn of events in recent Greek history. No author, ancient 
or modern, has failed to compare it either with Phoibidas' exploit 
and death in 381. More to the point, however, is his remark, 77, 
~ 
that Agesilaos' ¢1A£Ta1p1a worked, where his opponents'toleration 
of democracies had failed. Smith, 278, notes that in 381 Agesilaos 
was unpopular with the allies, while Agesipolis was not, but correctly 
asserts that control of Spartan policy was still firmly in the elder 
king's hands. 
62Hertzberg, 157, 329, tries to show that Agesilaos' policies 
prevented such a crusade despite a sort of wistful longing for it in 
some quarters of Greece. In fact Agesilaos was far teo practical a 
man of affairs to be deluded about its impossibility. Cawkwell, 71, 
writes that there is no evidence that Agesilaos ever gave up his 
Panhellenism, but he simply faced the fact that in the 380's and 370's 
an anti-Persian crusade was unrealistic. See also note 6 above. 
63cartledge, 289-90, has remarked, "already, then, before 379, 
there were indications that the feet of the Spartan colossus might be 
in 382 or Thrasyboulos' restoration of the Athenian democracy in 403. 
Even the Lakonophile Xenophon felt compelled to write that justice 
was on the side of the Thebans. 64 
While Xenophon's is the only surviving account more or less 
contemporary with the events, his narrative is flawed in places and 
requires supplementation and correction by the much later versions of 
Diodorus and Plutarch. 65 
Because of vexation with Spartan behavior since 386, Athens 
provided fertile ground for a Theban counter-insurgency. As noted in 
chapter seven, 66 the Athenians favorably received some 300 exiles, 
of ceratliic composition. Within a decade, the feet had crumbled and 
the giant had been toppled from his pedestal. 11 
64 , Hell. 5. 4 .1. 
65 sch~fer, Die Berichte Xenophons, Plutarchs und Diodors 
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uber die Bestzung und Befreiung Thebens, 382-379 y_. Chr., Munich, 
1930, 19-22, 68-71, 73, 77, and Judeich, "Athen und Theben vom 
Konigsfrieden bis zum Schlacht bei Leuktra, 11 Rh.M., 76 (1927)., 172-80, 
discuss the difficulties in trying to reconst~ what happened from 
the divergent accounts preserved by our three principal sources. 
Sch~fer purports to see a Theban tradition stemming from the lost 
histories of Kallisthenes in Plutarch's Pelopidas and Daimonion of 
Sokrates. He also thinks Diodorus' version represents a balance of 
Theban and Athenian perspectives attributable to Ephoros. Xenophon, 
Sch~fer believes, writes in a moralistic vein, attempting to reconcile 
Athenian and Spartan viewpoints with a distinctly anti-Theban bias. 
This bias results in his omission of any mention of Epameinondas or 
Pelopidas. The weakness in Plutarch is that he neglects to note the 
Athenian role in the coup. Because of the tenuous nature of the evi-
dence, some of the details of this analysis have been challenged. See 
Pearson, The Lost Histories of Alexander, 32; and Jacoby, Fr.Gr.~. 
2B.2, 420-32. 
66xen. Hell. 5.2.31; Diad. 15.20.2. 
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whose leader was Androkleidas, colleague of the executed Ismenias, 
after the fall of the Kadmeia. Although Kallistratos of Aphidna's 
timorous pro-Spartan faction controlled the Athenian government, demo-
cratic and anti-Spartan elements abounded. For this reason, the 
refugees could expect to find aid and comfort,especially in view of 
67 Theban hospitality to 1brasyboulos' group in 404/03. 
Atnenian hospitality and Androklcidas' murder proved the 
catalysts necessary for a conspiracy. Leontiades' faction in Thebes 
ordered the murder of the exile leader and others, but the assassins 
failed except for Androkleidas. With the deaths of Ismenias and 
Androkleidas the anti-Spartan group, which favored a strong Boiotian 
league, was leaderless. Although many of the exiles were frightened 
and demoralized by the assassination, Pelopidas succeeded in keeping 
their spirits up. As the months turned to years, Pelopidas gradually 
emerged as the most prominent of the exiled patriots. Under his 
prodding the exiles slowly realized that they could not remain in 
Athens indefinitely. Both honor and expediency demand~d a bold stroke 
to expel the traitorous tyrants and Spartan garrison from their city. 
An opportunity arose when Phyllidas, a friend of the exile }felon, 
visited Athens and \vas won over. 68 Another Theban, Charon, whose 
name was grimly appropriate, shared Phyllidas' rev~lsion for the 
67 Rice, "Xenophon, Diodorus and the Year 379/78 B.C.," 
Yale Classical Studies, 24 (1975), 97-98, n.9, trenchantly dis-
cusses the significance of factional politics in both Athenian 
and Spartan affairs and their interrelation to one another. See 
also Judeich, 175-80. 
68
xenophon (Hell. 5.4.2)implies that Phyllidas was secretary 
to the polemarchs at the time of his visit. Plutarch (Moral. 595a-b, 
polemarchs and offered his house as a base within the city. 
After a day was set for the coup, the conspirators secretly 
left Athens to enter Thebes at nightfall. Pherenikos was left in 
charge of the bulk of the exiles at the frontier between Attika and 
Boiotia. With this group there was also a contingent of Athenian 
volunteers commanded by two strategoi. 69 The sequence of events for 
the next two or three days is quite confused and in places the 
testimony is contradictory. Numerous discrepancies of detail occur 
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in Plutarch and Xenophon's versions and there are even some differences 
. 70 between the two narratives of Plutarch. 
The time was December and the occasion was a festival of 
Aphrodite which coincided with the winter solstice. 71 The con-
spirators set out on foot, entered Thebes at dusk and assembled at 
Charon's house. 72 \Vhile their fellows and the Athenian volunteers 
Pelop. 7.1-3) writes that he contrived to become their secretary later. 
69 Xen. Hell. 5.4.3, 9; Plutarch __ (Pelop. 8.1), as noted above, makes 
no mention of this Athenian aid. 
70Grote, Vol. 8, 77-83,follows Plutarch for detail, noting where 
he differs from Xenophon. Beloch 3.2, 234-35, as Delacey and Einarson 
in the Loeb edition, 362-64, observes that the differences between 
Xencphon and Plutarch are irreconcilable. Schafer, 51-63, examines 
the matter in great detail as an exercise in Quellenforschung, but 
cannot establish with any certainty the merits of one version over 
another. See also Meyer, Vol. 5, 365, n.l. 
71 Dummler, RE 1. 2, 23 71 and Heyer, Vol. 5, 365. 
72According to Xenophon (Hell. 5.4.3), there were seven con-
spirators led by Melon. He assigns a lapse of two days from their 
massing at the frontier to the tyrannicide. Plutarch (Pelop. 8.1-
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waited at the border, 73 the conspirators made their final preparations 
for the deed. On the night of the festival Phyllidas arranged a 
dinner at the polemarcheion to celebrate the end of the tyrants' year 
in office. As Phyllidas had promised, a group of hetairai and komasts 
arrived after the meal. These of course were the disguised con-
spirators who, suddenly doffing their outer garments, stabbed 
Archias and Philippos to death. 74 A second group led by Pelopidas 
went to Leontiades' house, pretending to have a message from the 
polemarchs. Leontiades grew suspicious at the sight of the group, 
however, and reached for his sword. Despite a courageous effort, he 
was overwhelmed by the more numerous conspirators and killed. A third 
polemarch, Hypates, tried to flee across the rooftops near his house, 
but he too eventually perished at the hands of the liberators.75 
9.1) writes that there were twelve conspirators and that they entered 
Thebes disguised as hunters during an evening snowstorm with only one 
day between departure and deed. Xenophon's chronology is probably---
better. 
73since Plutarch specifies the Thriasian plain as the point of 
departure, the most likely sites would be the border fortresses of 
Eleutherai and Oinoe on the spurs of Mt. Kithairon. See Weisner, RE 
20.1, 1011-13; Princeton Encyclopedia, 70; and The Blue Guide to Gr;ece, 
209 with map. 
74xen. Hell. 5.4.6-7 ascribes leadership of the second group 
to Phyllidas. He cites no figures, but Plutarch (Moral. 596a-b, Pelop. 
9.1) states that the number of conspirators in the city eventually grew 
to forty-eight. 
75This detail is preserved only in Plutarch (Moral. 596 and 
Pelop. 11.6). 
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Pelopidas and Melon then proclaimed the tyrants' death and 
the liberation of the city while calling the citizens to assembly. 
They also sent for the rest of the exiles and the Athenian 
volunteers at the border after releasing all political prisoners in-
carcerated by the tyrants. Some Theban Lakonophiles with the Spartan 
garrison managed to barricade th~mselves on the Kadmeia during the 
. h . 76 uproar 1n t e c1ty. 
At daybreak the newly armed citizens and freed prisoners launch-
ed an assault on the Kadmeia. Two of the three Spartan commanders had 
sent an urgent request for help to Thespiai and Plataia during the 
night, but within a few days they agreed to surrender to the new govern-
ment in exchange for safe conduct. 77 As the Spartan garrison filed out 
of the city with the Theban Lakonophiles, o~ly the Athenians' inter-
vention cut short a massacre of those who had supported the tyrants. 
The survivors were then allowed to depart in peace with the 
Lakedaimonians. 78 
With the recapture of their city, the death or expulsion of the 
Lakonophiles and the departure of the Spartan garrison the Theban 
76 Xen. Hell. 5.3.8-10; Plut. Moral. 596, Pelop. 12.3-4. The 
number of those who fled to the Kadmeia was 1500. 
77 Xen. Hell. 5.4.10-12. A third officer chanced to be in 
Haliartos at the time of the coup, Plut. Pelop. 13, Moral. 597a. 
78xen. Hell. 5.4.12. 
patriots had ushered in a new era in the struggle for supremacy in 
Greece.79 Agesilaos' designs for hegemony were now in jeopardy. 
A rupture had appeared in his network of control beyond the Isthmos. 
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The simple expedient of manipulating opponents at home while imposing 
docile oligarchies in other poleis was shown to be not without serious 
risk. 80 Only a few months before the Theban coup, virtually all trace 
of dissent in European Greece had been silenced or crushed. Sparta 
stood at the zenith of her political and military ascendancy. Agesi-
laos, the architect of this pre-eminent position, appeared vindicated 
in fu11. 81 It is ironic, therefore, that the first fissure in the 
king's hegemony should occur with the success of his bitterest foes, 
the exiles of Thebes. 
79Diod0rus (15.23.1-3) gives a terse notice of the tyranni-
cide. In his version the tyrants were killed at home in their sleep. 
At dawn the citizens assembled and launched an attack against the 1500 
Spartans and Lakonophiles who had fled during the night to the Kadmeia. 
Nepos (Pelop. 2.1-4.1) also. summarizes the coup briefly. A final curt 
and rather garbled notice of the tyrannicide appears in Polyainos 
2.4.3, but for the historian's purposes, it is virtually worthless. 
8°Even Agesilaos' friend and admirer Xenophon (Hell. 5.4.1) 
adverts directly to the implications of the Thebans' success which he 
links closely to the eventual collapse of the Spartan hegemony. He 
cannot bring himself to credit the role played by Epameinondas and 
Pelopidas, however, which leads Schafer, 60-61, to speculate that 
Xenophon has set forth the official Spartan version of the coup. 
81
nespite appearances, Beloch 3.1, 146-47; Parke, 74; Cawkwell, 
80; and Cartledge,290,all note that Sparta's position was not as secure 
as it may have seemed in the autumn of 379. 
CHAPTER IX 
SPARTA'S RESPONSE TO THE THEB~~S, SPHODRIAS' RAID 
AND AGESILAOS 1 CM-rPAIGNS IN BOIOTIA, 378-377 ~.£_. 
By January of 378, the Theban Lakonophiles and the Spartan 
garrison in the Kadmeia had surrendered. With the departur~ of these 
people. Pelopidas, Melon and Epameinondas set about the business of 
forming a government in the city and ·reconstituting the Boiotian 
league. The ne':.v government 1 s first diplomatic initiative had been 
to dispatch a conciliatory legation to Sparta while the garrison 
was: still blockaded. The Spartans, however, rebuffed this overture. 1 
t-lith the rejection of the Theban embassy, Agesilaos easily 
persuaded the ephors to call out the ban. He decided this time (un-
like at Hantineia in 385 and Olynthos in 381) not to manipulate the 
young king but rather to decline the honor of command himself, citing 
his more than forty years of military service. 2 The real reason for 
1 ( . Isokrates Plat. 29) shows that the Thebans made this gesture 
in the hopes of avoiding a war. So soon after the coup, despite the 
aid of Athenian volunteers, they could not be sure of Athens' official 
support. Rice, "Xenophon, Diodorus, Etc.," 104, observes that Isokrates 
has deliberately distorted the purpose of this legation to put the 
Thebans in a bad light, but with Xenophon's testimony (Hell. 5.4.10-12) 
and that of Deinarchos (Contra Demosth. 38-39), Isokratesr-remarks 
confirm the unofficial participation of some Athenians in the coup. 
See also Sc~afer, 3.2, 324. Meyer, Vol. 5, 367-68, believes that the 
Theban embassy mentioned by Isokrates occurred after Kleombrotos' 
incursion. 
2xen. Hell. 5.4.14; Plut. Ages. 24.2-3; Died. 15.27.3. 
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his decision was concern that after his advocacy of the Philiasian 
oligarchs, he would again be seen as a friend of tyrants were he to 
take the field against the Thebans. 3 Moreover,there is evidence of 
great internal stress at Sparta immediately after the events at 
Thebes. 4 Bearing these things in mind and the fact that he was re-
nowned for his animosity against Thebes, Agesilaos stepped aside. 
3plut. Ages. 24.3. Agesilaos had seen to it that the ephors 
made the same demand of the Theban legates as they had of the 
Phliasians: restoration of the exiles. This naturally was the one 
condition Pelopides, Epameinondas and Melon could not agree to which 
made war inevitable. 
4After assuming command of the allied force, the young king 
Kleombrotos had two of the three officers in charge of the garrison 
at Thebes executed for failing to await reinforcements. One of these 
officers may have been Herippidas, a long time collaborator of both 
Lysander and Agesilaos. Plutarch (Moral. 597a) is our only source 
for the names of these officers, but his text is corrupt. Hertzberg, 
Das Leben des Agesilaos, 159,accepts the reading Herippidas as do 
Delacey and Einarson who provide a full discussion of the problem, 
Loeb Moralia, Vol. 7, 441, 509. Athenaios (Deipnosophistai 609b) in 
a discussion of beautiful women reports that Agesilaos contrived the 
execution of Xeinopeitheia and her daughter Chryse during a period of 
factional strife. Xeinopeitheia, reputedly the most beautiful woman 
in the Peloponnesos, was the wife of Lysandridas, one of the three 
officers in charge of the Kadmeia. Because he was away in Haliartos 
at the time of the garrison's surrender, he was spared the death 
penalty. Nevertheless the fine assessed against him was so ruinous 
that he chose exile rather than reduction in status to D~o~e(wv 
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At the time of the death of Xeinopeitheia and Chryse, Agesilaos was 
described as KaTacrTacrl~aas. See Meyer, Vol. 5, 367, n.l; Jacoby, 
Fr.Gr.R.,2B.l, 587 (fragment 240 Theopompos). Also at this time 
Agesilaos had the contents of Alkmene 1 s tomb at Haliartos transferred 
to Sparta upon oracular instigation. All that remained was a bracelet, 
a stone, two urns and a large bronze tablet inscribed with what seemed 
to be Egyptian hieroglyphics. Agesilaos ordered that copies of the 
inscription be sent to Nektanebis who became Pharoah in 380 B.C. He 
requested an interpretation, but no word is preserved of any response; 
see Plut. Moral. 577e. See also Pieper, RE 16.2, 2234 and Beloch, 
3.2, 123-24. The removal of Alkmene'S body and the substitution 
The internal wrangling at Sparta in the early weeks of 379 
made it clear that Agesilaos' strong anti-Theban policy had failed.5 
It was nonetheless incumbent upon the Spartans to make some sort of 
response to the Thebans' rejection of their demand to take back the 
exiles. Kleombrotos, the younger brother of Agesipolis, who had be-
come king upon the latter's death in 380, therefore obtained his 
first field command. 6 
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Kleombrotos led the allied army into Boiotia through the pass 
defended by the Athenian fortress of Eleutherai which was located 
some 17 km. south of Thebes.7 He carefully avoided a clash with 
Chabrias' Athenian peltasts, but turning west, he routed a group of 
Theban irregulars composed of the freed political prisoners. After 
passing through Plataia and Thespiai, he eventually reached Kynos-
of a stone for it are mentioned by Plutarch (Romulus 28.7), Pausanias 
(9.16.7) and Pherekydes (Jacoby, Fr.Gr.~. Vol. 1.1, 83, no. 84). 
Jacoby observes (Vol. 1.2, 307) that this anecdote appears in the 
earliest part of Pherekydes' work which deals with the Greece of myth 
and legend. 
5see Smith, "The Opposition to Agesilaos' Foreign Policy," 
282~ and Rice, "Xenophon, Diodorus, e.tc., " 105. 
6xen. Hell. 5.4.13-14; Plut. Ages. 24.2-3; Diod. 15.27.3. 
Hertzberg, 159; and Rice, 104-0S,have seen Agesilaos' decision not 
to take command as another instance of his strategy of allowing those 
opposed to him to bear the onus of carrying out his designs. In this 
view KleombrGtos' command would ease the vexation against Agesilaos, 
deprive his rivals of a strong leader and permit him to keep a close 
watch on matters at home. Finally, just as in 385 at Mantineia, if 
the youthful king were to falter, Agesilaos could come to his rescue. 
Should he succeed, he would merely advance the elder king's policy. 
See especially Rice, 105. 
7see Milchhofer, RE 5.2, 2345; The Blue Guide to Greece, 1978, 
kephalai before returning to Boiotia for sixteen days. 8 Because his 
was not a full levy, Kleombrotos merely reinforced Spartan outposts 
in Boiotia, such as Plataia and Thespiai, rather than attempting to 
force a pitched battle with the Thebans. 9 Although most strategic 
passes to the south were garrisoned by Athenians and the winter pre-
eluded adequate provisions for a longer campaign, his men were some-
'"hat puzzled \Vhen Kleombrotos ordered two-thirds of the force back to 
the Isthmos. 10 Before leaving Boiotia the young king had made 
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Sphodrias harmost at Thespiai, leaving him a sum of money for recruit-
ing mercenaries and one-third of the allied troops. 11 
In order to avoid entrapment between hostile Boiotian or even 
Athenian forces, Kleombrotos withdrew along the coastal road of 
Kreusis. After losing some animals and equipment during a violent 
storm near Aigosthena in the Hegarid, Kleombrotos disbanded the army 
and went home. 12 
363; and The Princeton Encyclopedia of Classical Sites, 368-69. 
8 Xen. Hell. 5.4.14-15. This transpired after the 
execution of the officers who had surrendered the Kadmeia. 
of the trial was Megarai Plut. Pelop. 13; Diad. 15.27.3. 
9 See Meyer, Vol. 5, 367-68. 
10xen. Hell. 5.4.16. 




xen. Hell. 5.4.17-18. Hammond, "The Main Road from Boiotia 
to the Peloponnese through the northern Megarid," ABSA,49 (1954), 103-
22, discusses the extremely rugged and at times hazardous topography 
of this coastal area. 
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During the incursion, \vhich his troops believed \vas 
lnconclusive, Kleombrotos accomplished the follo,..ring. First he 
executed two of the three officers who were present at the surrender 
of the Kadmeia and fined a third '''ho \vent into exile . 13 Also 
in passing through the Isthmos, his show of strength tempered the 
reaction of some Korinthians who were ready to revolt from the 
1] . 14 a 1.ance. Fin~lly his m3rch dramatically cooled the anti-
Spartan ardor of certain Athenians and induced the assembly to 
co;:1demn to death the t'vo generals who had aided the Theban uprising 
unofficially. One was in fact execcted, while the other fled into 
exile. At the same tine other pro-Theban citizens faced trial on 
lesser charges. 15 
Attika 
~hile Kleombrotos' army was penetrating central Greece as 
far as Kynoskephalai, Agesilaos sent a legation to Athens '.vhose mission 
13see Pltlt. Pelop. 13, ~!oral. 597a; Diod. 15.27.3. 
14xen. Hell. 5.4.19. 
15Plut. Pe!E.E_. 14.1. Rice, "Xenophon, Diodorus, etc.," 
97, n.l, believes that Kallistratos of Aphidna's mildly pro-Spartan 
party instigated these trials to conciliate Agesilaos, whose legates 
arrived in Athens at this time to urge neutrality. See Hertzberg, 
162-63, and Rice, 111. 
''as to discourage any aid to the The ban insurgents. Kallias, the 
Spartans' proxenos at Athens, received the three legates Etymokles, 
Aristolochos and Okyllos at his home. 16 As noted above, the arrival 
of these legates and Kleombrotos' s,.,rift mid,.,rinter march induced the 
assembly to condemn the two adventurous strategoi to death. 17 Thus 
the Spartans' initiatives in the wake of Pelopidas and Melon's coup 
were at least partially effective. Although they had net ~2gdined 
control of the Kadmeia, they had shmm the rest of the Greek ~.,rorld, 
especially the Athenians, that they were prepared to maintain the 
order imposed with the King's Peace by force if need be. 18 Despite 
the elder king's diplomacy and Kleombrotos' show of strength beyond 
the Isthmos, a series of events set in motion by the harmost at 
Thespiai would make war once again inevitable in Gr£ece. 
Shortly after Kleombrotos' return to Sparta and the trial of 
the strategoi at Athens, Sphodrias set out from Thespiai at sunset 
16 Xen. Hell. 5.4.22. 
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17Hertzberg,l63, has observed that Agesilaos was responsible 
for this mission because Etymokles, the chief legate, was one of his 
partisans; see Xen. Hell. 5.4.32. It is possible that the Thebans' 
conciliatory, though failed, legation to Sparta dates to the aftermath 
of Kleombrotos' incursion; see note 1 above. 
18Agesilaos' interpretation of the autonomy clause worked with 
special severity against the Thebans and the Boiotian league (see 
ch. 7) in part because of his hostility to the Thebans, but also be-
cause he perceived the threat posed to Spartan supremacy in central 
Greece by a united Boiotia. There is evidence that shortly after the 
tyrannicide at Thebes, Pelopidas and the other leaders had swiftly 
taken steps to revive the Boiotian league; see Plut. Pelop. 13.1, Moral. 
597a; Polybios 6.43, 44.9; and Paus. 9.1.5. Plutarch notes 
in order to capture the Peiraeus. By daybreak he had led his troops 
~0 1 h . . . f El . ' h Th . . 1 . 19 some ::> r<m. to t e VJ.cJ.nJ.ty o eus1s 1n t e r1as1an p a1n. 
Unfortunately for his intentions, he was still 20 km. short of the 
harbor. In anger and frustration he pillaged a few houses and seized 
some cattle before retreating to Thespiai. ~~en a general alarm 
was sounded in Attika, the hoplites and other citizens naturally 
rushed to repel what they thought was a major invasion. As the truth 
became apparent, the Athenians dispatched legates to Sparta with a 
demand for an explanation and justice. The Spartans, however, had 
anticipated this reaction, having laid capital charges against 
Sphodrias. Realizing the enormity of his error, the harmost chose to 
disregard the ephors' summons in fear for his life. 20 
That Sphodrias' raid was even undertaken points up the 
difference in purpose between Agesilaos' partisans and those of 
that the citizens' assembly elect~d Melon, Pelopidas and two others 
Boiotarchs, not polemarchs, for 378. At first the Thebans were 
largely alone except for their alliance with the Athenians (see 
below), but by 376 they had restored most of the Boiotian league with 
the expulsion of the last Spartan garrisons. See Busolt/Swoboda, 
1423-24 and Meyer, Vol. 5, 380-81. 
19This is the figure cited by Beloch 3.1, 147 which can be 
obtained by consulting topographical maps such as that of the Blue 
Guide to Greece, 1978 ed. Cary, CAR 6, 66-67, gives the distance as 45 
miles, a rather large figure, and he believes that the march may have 
started at Plataia. See also n. 25. 
20 Xen. Hell. 5.4.20-24; Plut. Ages. 24.3-6; Pelop. 14.1-3; 
and Kallisthenes fr. 9 in Jacoby, Fr.Gr.~., Vol. 2B.l, 643; Jacoby, 
Vol. 2B.2, 418, does not allude to the possibility that Sphodrias 
acted on Kleombrotos' orders. 
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Kleombrotos. Xenophon and Plutarch21 explain the raid as the result 
of Sphodrias' foolish vanity and a bribe offered by an agent of Melon, 
Pelopidas and Gorgidas. According to this version the Theban agent 
convinced Sphodrias that not only was such a feat possible, 22 but 
>vere the harmost to bring it off, his renown >vould eclipse even that 
of Phoibj das >vho had seized the Kadmeia in 382. Thus fired by ambition 
and idle hopes, Sphorlr;a~ made his ill-fated attempt. 23 
As soon as the danger had passed, the Athenians arrested the 
three legates sent by Agesilaos to assure the Athenians' neutrality 
and urge the prosecution of the two strategoi.24 Etymokles was able 
to persuade his captors, however, that the legates were innocent of 
any complicity in Sphodrias' attack. With assurances that the culprit 
would be punished, the legates were set free. 25 
21Hell. 5.4.20-21; Ages. 24.3, Pelop. 14.1, where Plutarch 
clearly paraphrases his sourc~ Xenophon. See Meyer, Vol. 5, 369, n.l. 
22The agent noted that the Athenians would be caught completely 
una>vare and that the "long walls" running from the Peiraeus to the city 
as yet had no gates (Hell. 5.4.20). See also Meyer, Vol. 5, 369. 
23nespite its superficial plausibility, virtually no one has 
accepted at face value the explanation for the raid advanced by Xenophon 
and Plutarch. See Meyer, Vol. 5, 369; Beloch, 3.1, 147, n.l; Grote, 
Vol. 7, 86; and Rice, 114. 
24xen. Hell. 5.4.22. 
25xen. Hell. 5.4.23. There is some doubt as to both the 
feasibility of Sphodrias' attempt and its date. Disregarding the 
distances, terrain, or difficulty of night marches, Rice, 116, n.52 
believes that it was feasible. A careful consideration of topography, 
however, taken with the ancient estimates of Sphodrias' character 
(see note 20), shows that except by horseback, it \vould be arduous 
to get from Thespiai (or Plataia) to the Peiraeus overnight. See 
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Because the explanation set forth by Xenophon and Plutarch 
for Sphodrias' raid is plainly inadequate, it is necessary to consider 
the much different reason advanced in the Ephoran tradition of 
Diodorus.26 Although his chronology is clearly erroneous and his 
placing of Athens' first official aid to Thebes is out of sequence, his 
explanation for Sphodrias' raid is surely correct. 27 He writes very 
)/ ) \ "I I s ~ ' \ "' ~ ~ I 
simply that STrSlO"E:V etU'TOV KI'.S01J OO'tOS o SetGlAE:US 'TWV JlCY.K"S6Ct11JOVlWV 
>! 0. / "' l / ./ \_ "' avsu 't11S yvw11ns -rwv E¢opwv Ket'taA.aBEa8cn -rov ITs 1 pen a. 
Because Sphodrias had a good deal of money to recruit 
mercenaries, it is likely that bribery would be ineffective. Also, 
\vith a third of Kleombrotos' levy28 under hig,.. command, one can surmise 
that more than just the garrisoning of Thespiai \vas intended. In any 
case a major figure in Sparta was certainly behind Sphodrias' rash 
decision to invade Attika. Because Agesilaos' diplomacy in Athens 
Beloch, 3.1, 147,and Meyer, Vol. 5, 369. While neglecting to mention 
that people returning to Athens at sunrise from the Eleusinian mys-
teries (Plut. Ages. 24.7-8) gave the alarm, Rice, 117, n.54, is surely 
correct in dating the raid to early or mid-~1arch. The mysteries, a 
cult whose original purpose was to insure good crops, were celebrated 
just before the vernal equinox. See Stengel RE 5.2, 2332, \vho dates 
the Eleusinia to the period comprising 28 Hekatombion to 12 
Boedromion. 
26Diod. 15.29.5-7. 
27Grote, Vol. 7, 86; Meyer, Vol. 5, 369, n.9; and Fiehn, RE 3A.2, 
1749-50, are cautious in accepting Diodorus' explanation. Beloch,~.1, 
147, n.l, believes that Kleombrotos' complicity is sehr moglich, while 
Rice, 114, insists that it is the only possible reason, based on his 
hypothetical reconstruction of factional wrangling in Sparta. In addi-
tion to misdating these events to 377, Diodorus also erroneously places 
Demophon's expedition to aid the Thebans before Sphodrias' acquittal. 
28There is no evidence about the number of Kleombrotos' troops; 
232 
had been effective since the primary focus of his concern was the The-
ban coup, it is highly unlikely that the decision ~;.;ras his. If \var \vere 
necessary to subdue the Boiotians, it cannot have been his purpose to 
provoke the Athenians or drive them into the Boiotian camp. Since 
Plutarch explicitly writes that Sphodrias belonged to the group in 
Sparta opposed to Agesilaos, the combined literary evidence about the 
harmost's situation points ultimately to Kleombrotos' responsibility 
for his subordinate's move. 29 
As we have seen, the news of Sphodrias' fiasco induced the 
ephors to lay a capital charge against him even before the Athenians 
. d 30 arr~ve to protest. Also Agesilaos would have taken a dim view of 
however, as Eudamidas took 2,000 soldiers to Potidaia in 382 before 
Teleutias arrived with the full levy of 10,000, Kelombrotos likely 
had 2,000 or perhaps 3,000 for his midwinter incursion. Thus 
Sphodrias with as many as 1000 soldiers in Thespiai had far more 
than needed to garrison effectively the town and money to recruit more! 
See ch. 7, n.44. 
29 I Plut. Ages. 24.4. Despite Lysander s death nearly seventeen 
years earlier, Rice,ll4~15, believes that Sphodrias was a Lysandrian, 
that Kleombrotos ordered the attack to bolster his prestige after 
failing to retake the Kadmeia and because the young king believed the 
raid was feasible. Meyer, Vol. 5, 369, writes that Sphodrias (who 
disliked Agesilaos) was a member of Kleombrotos' group. Both 
Kleombrotos and Sphodrias likely underestimated the difficulty of the 
project, but decided to make the attempt because some Spartans 
genuinely feared a revived Athens in alliance with Thebes. This 
interpretation accords very well with the evidence, while obviating 
the need to posit a tripartite ideological struggle in Sparta. One 
need only remark that some Spartans understood better than Agesilaos 
the importance of seapower; see below. 
30 Xen. Hell. 5.4.24. 
of Sphodrias' efforts, knowing that a full-scale invasion of Boiotia 
would be necessary to crush nascent resistance to Sparta's influence 
beyond the Isthmos. Because he eventually moved to acquit 
Sphodrias, 31 even though admitting his guilt; a reason must be 
sought for his change of heart. Xenophon and Plutarch32 write that 
it ~vas because of Archidamos' advocacy. Archidamos, Agesilaos' son, 
and Sphodrias' son ~vere J ewers. In this version, Archidamos per-
suaded his father to have mercy on the culprit. Since Sphodrias 
had formerly been a good soldier, Agesilaos finally acquiesced, 
noting that the state could not afford to waste the life of a man of 
proven worth. 
His son's pleas perhaps moved the elder king, but a more 
likely explanation for his volte-face was news brought back from 
Athens by Etymokles: Kallistratos' mildly pro-Spartan faction would 
be unable to contain the surge of anti-Spartan fervor unleashed by 
Sphodrias' egregious assault. 33 
As noted earlier, the swift retribution against the officers 
in charge of the Kadmeia showed that Agesilaos was not at all loathe 
31xen. Hell. 5.4.34; Plut. Ages. 26.1, Pelop. 15.1; Diod. 
15.29.6. 
32Hell. 5.4.25-32; Plut. Ages. 25.1-5. 
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33xenophon (Hell.5.4.23)writes that Etymokles, Aristolochos and 
Okyllos were released after giving assurances that they knew nothing 
of Sphodrias' attack and that he would be tried for his life. Since 
Etymokles was Agesilaos' personal friend, it is quite likely that 
he returned quickly to Sparta with ner,rs of the Athenians' mood -
a decidedly ugly one regarding the Spartans. 
to countenance death or exile, even if he did not press for them 
personally. Moreover, he was not above procuring the execution even 
34 of offending women. In order to compose internal dissension in 
the face of a combined Athenian and Theban threat, Agesilaos, having 
decided that Athens was lost, voted to acquit the guilty Sphodrias. 
Since Sphodrias was a partisan of Kleombrotos, as a conciliatory 
gesture, unlike Phoibidas, he was not even fined. 35 
~nen the report of Sphodrias' acquittal reached Athens, what 
Agesilaos anticipated was not long in coming. The sudden surge 
of anti-Spartan rancor moved the assembly to declare the Spartans 
f I - 36 in violation o the King s Peace. For several years the Athenians 
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had been conducting quiet diplomacy in the Aegean. inus it is unlikely 
34
see note 4 above for a discussion of Agesilaos' role in the 
decision to execute the two officers present when the Kadmeia 
garrison surrendered and to exile a third who chanced to be in 
Haliartos. Also Agesilaos had the wife and daughter of the exiled 
officer killed during a period of factional strife immediately after 
the Spartan garrison surrendered (Jacoby, Fr.Gr.~ .• Vol. 2B.l, 587 
under Theopompos ). 
35
xen. Hell. 5.4.34; Plut. Ages. 26.1, Pelop. 15.1. Diodorus 
~5.29.6)writes that the two kings cooperated to obtain his unjust 
acquittal. Hertzberg, 163-66, observes that ultimately both kings 
and their partisans desired Sphodrias' acquittal for the sake of 
unity in the face of impending war. Meyer, Vol. 5, 378, surmised 
that Agesilaos thought Sphodrias' acquittal would not measurably 
affect Sparta's relations with Athens. Smith, 281, is probably 
closer to the mark when he suggests that Agesilaos did realize how 
the Athenians would react, but underestimated the vigor and sericus-
ness of their response. 
36Diod. 15.29.5. 
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that the turn of events in lakedaimon caused the Athenians to offer 
alliance to any polis disenchanted with the Spartans, but it seems to 
have accelerated an existing trend. 37 The most weighty results of 
Sphodrias' acquittal were the Athenians' treaty with Thebes and the 
. f h . d . . 1 38 creat1on o t e1r secon mar1t1me eague. 
The return of Etymokles' legation to Sparta with news that 
popular support for the pro-Spartan Kallistratos was crumbling 
likely induced Agesilaos to seek reconciliation with those opposed to 
his aims in Sparta. 39 It was necessary for him to settle internal 
wrangling as his long military and political experience surely told 
him that war was corning. Because he did not fully appreciate the 
role of seapower in statecraft, he probably decided that Athens was 
lost. His long-standing antipathy to the Thebans surged to the fore. 
as an opportunity arose for him to take the field against them (and 
37For evidence of Athenian diplomatic initiatives before 378, 
see Tad, GHI, Vol. 2, 56-72 and Bengtson, Staatsvertrage 2, 206-14. 
38Besides the more detailed accounts of Xenophon (Hell. 5.4.34), 
Plutarch (Ages. 26.1, Pelop. 15.1) and Diodorus' chronologically mis-
placed narrative (15.26), Aristeides(258)and Polybios(9.23.7)also recall 
the Sphodrias affair and its consequences. Epigraphical evidence for 
the defensive pact between Athens and Thebes appears in Tad, GHI, Vol. 
2, no. 123 and Bengtson, Staatsvertrage 2, 203-06. 
39Rice, 97, n.9 and 123-24, in his complicated reconstruction 
of factional politics in Athens and Sparta in this period believes 
that Kallistratos was unable to check the Athenians' fury at the 
official sanctioning of Sphodrias' attack implicit in his acquittal. 
As a result his pro-Spartan clique was voted out of power and the 
Athenians prepared to go to war against the Peloponnesian alliance. 
See also Meyer, Vol. 5, 369. 
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their new Athenian allies) in Boiotia for the first time since the 
summer of 394. The collapse of the faction loyal to him in Athens 
tvas perhaps regret table, but the chief order of business \vas to 
prevent a revival of the Boiotian league and to chastise the anti-
Spartan group. 
The recently concluded defensive pact with Athens guaranteed 
tl1at the Thebans would not stand alone. Diodorus' misplaced passage 
shows that the Athenians' preliminary expedition to Boiotia consisted 
of 5.000 n,en. 40 In addition, the pro-Boiotian party in Athens came 
. . . . h. b 'ld. f- 41 to pm.;er, set tJ.ng :tn mot~on a mass:tve s :tp- u:t :tng e tort. With 
chr: d.::pacture of De:nophon's 5,000 men the assembly voted a full 
- '1. . 42 d 1' . . . 1' . f s h d . ' k nobl 1zat:ton an , rea 1z1ng tne 1rnp :tcatlons o. Lp o rlas attac·, 
or~ered the long walls to be fitted ~ith gates. There was a resurgence 
of Athenian influence in the Aegean when the Athenians undertook 
exte:;sive operations against Sparca by sea. 43 By the summer of 378 
40Diod. 15.26. Schafer., 74-75; Rice, 124; Seager, "The King's 
Peace and the Balance of Pmver in Greece, 386-362 B. C.," Athenaeum, 
52 (1974), 47; Grote, Vol. 8, 96-97; Beloch, 3.1, 150; and Neyer, 
Vol. 5, 366, n.2, all note the impossibility of Demophon's march 
occurring before the Sphodrias affair. 
41 Xen. Hell. 5.4.34. 
l;2 
Diodorus (15.29.7) puts the strength of the full mobilization 
at 20,000 troops, 500 horsemen and 200 ships. Polybios (2.62.6), 
however, cites a more realistic figure of 10,000 troops and 100 ships. 
Kirchner~ RE 5.1, 152, no. 6, observes that Demophon and Chabrias~ by 
attacking the Peloponnesians from Thebes in the summer of 377, forced 
Agesilaos to retreat (Schol. Aristeid. Panath. 173.11). 
4~ ~Isok. Plat. 9. 
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many Greeks Hho tvere ouL of sympathy \·lith the Spartans fell away from 
the Peloponnesian alliance to join the Athenians. 44 
If Agcsilaos believed that the Athenian reaction to Sphodrias' 
acquittal would be of l1ttle consequence, he would appear to have mis-
calculated. Nonetheless Kleombrotos' indecisive incucsion, Sphodrlas' 
misadventure, and Demophon's preliminary expedition in the early 
spring combined to revive confidence in the elder king. Faced with 
the hostile alliance of Athens and Thebes the Spartans turned to 
' • 
1 f h. b '1' . h t=. ld 45 ~~esl~aos cr 1s proven a 1 1ty 1n t .e .1e . He responded with 
enthusiasm to the call, waiving his prior cl2iw of age, but insisted 
on bringing to completion the r~organization of the alliance's 
military structure begun in 382. 46 Greece had been divided into ten 
administrative rlistricts as the full allied levy under Agesilaos showed. 
The army Has coc;:posed of ten contingents \vhich included the Lake.daimon-
ians, Arkndians, Eleians, Achaians, Korinthians, :t-1egarians, Sikyonians, 
~- 47 
Phiiasians, Phokians, Lokrians, Olynthians and l'hracians. The rate 
44 . Plut. ~elop. 15.1. 
'+5xenophon (Hell. 5. 4. 35) Hrites that the Spartans thought 
Agesilaos would conduct the war cj>pOVll-l~TE:pov av o¢ (al TOU KAt:opSpOT01J. 
Diodorus (15.30). notes the Spartans' choice was based on Agesilaos' 
courage, intelligence and energy. He also tvrites that the Spartans 
took a much more lenient and conciliatory stance to many Greek cities 
because of wide-spread defection to Athens' new maritime league and 
the renascent Boiotian confederacy. 
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of cornmutation for poleis not ~.;ishing to contribute soldiers was t~vo 
/ ~1AOl equalled one hoplite,while one horseman was the equivalent of 
four hoplites. The daily pay was set at three Aiginetan obols per 
h 1 . 48 op 1te. 
lfhen the army marched against Phlious many allied soldiers 
grumbled about the Spartans' incessant demands on their manpower 
evidently to indulge Agesilaos' support of exiled tyrants. 40 This 
time Agesilaos retorted to their complaints with the following device. 
He ordered every tradesman to rise upon hearing the name of his craft 
called out by a herald. In time nearly the entire allied army was 
on its feet except the Spartans. The reason was that Spartans were 
forbidden by a Lykourgan rhetra from learning any trade but war. 50 
Thus despite the allies' muttering, Agesilaos maintained that Sparta 
provided more real soldiers than any allied polis or all of them 
together. 51 
h~en the full levy assembled for the march north under 
Agesilaos, there were over 18,000 soldiers and 1,500 horsemen. Before 
securing the area of Mt. Kithairon, Agesilaos had ordered the warring 
48 Xen. Hell. 5.2.21, 6.2.16. Hertzberg, 166, believes that 
Agesilaos had a hand in this. Since the project had begun with the 
war against Olynthos, Agesilaos was in fact the architect of the re-
organization. Grote, Vol. 8, 102-05, discusses at length the 
similarities to Athens' fifth-century maritime ~PXn See also 
Busolt/Swoboda, 712-13. 
49see ch. 8, note. 40. 
50P1ut. Lyk. 24.2. 
51P1ut. A 26 3 5 M 1 ?08 P 1 . 1 1 7 ~· . - , • ora . _ e; o ya1nos ,_, .. 
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poleis Kleitor and Arkadian Orchomenos to cease hostilities at once 
f . 5? or ace occupat~on. - He then ordered the mercenaries serving these 
tmms to occupy the Kithairon passes. ~fuen this had been done, he 
1 d h f 1 Th . . b . h. . 53 e t e army sa e y to esp~a~ to eg~n ~s summer operat~ons. 
That Agesilaos failed to anticipate the vigor of the Athenian 
response to Sphodrias' acquittal soon became evident. As soon as the 
allied army set up camp near Thespiai, 5000 soldiers and 200 horsemen 
under Chabrias arrived to aid the Boiotians who ~.;ere commanded by the 
Boiotarch Gorgidas. 54 
In revie'tving Agesilaos' two incursions into Boiotia, an attempt 
to reconcile t~vo rather divergent traditions is needed. The authors 
~.;ith the most extended accounts differ significantly in emphasis and 
detail. As in the case of the disparity between the Oxyrhynchos 
historian's description of the Asian campaign in 395 and that of 
Xenophon55 and the somewhat incongruent reports of Xenophon and 
Plutarch on the liberation of Thebes, 56 some analysis will be 
necessary for an accurate reconstruction of the campaign. As in the 
52 see Geisau, RE 11.1, 611-13,and the Princeton EncYclopedia, 
458 for Kleitor. For Arkadian Orchomenos see Muller-Graupa, RE 18.1, 
88-90,and the Princeton Encyclopedia, 653-54. --
53 Xen. Hell. 5.4.36-38. 
54Diod. 15.32.5; Polyainos 2.1.2. 
55 see chs. 1 and 4. 
56 see ch. 8. 
240 
earlier instances information from other authors can supplement or 
confirm material from the major sources. In the diagram which follows, 
events of the first incursion of 378 are distinct from those of the 
second in 377. It is necessary to bear in mind throughout the follow-
ing discussion that Diodorus has erroneously ascribed both incursions 
to 377. His confused chronology need not reflect, however, on the 
57 
accuracy of the operational detail that he presents. 
The Campaign of 378 
Xenophon, Hellenik~ 5.4.36-46: 
First Phase: 
1) Pacification of Kleitor and 
Orchomenos from Tegea. 
2) Occupation of Mt. Kithairon 
3) Arrival at Thespiai. 
4) missing 
5) Agesilaos lays waste to the 
land outside the ditch and stock-





3) 18,000 soldiers and 1500 
horsemen arrive at Thespiai. The 
army rests for a few days. 
4) 5,000 soldiers and 200 horse-
men under Chabrias arrive from 
Athens. 
5) Theban and Athenian forces oc-
cupy a fortified hill 3~ km. from 
city. Agesilaos' peltasts try to 
draw out defenders, but are pushed 
back. 
57 See Heyer, Vol. 5, 365, n .1, and Be loch, 3. 2, 234. 
6) Theban cavalry suddently charges 
allied cavalry and peltasts. Hop-
lites and main allied cavalry 
wheel about and rout the Thebans. 
Some losses on each side. 
7) In a sally at da~vn, Agesilaos 
attacks an unguarded segment of 
stockade, burning some of the 
enclosed land up to the city's 
walls. 
8) missing 
9) Agesilaos returns to Thespiai 
and replaces Sphodrias as harmost 
with Phoibidas. 
10) Agesilaos disbands army at 
Megara and returns to Lakedaimon. 
11) missing 
Second Phase 
12) Phoibidas harasses the 
Boiotians from Thespiai. 
13) Thebans retaliate by march-
ing out in full strength. 
14) Phoibidas' peltasts hem in 
and thrust back the Theban 
phalanx. 
15) Thebans regroup in a ravine 
and make a sudden assault against 
allied peltasts. After Phoibidas 
dies,the rest of the allied 
troops retreat within the walls 
of the city. 
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6) Well disciplined display on 
hill by Chabrias' peltasts in-
duces Agesilaos to abandon ef-
forts to force a pitched battle. 
7) Agesilaos orders allies to 
plunder all areas outside city and 
hill, thus gathering a great deal 
of booty. 
8) Advisors chide Agesilaos f~r 
not attempting to force a major 
battle despite his superior num-
bers. The king retorts by claim-
ing victory, since the enemy did 
not defend his fields and crops. 
9) Agesilaos returns to Thespiai 
and makes Phoibidas harmost. 
10) Agesilaos disbands army at 
Megara and returns to Lakedaimon. 
11) Chabrias has statues of him-
self erected in Athens to celebrate 
his success against Agesilaos. 
Second Phase 
12) missing 
13) Thebans attack Thespiai, but 
fail to dislodge the Spartans. 
14) missing 
15) Phoibidas rashly counter-
attacks and loses 500 allied lives, 
including his own. 
16) Anti-Spartan exiles find re-
fuge at Thebes. Thebans, re-
kindling their courage, make 
raids against other poleis 
occupied by Spartans. 
17) Lakedaimonians suffer losses 
at Tanagra, where Panthoidas is 
killed, and at Plataia. New 
polemarch with mora arrives to 




Plutarch (Pelop. 14.1-5) mentions the Spartan difficulties at 
Plataia and Tanagra, and records the death of Panthoidas. For the 
campaign of the following spring, the chart appears as follows: 
Xenophon, Hellenika 5.4.47-55, 58. 
1) Agesilaos orders Thespian har-
most to occupy Kithairon. 
2) Agesilaos proceeds to Plataia, 
feigns a march to Thespiai, but 
turns to Erythrai instead. 
3) missing 
4) Peloponnesians pass the stock-
ade at Skolos and ravage fields 
east of Thebes as far as the allied 
city of Tanagra. 
5) Deceived Athenians and 
Boiotians at Thespiai wheel about 
to the east and occupy a hill to 
await the allied army. 
6) Agesilaos, however, marches 
against the unguarded city of 
Thebes. 
7) Athenians and Boiotians 
rush to the city's defense and 
skirmish with allies. 
Diodorus 15.34.1-2: 
1) missing 
2) and 3) Agesilaos is prevented 
from ravaging the land by Theban 




6) Sporadic Athenian and Boiotian 
efforts to harass the Lakedaimonian 
invaders occur. 
7) Sortie of Athenians and Boiot-
ians in full strength from the 
city results in a struggle from 
which Agesilaos suddenly with-
draws.58 
58see note 42 for Demophon's participation in this sortie. 
8) Agesilaos occupies the hill 
abandoned by the Athenians and 
Boiotians. Next morning he sets 
out for Thespiai. 
9) Harassed by Chabrias' peltasts, 
the king orders the Olynthian 
cavalry to attack. The peltasts 
are driven off and suffer some 
losses. 
10) At Thespiai, Agesilaos corn-
poses factional strife, ~vithdraws 
the army to ~1egara and disbands it. 
11) Agesilaos suffers severely 
swollen leg (phlebitis?) at Megara. 
Efforts to reduce the swelling by 
opening a vein almost cause his 
death. He is carried back to 
Sparta and remains bed-ridden for 
the rest of 377 and into the 
following year. 
12) After departure of allied 
army, some Boiotians captured en 
route to buy grain at Pagasai 
escape prison in Oreus and lead 
an anti-Spartan uprising. A 
permanent grain supply is there-






A glance at the diagram reveals a distinctly different tone 
and emphasis in ~vhat each author presents. The gaps in Diodorus' 
version of the second march result from overcompression and the mis-
apprehension that both marches occurred in 377. Xenophon, of course, 
interpreting events from a Lakedaimonian perspective, is at pains not 
to criticize his friend, benefactor and hero Agesilaos. 59 It is not 
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59
cawkwell, 63-64, and Rice, 95-96, have thus accurately charact-
erized Xenophon's relation to Agesilaos. 
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surprising that he should try to minimize the Boiotian and Athenian 
success in resisting Agesilaos' numerically superior forces. 
Similarly he highlights his old friend's tactical accomplishments, 
h .l . h f h. d . 60 w 1 e suppress1ng t ose o 1s a versar1es. Although Diodorus' 
epitome of Ephoros is sometimes careless or superficial, it has the 
virtue of not being obviously biased in favor of Agesilaos and 
the Spartans. Not being under such a constraint, Diodorus more 
accurately and impartially describes the Lakedaimonians' failure 
to regain control of central Greece. Even Xenophon could not ob-
scure the fact that the Spartans' only success was to restrict 
temporarily the Boiotians' food supply. The revolt of Oreus, 
however, in the northern tip of Euboia ( F 377 ) reversed even this 
h . 61 ac 1evement. 
Regarding the campaign of 378, Xenophon is silent about 
Chabrias' 5,000 peltasts and 1,500 horsemen. Their presence is attest-
ed nonetheless not only by Diodorus, but Polyainos62 and Nepos. 63 
60see also the remarks on Xenophon's historiography in ch. 1. 
This case is not the same as that involving the battle of Sardis. In 
the earlier instance, Xenophon appears to have had only partial and 
somewhat faulty information from which to reconstruct his account. 
In the case of the Boiotian campaigns of 378/77, however, he is clearly 
trying to construe as favorably as possible an essentially inconclusive 
effort. 
61 Xen. Hell. 5.4.56 
62Polyain. 2.1.2. 
63chabrias 1.1-3. 
Xenophon may be exaggerating the size of the area included by the 
ditch and stockade which the Thebans built to protect their grain 
and livestock. A sudden allied sortie could have damaged such 
supplies and caused a loss of some animals, but Diodorus is probably 
right to emphasize Agesilaos' wide-ranging pillage and large yield 
of booty.64 The slightly outnumbered Thebans and Athenians relied 
on the walls and fortified salients in the field for defense. 65 It 
should be noted that Agesilaos' tactics, as described by Diodorus, 
are entirely consistent with his hugely successful Asian campaign. 
Also Diodorus is likely correct to mention the criticism leveled 
against the king by his advisors for not bringing about a decisive 
confrontation.66 Some of the blame rests with the defenders who 
naturally were unwilling to risk a pitched battle while their de-
fenses were sound. Although he does not mention the stockade, 
Diodorus' account more reliably conveys the desultory and indecisive 
nature of the incursion. 
After recounting Agesilaos' withdrawal, Xenophon attempts to 
portray Phoibidas in more favorable tints than he perhaps deserves. 
64xen. Hell. 5.4.38; Diod. 15.32.6. 
65oespite Demophon's 5,000 soldiers, Chabrias' 5,000, 1,500 
horsemen and perhaps 3,000 to 5,000 Boiotians, the Peloponnesian levy 




Diodorus states only that a Theban assault on Thespiai failed, but 
that Phoibidas' ill-considered counterattack caused his own death 
and that of 500 allied soldiers. 67 Xenophon admits that the Thebans 
took heart at Phoibidas' death and Plutarch supplies the reason. 
Under Pelopidas' leadership, a Boiotian force also killed Panthoidas, 68 
harmost of Tanagra and forced the Lakedamonians to ~vithdra~,r from 
Plataia. These reverses ornmpted the Spartans to fortify Thespiai 
with a polemarch and mora. 69 
In the spring of 377 Agesilaos once again tried to subjugate 
the Boiotians. Xenophon writes that the king ordered the polemarch 
at Thespiai to prepare a market for the army in order to deceive the 
Athenians and Boiotians. As soon as word reached him that the market 
was ready, Agesilaos led the troops directly east from Kithairon in-
stead of march~ng north to Plataia and Thespiai. His destination was 
Erythrai, 70 and en route he passed by the stockade at Skolos which the 
Thebans had deserted. 71 The purpose of this feint was to draw the 
defenders to the west of Thebes, while the allies pillaged to the east 
67Diod. 15.33.5-6. 
68This was the officer sent to relieve Klearchos at Byzantion in 
402. He then defeated Klearchos in battle when the latter resisted be-
ing replaced. See Diad. 14.12 and Schaefer, RE Vol. 18.2, 776-77. 
69xen. Hell. 5.4.46; Plut. Pelop. 15.4-5. 
70
see Philippson, RE 3A.l, 575, and Princeton Encyclopedia, 993. 
71Geyer, RE 3A.l, 567,and Polyain. 2.1.11. 
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as far as Tanagra. 72 Xenophon offers as proof of the ruse's success 
the undefended stockade at Skolos. According to Diodorus' more cursory 
version, the defenders had fortified many more locales in the country-
side during the winter. Agesilaos, realizing this, decided to turn 
his attention to another part of Boiotia which he had not plundered 
during the first incursion. Also he would naturally have wanted to see 
whether he might retrieve the situation in Tanagra after Panthoidas' 
death. Diodorus implies nonetheless that necessity as much as cunning 
dictated Agesilaos' course.7 3 
The Thebans formed up at the base of a hill called the 
\ ypaos 
to confront the allies. 74 Agesilaos again supposedly de-
ceived the Boiotians by marching on a nearly undefended Thebes. ln 
this interpretation the Boiotians abandoned their hill in a panic to 
prevent the fall of the city. In the ensuing skirmish.both sides 
suffered some losses, but the allies were able to continue their march 
westward. 75 Chabrias' mercenaries harassed the allied rear until 
Agesilaos ordered the Olynthian cavalry to repel them. Apart from the 
account of the tyrannicide, this is Xenophon's only reference to 
Athenian support of the Boiotian cause.76 
Diodorus, however, preserves a different tradition in which the 
72 Xen. Hell. 5.4.47-49. 
73niod. 15.34 .1. 
7 4rn Polyainos ( 2. 1. 12) and Front inus ( 1. 4. 3), this feature is 
called the "Seat of Rhea." 
75xen. Hell. 5.4.50-54. 
76xen. Hell. 5.4.55. 
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Boiotians, having forced Agesilaos to withdra~.;r to the ~vest, erected 
a trophy after a successful sortie from the city. In this version 
the Boiotians and Athenians had prevented the Peloponnesians from 
pillaging west of Thebes, but once again had striven to avoid a 
pitched battle. \fuat could have changed the defenders' tactics \.;rould 
have been an assault on the city. Agesilaos perhaps reached such a 
decision because of the fortified hills to the west of the city. Also 
frustration at being limited to pillage and awareness of his advisors' 
criticism in 378 likely caused him to order a direct attack on Thebes 
as the best way to force a confrontation. 
\-lith these things in mind after his inconclusive campaign near ..._ 
Tanagra, the king made his move. He may have believed that the city 
itself was undermanned because of the defenders' efforts to fortify 
the terrain to the west. 77 The sudden eruption of a sizeable force 
from within the walls revealed to the king his error in judgment. To 
avert a rout he quickly trumpeted a retreat. Because they controlled 
the field, the Thebans erected a trophy in the retreating Peloponnesians' 
wake.78 
After this description of matters on land, Diodorus turns his 
attention to naval affairs. Xenophon, however, notes that Agesilaos 
ended the civil strife in Thespiai, thus preventing a slaughter of 
h . s f . 79 t e ant~- partan act~on. Perhaps word of this strife induced the 
77This is what Xenophon reports (Hell. 5.4.51). 
78Diod. 15.34.1-2. 
79Hell. 5. 4. 55. 
king to cut short his efforts to recover Tanagra, since civil 
violence in a tmro occupied by a Spartan mora did not augur ~vell for 
allied cause. Also since the winter the Thebans had provided refuge 
for anti-Spartan groups from all Boiotia. 80 Though his assault on 
Thebes had failed, the king isolated the Thespian insurgents, thereby 
protecting his line of retreat. 
Despite Xenophon's best efforts, the central futility of the 
two incursions and the Thebans' victory in the one major encounter 
emerge clearly from the sum of the evidence. The last mat'ter dis-
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cussed before Agesilaos' illness and brush with death was the disband-
81 ing of the army at Megara. 
After the soldiers had gone home, Agesilaos left the temple 
of Aphrodite in Hegara one day and was mounting the steps to the 
archeion when he was stricken with severe cramps in his good leg. 
Inflammation and swelling soon set in, so a Syracusan physician 
opened a vein. The surgeon, however, was unable to stanch the flmv 
of blood and Agesilaos fainted. Before the bleeding stopped, the king 
almost died. His aides had to carry him back to Lakedaimon where he 
80xen. Hell. 5.4.46. 
8lxen. Hell. 5.4.55. Although Xenophon's Hellenika and 
Diodorus are our chief sources for the two Boiotian incursions, 
allusions to these operations also appear in Xenophon's Agesilaos 
2.22, Plutarch's Agesilaos 26.2-3, and a series of anecdotes preserved 
in Polyainos' Strategemata. Items 2.1.2, 18 and 21 seem to refer to 
378, but 2.1.9, 20 and 25 could describe events in either year. In 
general they tend to confirm the desultory and ineffectual nature of 
the Spartan efforts. Grote, Vol. 8, 121, n.l,and Cartledge, Sparta 
and Lakonia, 290-91, both discuss these anecdotes briefly. 
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remained bedridden for months and ~vas unable to resume command of 
11 . d . . h . 82 a le operatlons ln t e sprlng. 
It is perhaps ironic that physical disability should occur 
just as the cornerstone of Agesilaos' hegemony was crumbling. The 
rivalry between the king and the navarch who gave his name to the 
defunct peace flared up again. Antalkidas chided Agesilaos after his 
return from Boiotia for violating a clause in the ~rear rhetra 
of Lykourgos. This clause forbade campaigning too often against the 
same foe lest that foe learn the art of successful warfare. 83 
Because he had failed to retrieve matters in Boiotia, Agesilaos 
cannot have missed the aptness of Antalkidas' remark. Although the 
most important factor in their success was the alli2nce with Athens, 
the Boiotians proved themselves a match for the Spartans because 
Agesilaos underestimated the vigor of the Athenians' response. The 
reason for this response was that the Athenians considered the Peace 
of Antalkidas no longer binding after Sphodrias' acquittal. 84 
Even before Agesilaos' protracted illness, the underpinnings 
of his hegemony had been loosened. Unrest in poleis garrisoned by 
82 Xen. Hell. 5.4.58; Plut. Ages. 27.1-2. 
83Plut. Ages. 26.2-3; Moral. 189f. 213f and 217e. In some of 
these citations Agesilaos is represented as wounded ( TIAny{vTa Dnd 
"' .> , GnSatwv EV ~ax~ ), but this is a confusion of the events of 377 
with the battle of Koroneia in 394. This injunction appears in 
Plutarch's Lyk. 13.5, Moral. 227c; and Po1yainos 1.16.2. 
84see Aristeides 173.5-15 and 258.10. 
Sparta, defection to Athens' new maritime league of cities allied to 
Sparta, and the revival of the Boiotian league all signalled a pro-
found shift in Greek political realities. As in the Chalkidike with 
Teleutias' death and the liberation of Thebes, Agesilaos' purpose 
suffered a setback. Major responsibility for directing the affairs 
of state fell to Kleombrotos. Agesilaos' illness was perhaps pro-
vidential; he suffers a six years' absence from our sources, not 
reappearing until the peace conference just before the battle of 
Leuktra (summer 371). 85 It is possible that Kleombrotos and his 
partisans might have increased their prominence in affairs of state 
even if Agesilaos had remained healthy. His lack of naval sense 
and ingrained hostility to Thebes weakened his perception of the 
threat posed by a revived Athenian league. If so it is again ironic 
that the 10,000 Athenians on land precluded his success in Boiotia. 
Agesilaos likely realized too late the reason for his failure to 
retrieve the situation in central Greece. 
It is fitting, therefore, that political ascendancy in 
Lakedaimon should pass to a group that did recognize the seriousness 
of Athens' maritime threat. When Agesilaos re-emerged into full 
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light of history, his homeland stood on the brink of its greatest 
single disaster, the defeat at Leuktra. The Spartans never recovered 
from this setback and were reduced to the role of minor local contender 
in Greek affairs. From 371 to his death in 360 Agesilaos' role in the 
85see Hertzberg, 173-74 and Smith, 282-84 with notes. 
state had changed dramatically from the days when the Spartan 
hegemony stood at zenith - the hegemony of which he had been both 
architect and koryphaios. 
252 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Accame, Silvio. Ricerche intorno alla guerra corinzia, Naples, 1951. 
Anderson, John K. Hilitary Theory and Practise in the Age of 
Xenophon, Berkeley, 1970. 
"The Battle of Sardis in 395 B.C.," California 
Studies in Classical Antiquity, 7 (1974), 27-53. 
Andrewes, Antony. "Two Notes on Lysander," Phoenix, 25 (1971), 206-226. 
Barber, Godfrey L. The Historian Ephorus, Cambridge, 1935. 
Barbieri, Guido. Conone, Rome, 1955. 
Bayet, Jean. Litterature Latine, Paris, 1965. 
Beloch, Karl J. Griechische 9eschichte, 4 Vols., Berlin, 1927 (2nd ed.). 
Bengtson, Hermann. Die Staatsvertrage des Altertums, 3 Vols., Munich, 
1962. 
Blass, Friedrich. Die attische Beredsamkeit, 2 Vols., Berlin, 1874. 
Bloch, Herbert. "Studies in Historical Literature of the Fourth 
Century B.C.," Athenian Studies Presented toW. S. 
Ferguson, Harvard, 1940, 303-341. --- -
Barker, C. "Konig Agesilaos von Sparta und der Artemis-Tempel in 
Ephesos," Zeitschrift filr Papyrologie und Epigraphik, 
37 (1980), 69-75. 
Brown, Truesdell. The Greek Historians, Lexington, Mass., 1973. 
Bruce, I.A.F. "Internal Politics and the Outbreak of the Corinthian 
War," Emerita, 28 (1960), 75-86. 
"The Democratic Revolution at Rhodes," Classical 
Quarterlv, 11 (1961), 166-170. 
An Historical Commentary on the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, 
Cambridge, 1967. 
Bruns, Ivo. Das literarische Portrat der Griechen im funfte und 
vierte Jahrhunderts vor Chris~Geburt, Hildesheim, 1961 
(repr. of 1898 ed.).-
253 
254 
Buckler, John. "The Alleged Theban-Spartan Alliance of 386 B.C.," 
Eranos, 78 (1980), 179-185. 
Busolt, Georg. "Der Neue Historiker und Xenophon," Hermes, 43 (1908), 
179-185. 
Busolt, Georg and Swoboda, Heinrich. Griechische Staatskunde, 
2 Vols., Munich, 1926. 
Cartledge, Paul. Sparta and Laconia: A Regional History, 1300-362 
!·~··Boston, 1979. 
Cavaignac, E. "Les dekarchies de Lysandre," Revue des Etudes 
Historiques, 90 (1924), 285-316 . 
. "A propos de la bataille du torrent du Nemee," Revue 
--------des Etudes Anciennes, 27 (1925), 273-278. 
Cawkwell, George L. 
394 B.C.," 
"A Note on the Herakles Coinage Alliance of 
Numismatic Chronicle, 16 (1956), 69-75. 
"The L:TN Coins Again," Journal of Hellenic Studies, 
83 (1963), 152-154. 
"Agesilaos and Sparta," Classical Quarterly, 26 (1976), 
62-84. 
"Review of Sparta's Bitter Victories," Classical Review, 
30 (1980), 242-244. 
Champers, James T. "On Messenian and Laconian Helots in the Fifth 
and Fourth Centuries B.C.," The Historian, 40 (1977), 271-285. 
Cloch~, Paul. La Politique f"trang~re ;!_' Athenes de 404 ~ 338 ~·~·, 
Paris, 1934. 
Cornelius, F. "Die Schlacht bei Sardis," Klio, 16 (1932), 29-31. 
Delacey, Phillip and Einarson, Benedict. Plutarch's Moralia, 15 Vols., 
Harvard (Loeb Classical Library), 1959. 
Delbrilck, Hans. "Antike Kavallerie," Klio, 10 (1910), 335-340. 
I ' Delebeque, E. Essai ~ la vie de Xenophon, Paris, 1957. 
Dippel, Rheinhard. Quae ratio intercedat inter Xenophontis historiam 
Graecam et Plutarchi vitas quaeritur, Gissen, 1897. 
Drerup, E. "(<Hpt!Joou7 1n::p\ TIOA.l TE{as," Studien zu Geschichte und 
Kult;r des Aitertums, Paderborn, 1908. --
Dugas, Charles. "La Campagne d'Ag~silas en Asie Mineure (395)," 
Bulletin de Corr:spondance Hell~nique, 34 (1910), 57-95. 
Ed~;.;ards, I.E.S. and Hammond, :~.G.L., eds. The Cambridge Ancient 
History, 12 Vols., Cambridge, 1964-.--
Ehrenberg, Victor. The Greek State, London, 1969 (2nd ed.). 
Finley, }1.1. The Use and Abuse E.£ History, New York, 1975. 
255 
Frazer, J.G. Pausanias' Description £i Greece, 6 Vols., London, 1898. 
Garo~~~. Percy. ~History of Ancient Coinage, Chicago, 1974 
(repr. of 1918 ed.). 
Gemme, Arnold, Dover, Kenneth J. and Andrewes, Antony. An Histor-
ical Commentary££ Thucydides, 5 Vols., Oxford, 1956-1981. 
Grenfell, Bernard P. and Hunt, ArthurS., eds. The Oxyrhynchos Papyri, 
48 Vols., London, 1898-1981. 
Griffith, Guy T. "The Union of Corinth and Argos," Historia, 1 (1950), 
236-256. 
"The Greek Historians," Fifty Years (and Twelve) of 
Classical Scholarship, (M. Platnauer, ed.), Oxford, 1968. 
Grote, George. ~History of Greece, 10 Vols., London, 1888. 
Hamilton, Charles D. Sparta's Bitter Victories, Ithaca, New York, 1979. 
Hammond, N.G.L. "The Main Road from Boeotia to the Peloponnese 
Through the Northern Megarid," Annual of the British School 
at Athen~, 49 (1954), 103-122. 
Hammond, N.G.L. and Scullard, H.H., eds. The Oxford Classical 
Dictionary, Oxford, 1970 (2nd ed~ 
Hampl, Franz. Die griechischen Staatsvertrage des vierte Jahrhunderts 
vor Christi Geburt, Leipzig, 1938. 
Hatzfeld, Jean. "Notes sur la chronologie des Hell~niques," Revue 
des Etudes Anciennes, 35 (1933), 387-409. 
Les Helllniques de Xenophon, Paris, Ed. Bud~, 1939. 
Hertzberg, Gustav F. Das Leben des Agesilaos II~ Sparta, Halle, 1856. 
Hill, G.F. Greek Historical Coins, Chicago, 1976 (repr. of 1906 ed.). 
256 
Jacoby, Felix. Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker, 3 Vols.: 
1-2 Berlin, 1923-30; 3 Leyden, 1940. 
Jenkins, G. Kenneth. Ancient Greek Coins, New York, 1972. 
Judeich, 1-lalther. "Athen unci Theben vom K"onigsfrieden bis zum 
Schlacht bei Leuktra," Rheinisches Huseum ~ Philologie, 
76 (1927), 171-197. 
Kagan, Donald. "The Economic Origins of the Corinthian \.Jar," 
Parola del Passato, 16 (1961), 321-341. 
"Corinthian Politics ~uJ tlte Revolution of 392 B.C.," 
Historia, 11 (1962), 447-457. 
Koenen, Ludwig. "Papyrology in the Federal Republic of Germany and 
Fieldwork of the International Photographic Archive in Cairo," 
Studia Papyrologica, 15 (1976), 39-79. 
Kraay, Colin and Hirmer, ~L~x. Greek Coins, New York, 1966. 
Kromayer, J. and Veith, G. Schlachten-atlas zur antiken Kriegsgeschichte, 
Hunich, 1922. 
Kromayer, J. Antike Schlachtfelder, 4 Vols., Berlin, 1931. 
Larsen, J.A.O. "The Early Achaean League," Studies Presented to 
David~- ~obinson, 2 Vols., (G. Mylonas, ed.), St. Louis, 
1953. 
Greek Federal States, Oxford, 1968. 
Legon, Ronald. "Phliasian Politics and Policy in the Early Fourth 
Century B.C.," Historia, 16 (1967), 324-337. 
Lenschau, Thomas. "Die Sendung des Timokrates und der Ausbruch des 
Korinthischen Krieges," Philologische Wochenschrift, 47 
(1933), 1325-1328. 
Lesky, Albin. Geschichte der Griechischen Literatur, Munich, 1971. 
Lins, Hermann. Kritische Betrachtung der Feldzuge des Agesilaos in 
Kleinasien, Halle, 1914. 
Martin, Victor. "Sur une interpretation nouvelle de la Paix du Roi," 
Museum Helveticum, 6 (1949), 127-139. 
Meiggs, Russell and Lewis, David. A Selection of Greek Historical 
Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century~.~., Oxford, 1971. 
Meyer, Eduard. Theopomps Hellenika, Hildesheim, 1965 (repr. of 1909 ed.). 
----------· Geschichte des Altertums, 5 Vols., Stuttgart, 1958 
(6th ed.). 
Nunro, J .A. R. "Dascylium," Journal of Hellenic Studies, 32 (1910), 
57-67. 
Niese, Benedict. "Agesilaos," Paulys Realencyclopadie der 
classischen Altertumswissenschaft 1.1, Stuttgart, 1893, 
796-804. 
Olmstead, Albert. A History of the Persian Empire, Chicago, 1948. 
Oppolzer, Theodore. Canon of Eclipses, Harvard, 1962. 
Parke, Herbert W. "The Development of the Second Spartan Empire," 
Journal of Hellenic Studies, 50 (1930), 37-79. 
Greek Hercenary Soldiers, Oxford, 1933. 
257 
Parke,Herbert W. and Wormell, Donald E.W. The Delphic Oracle, 2 Vols., 
Oxford, 1961. 
Pearson, Lionel. The Lost Histories of Alexander, New York, 1960. 
Perlman, S. "The Causes and Outbreak of the Corinthian War," 
Classical Quarterly, 14 (1964), 64-81. 
"Athenian Democracy and the Revival of Imperialist 
Expansion at the Beginning of the Fourth Century B.C.," 
Classical Philology, 63 (1968), 257-267. 
Prentice, W.K. "Themistogenes of Syracuse: An Error of a Copyist," 
American Journal of Philology, 68 (1947), 73-77. 
Pritchett, William K. "The Battle Near the Nemea River in 394 B.C.," 
Studies in Ancient Greek Topography, 2 Vols., Berkeley, 1969, 
74-84. 
Rahe, Paul. Lysander and the Spartan Settlement, 407-403 ~.f., Yale, 1977. 
Ramsay, W.M. The Historical Geography of Asia Minor, Amsterdam, 1962. 
Rice, David G. "Agesilaos, Agesipolis and Spartan Politics, 386-
379 B.C.," Historia, 23 (1974), 164-182. 
"Xenophon, Diodorus and the Year 379/78 B.C.," Yale 
Classical Studies, 24 (1975), 95-130. 
Why Sparta Failed: ! Study in Politics and Policy from 
the Peace of Antalcidas to the Battle of Leuctra, 387-371 ~.f., 
Yale, 1977. 
258 
Rose, H. J. ~Handbook of Greek Literature, New York, 1960. 
~Handbook of Latin Literature, New York, 1960. 
Rossiter, Stuart. The Blue Guide to Greece, London, 1977. 
Ryder, T.T.B. Koine Eirene, Oxford, 1965. 
Schafer, A. Die Berichte Xenophons, Plutarchs und Diodors uber die 
Besetzung und Befreiung Thebens, 382-379 ~· Chr., Munich, 1930. 
Seager, Robin. "The King's Peace and the Balance of Power in Greece, 
386-362 B.C.," Athenaeum, 52 (1974), 36-63. 
Seager, Robin and Tuplin, Christopher. "The Freedom of the Greeks 
of Asia," Journal of Hellenic Studies, 100 (1980), 141-154. 
Smith, R.E. "The Opposition to Agesilaos' Foreign Policy, 394-371 
B.C.," Historia, 2 (1954), 274-288. 
Sordi, Marta. "A Proposito di uno scritto politico del 401-400 a.c.," 
Rivista di Filologia, 33 (1955), 175-198. 
Stillwell, Richard, ed. The Princeton Encyclopedia of ClassicAl 
Sites, Princeto;:-1976. 
Tod, Marcus. A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions, 2 Vols., 
Oxford, 1968. 
Tritle, Lawrence A. "Review of Sparta's Bitter Victories," Classical 
Philology, 76 (1981), 234-237. 
Volquardsen, C.A. Untersuchungen uber die Quellen der griechische und 
sizilische Geschichte bei Diodor XI-XVI, Kiel, 1868. 
Wade-Gery, Henry T. "Kritias and Herodes," Classical Quarter+y, 
39 (1945), 19-33. 
Walbank, Frank w. An Historical Commentary on Polybios, 3 Vols., 
Oxford, 1957-79. 
Walker, E.M. The Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, Its Authorship and Authority, 
Oxford, 1913. 
Wesenberg, B. "Agesilaos im Artemision," Ze:ttschrift fur Papvrologie 
und Epigraphik, 41 (1981), 175-180. 
Westlake, Henry D. "Individuals in Xenophon's Hellenica," Essays on 
Greek History and Greek Historians, New York, 1969. 
"Decline and Fall of Tissaphernes, 11 Historia, 30 
(1981)' 257-279. 
259 
Hilcken, U. ''Zur Entstehung und Zweck des K:'6nigsfriedens," 
Abhandlung der Preussischen Akademie, phil.-hist. Klasse, 
no. 15 (1941), 4-11. 
Hissmva, G., Hittelhaus, K., Ziegler, K., eds. Paulys Realencyclopadie 
der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, Hunich, 1894-1978. 
Ziegler, Konrat. Der Kleine Pauly, Lexikon der Antike, 5 Vols., 
Hunich, 1964-1975. 
APPROVAl .. SHEET 
The thesis submitted by James G. DeVoto has been read and approved 
by the follo>Ving committee: 
Dr. Leo H. Kaiser 
Professor, Classical Studies, I .. oyola University of Chicago 
Dr. James G. Keenan 
Professor and Chairman, Classical Studies, 
Loyola University of Chicago 
Dr. John F. Makowski 
Associate Professor, Classical Studies, Loyola University 
of Chicago 
Rev. Joseph S. Pendergast, S.J. 
Professor, Classical Studies, Loyola University of Chicago 
Dr. George J. Szcmler 
Professm~. History, Loyola University of Chicago 
The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and 
the signature which appears below verifies the fac:t that any ne.::essary 
changes havc:~ been incorporated and that the thesis is no'W· given final 
appx-nval by the Committee with reference to content an.d form. 
The thesis is therefore accepted jn partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, 
.1 ].. /J; ._ R (9 [- r ----~--·--------------
Date 
260 
